COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 11TH MARINES 13 MAR 91

File: 970725_dec96_decls29_0011.txt
Page: 0011
Total Pages: 61
Subject = COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  11TH  MARINES  13 MAR 91                    

Parent Organization = SECDEF      

Unit = HQMC        

Folder Title = 11TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  JAN  FEB  91  SEC 1 OF 2                                       

Document Number =          1

Box ID = BX600135




                                     UNCLASSIFIED


          division target list  based on current Iraqi positions.

              In addition to the four division fire support plans during the
          months of January and February, the division FSCC also assisted in
          the development of a fire support plan for TF XRAY's hel4borne
          assault into blocking positions on the division's right +lank past
          the second obstacle belt (published 192200C Feb 91). This plan
          included a target list and schedule of -Fire to suppress enemy
          positions along the flight corridor to the landing zones. It also
          included schedules designed to suppress the enemy during the
          vulnerable period when the task force was initially getting
          organized on the ground.

                                          RAIDS


              During January and February, tie Ist MarDiv conducted a number
          of raids (attached) as a part of its deception/etmbiguity
          operations. The PSCC Target In-Formation Officer, working in
          conjunction with the G-2 Target Intelligence Officer, was critical
          in the selection of high value targets for engagement. The
          Electronic Warfare 0-Fficer assisted in coordinating radar jamming
          support for the raids and the division air section coordinated
          support packages which included a combination of the following:
          MEDEVAC with escort; fast FAC coverage; FLIR aircraft; jammer
          aircraft; attack aircraft =overage, and CIFS aircraft.

              Some of the earlier raids caused the enemy to respond with
          counter battery fires after which the FAC-A would direct attack
          aircraft onto the target for engagement. Later raids did not
          elicit the same enemy response as he apparently became aware of the
          division's tactics. The final raid of 10 Feb was an illumination
          only raid, designed to make ttie enemy believe the artillery
          illumination was actually that being dropped by a@.rcraft to evrde
          missile fire. It was felt that ttiis would elicit an enemy response
          to which attack aircraft on station could respond to.
          Unfortunately, there was no enemy response. The raids assisted in
          ambiguity operations, enabled the division to retain the ii-iitiative
          during pre-ground operations and engage high value targets.

                                        TARGETIN{3


              The ultimate aim of the division's targeting effort was the
          destruction of the Iraqi soldiers' will to fight. Within this, the
          focus was to eliminate or reduce Iraqi capabilities and systems
          upon which they were most reliant. The destruction of artillery
          systems, which formed the backbone of the Iraqi defenses and were
          capable of dF--Iivering chemical Munitions, was critical to the
          success of the division's overall scheme of maneuver.
          Specifically, the precedence for engagement c7+ targets during
          offensive operations was as follows:

                  1. NBC delivery means aiid munitions sites

                  2. Fire Support (MRL's long range systems (>25K), SP



                                                                  ENCLOSURE (1)


                           UNCLASSIFIED