BIOLOGICAL WARFARE LAB CAPABILITY INTO THE AOR 31 DEC 90

File: 123096_sep96_decls26_0003.txt
Page: 0003
Total Pages: 4

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE LAB CAPABILITY INTO THE AOR  31 DEC 90       

Unit: OTSG        

Parent Organization: HSC         

Box  ID: BX003201

Folder Title: CONFIRMATION OF ATTACK WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS                                                  

Document Number:          3

Folder Seq  #:         17




                                                    UNCLASSIFIED




                 (5)  @ Would degrade USAMIID BW identification
         capability during the most critical time period, Jan - Mar 91.

         2. Option 2.

             a.   (U) Place comprehensive BW identification capability in
         the two AOR labs for clinical decision making and screening
         environmental samples (Encl).

             b.   (U) Maintain capability for definitive analysis of BW
         samples at U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
         Disease (USAMRIID). The USAMRIID results would be able to
         withstand the most severe, worldwide, scientific scrutiny.

             C. (U) Advantages

                 (1) (U) Definitive BW analysis capability is established
         in the AOR for rapid initial assessment of potential BW attack.

                 (2) (U) Rapid assessment in AOR will permit defensive and
         appropriate measures to be taken against the identified BW threat.

                 (3) (U) Time for initial assessment is not dependent upon
         turn around time of CONUS lab analysis and reporting to AOR.

                 (4)  @ Maintains CONUS worldwide scientific community
         accepted capability to analyze BW samples and provides data through
         intelligence channels to NCA. Does not degrade USAMRIID analysis
         capability.

                 (5)  @ Technical Escort has established procedures for
         expeditious chemical/biological warfare sample shipment to CONUS.

                 (6)  @ Option 2 can be implemented in the AOR on or about
         15 Jan 91 provided country clearances and priority transportation
         for personnel and equipment/supplies are obtained expeditiously
         (Encl).

                 (7) (U) Civilian scientists not required for analytical
         tasks in AMR.

             d. (U) Disadvantages

                 (1) (U) Requires long distance transport of samples to
         CONUS labs.

(2) (U) Response is limited by long distance
         communication.
           @"msmwtoA,.
         3.t-@ option 2 provides greatest flexibility, a redundant
         capability, and most effectively supports the CINCCENT and NCA.
         Recommend Option 2 for implementation.

                                            2

                                      'ULIU@ UNCLASSIFIED

Document 4 f:/Week-36/BX003201/CONFIRMATION OF ATTACK WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS/biological warfare lab capability into the aor :12179609281927
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-36
Box ID = BX003201
Unit = OTSG
Parent Organization = HSC
Folder Title = CONFIRMATION OF ATTACK WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Folder Seq # = 17
Subject = BIOLOGICAL WARFARE LAB CAPABILITY INTO THE AOR
Document Seq # = 3
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996