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File: 980227_sep96_decls2_0006.txt
Page: 0006
Total Pages: 15

Box ID = BX005616

Folder Title = 800TH MP BDE AAR 1 JUN 91                                                                       

Unit = MISC        

Parent Org = MISC        







                Annex N (Logistical Support) to 800th MP Bde Desei@- Shield/Storm
                After Action Report

                housing for U.S. troops, as well as the EPW'S. With equipment
                and supplies coming from various geographical locations and sourc-
                es, communications was imperative to keep track of supplies
                on-hand and enroute to the camps. Also, transportation coordina-
                tion was extremely difficult when unable to readily enter into
                the Theater communication system. The Tac Lines were only in-
                stalled after the start of the Air War, and EPW's had been tak-
                en. The communications system was constantly inoperable, making
                information transfer unreliable at best.
                  . Recommendation: The KTOE should be re-structured to allow
                ror organic communication assets within the internal operations
                of each Camp, plus assets for a dedicated Brigade communications
                system. This would enable more rapid response in meeting the
                needs of the Camps, in all staff areas.

                10. Issue: Marginal Class IX Support
                    Finding- Repair parts were virtually non-existent in The-
                ater.
                    Discussion: This Brigade has no PLL authorization for motor-
                izea equipment. wnenever Requisitions were submitted for Class
                IX, the items were either not in-stock, or not carried on the
                ASL. when the requisition was rejected (fill or kill) the Bri-
                gade was advised to buy the item on the economy. As the entire
                requisition was returned without the supporting Maintenance Compa-
                ny documenting on some form of register, demand history could not
                be generated and the ASL for the maintenance Company could not
                be expanded. Also, the amount of man-hours locating the repa3.r
                parts on the economy was tremendous.
                    Recommendation: Authorized stockage lists need to reflect
                actual equipment densities of unit equipment. Futhermore, a more
                realistic ordering and shipping time needs to be incorporated in
                determining high and low limits, as well as ro-order points.
                Li. Issue: Transportation of EPW's in Theater
                    Finding: The lack of sufficient transportation assets avail-
                able sever*iy ninaered EPW movement from thi VII 6 XVIII Corp For-
                ward to the Theater rear.
                     Discussion: Doctrinally, the capturing Headquarters/Unit is
                responii-iblo to coordinate all transportation of EPW's from the Di-
                vision/Col@,H                0
                            ,@lding Facility t the Theater camps. This doctrine
                was ident      early an to the 22nd SUPCON, and was answered in
                general terms of it being handled by retrograde shipments. At no
                time prior to the start of the ground war was retrograde
                identified to handle the EPW evacuation process. The 49th



                                                N-6






                Annex N (Logistical Support) to 800th MP Bde Desei@- Shield/Storm
                After Action Report

                housing for U.S. troops, as well as the EPW'S. With equipment
                and supplies coming from various geographical locations and sourc-
                es, communications was imperative to keep track of supplies
                on-hand and enroute to the camps. Also, transportation coordina-
                tion was extremely difficult when unable to readily enter into
                the Theater communication system. The Tac Lines were only in-
                stalled after the start of the Air War, and EPW's had been tak-
                en. The communications system was constantly inoperable, making
                information transfer unreliable at best.
                  . Recommendation: The KTOE should be re-structured to allow
                ror organic communication assets within the internal operations
                of each Camp, plus assets for a dedicated Brigade communications
                system. This would enable more rapid response in meeting the
                needs of the Camps, in all staff areas.

                10. Issue: Marginal Class IX Support
                    Finding- Repair parts were virtually non-existent in The-
                ater.
                    Discussion: This Brigade has no PLL authorization for motor-
                izea equipment. wnenever Requisitions were submitted for Class
                IX, the items were either not in-stock, or not carried on the
                ASL. when the requisition was rejected (fill or kill) the Bri-
                gade was advised to buy the item on the economy. As the entire
                requisition was returned without the supporting Maintenance Compa-
                ny documenting on some form of register, demand history could not
                be generated and the ASL for the maintenance Company could not
                be expanded. Also, the amount of man-hours locating the repa3.r
                parts on the economy was tremendous.
                    Recommendation: Authorized stockage lists need to reflect
                actual equipment densities of unit equipment. Futhermore, a more
                realistic ordering and shipping time needs to be incorporated in
                determining high and low limits, as well as ro-order points.
                Li. Issue: Transportation of EPW's in Theater
                    Finding: The lack of sufficient transportation assets avail-
                able sever*iy ninaered EPW movement from thi VII 6 XVIII Corp For-
                ward to the Theater rear.
                     Discussion: Doctrinally, the capturing Headquarters/Unit is
                responii-iblo to coordinate all transportation of EPW's from the Di-
                vision/Col@,H                0
                            ,@lding Facility t the Theater camps. This doctrine
                was ident      early an to the 22nd SUPCON, and was answered in
                general terms of it being handled by retrograde shipments. At no
                time prior to the start of the ground war was retrograde
                identified to handle the EPW evacuation process. The 49th



                                                N-6

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