COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 11TH MARINES 13 MAR 91

File: 970725_dec96_decls29_0009.txt
Page: 0009
Total Pages: 61
Subject = COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  11TH  MARINES  13 MAR 91                    

Parent Organization = SECDEF      

Unit = HQMC        

Folder Title = 11TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  JAN  FEB  91  SEC 1 OF 2                                       

Document Number =          1

Box ID = BX600135



                                   U'NCLASSIFIED



          quick-fire net using latitudes and longitudes,   who in turn would
          direct Close Air Support (CAS) aircraft to the   target. 17 targets
          were engaged by CAS aircraft on 24 February using the quick-fire
          link from the CDC to the TAC(A).

              The AO established an emergency ammunition resupply package
          designed +or the CH-53 helicopter to li+t. The 8000 pound load was
          a complete package containing projectiles, powders, primers, and
          fuzes. 10 packages were readied and prestaged at an Ammunition
          61(pply Point (ASP), if needed. No emergency resupplies were made.

              In addition, the AD assisted in urgent MEDEVACs and advised the
          regimental (regt) Operations Officer (S-3) on aviation options
          throughout the ground offensive. He proved invaluable because of
          his skill on aviation matters.


              In summary, the AO rapidly adapted to the quick,-paced artillery
          regimental CDC, and provided timely anri accurate advice to the CDC
          on a variety of aviation issues. The quick-fire channel proved its
          worth during a four hour period on G-Day by linking the AO to the
          TAC(A) +or CAS aircraft requests on 17 colinterfire targets.


                                      Communications


              Regimental communications needed little reorganization in
          preparing for and executing t@.e ground attack into Kuwait. A
          leapfrog of the Alpha and Bravo command groups proved successful.
          The Bravo (Jump) retained the capability to come up on all single
          channel nets. The Alpha (Main) dispensed with ary external
          tactical phone service as the tempo of operations increased. Phone
          service was retained until B-2 to enable the staff to fine-tune
          their planning.

                                  Counter Battery Radar

              Radar coverage was intended to be as far -Forward on the
          battle-Field as possible while still maintaining physical security
          -For the teams. The radars were located with the artillery
          battalions for movement and security. Target processing -Functions
          and the cueing schedule were centralized in the regimental Combat
          Operations Center (CDC).

              The original intent was to leapfrog the radars through the two
          breaches, two at a time, with the battalions as they moved. Three
          radars, of a total of five with the regiment, were available during
          the ground offensive. On B-2, one radar went down hard with high
          voltage problems, and on B-1 another radar was destroyed by
          friendly air. The? quick pace of the battle and the loss of two
          radars required detailed coordination to ensure adequate radar
          coverage c4 the Division's zone, which was accomplished.

              The 0-36 radars were very effective against enemy indirect       i
          mortar and artillery -Fire and proved their worth on G-Day,


                                                                  ENCLOSURE (1)


                                 UNCLASSIFIED