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File: 980227_sep96_decls2_0005.txt
Box ID = BX005616
Folder Title = 800TH MP BDE AAR 1 JUN 91
Unit = MISC
Parent Org = MISC
Annex N (Logistical Support) to 8ooth MP Bde Deser@: Shield/Storm
After Action Report
S. issue: Department of Engineering and Housing (DER) Problems
Findinq: Upon arrival at Khobar Village, units of the 800th
MP Bd pefienced non-r*sponsiveness out of DEH, along with con-
flictln&x Instructions from the 22nd SUPCOM.
Discussion: The 800th MP Bde and it's 68 subordinate units
(strenglH-o-r o-ver 7300 troops) all had to initially process
through Khobar Towers enroute to their EPW Camp location. As
such, this required housina for each unit for up to a week.
f
Based on the TPFDL availability, a forecast of projected 800th MP
Bde Unit arrivals was submitted to DEH. However, DEH chose to ig-
nore the 800th's billeting requirements because we were not high
enough on the priority list. As time progressed, locating billet-
ing on Khobar was almost impossible as Khobar Village was ear-
marked for VII Corp units exclusively. once a unit finally ar-
rived at Khobar Village (which could easily be as late as 7 to 10
hours after landing at the APOD,) DEH would coldly turn them
away, stating there was no billeting available on Khobar. In or-
der to billot the 800th MP Bde Units, in a transient status,
units war* directed by this Headquarters to process through the
VII Corp DEH as a VII Corp asset. Then VII Corp DEH would i=edi-
ately provide them bill*ting in one of their many unoccupied
buiiaings.
Recommendation:
(a) The controlling Area Support Groups know the total
number of personnel and equipment which-will be filtering through
their area of operations which require billeting. Based upon
these figures, ASG's need to better coordinate with DEHs in order
to ensure adequate bill*tinq is available for all units arriving
in country.
(b)Furthermor*, the DEH chain-of-command must be sensi-
tive and more receptive to the needs of tired, travel-weary
troops. The kind of disregard for troop welfare, displayed by
DEH, impacted negatively on the soldi*r-s-, leaving them With a low
morale on the first day in Theater.
9. 'Issu*: Substandard Communication support
Findinq: EAck of organic communication within the 800th MP
BriliaB-a-Ham-por*d the G-4's ability to support the EPW camps in
their EPW Operations.
Discussion: Information exchanges between the Brigade and
the Tamps@wls@nearly impossible, with the communications system
in-place being sporidic-at best. This caused delays in ascertain-
in4-critical life-support requirements, such as water, food, and
N-5
Annex N (Logistical Support) to 8ooth MP Bde Deser@: Shield/Storm
After Action Report
S. issue: Department of Engineering and Housing (DER) Problems
Findinq: Upon arrival at Khobar Village, units of the 800th
MP Bd pefienced non-r*sponsiveness out of DEH, along with con-
flictln&x Instructions from the 22nd SUPCOM.
Discussion: The 800th MP Bde and it's 68 subordinate units
(strenglH-o-r o-ver 7300 troops) all had to initially process
through Khobar Towers enroute to their EPW Camp location. As
such, this required housina for each unit for up to a week.
f
Based on the TPFDL availability, a forecast of projected 800th MP
Bde Unit arrivals was submitted to DEH. However, DEH chose to ig-
nore the 800th's billeting requirements because we were not high
enough on the priority list. As time progressed, locating billet-
ing on Khobar was almost impossible as Khobar Village was ear-
marked for VII Corp units exclusively. once a unit finally ar-
rived at Khobar Village (which could easily be as late as 7 to 10
hours after landing at the APOD,) DEH would coldly turn them
away, stating there was no billeting available on Khobar. In or-
der to billot the 800th MP Bde Units, in a transient status,
units war* directed by this Headquarters to process through the
VII Corp DEH as a VII Corp asset. Then VII Corp DEH would i=edi-
ately provide them bill*ting in one of their many unoccupied
buiiaings.
Recommendation:
(a) The controlling Area Support Groups know the total
number of personnel and equipment which-will be filtering through
their area of operations which require billeting. Based upon
these figures, ASG's need to better coordinate with DEHs in order
to ensure adequate bill*tinq is available for all units arriving
in country.
(b)Furthermor*, the DEH chain-of-command must be sensi-
tive and more receptive to the needs of tired, travel-weary
troops. The kind of disregard for troop welfare, displayed by
DEH, impacted negatively on the soldi*r-s-, leaving them With a low
morale on the first day in Theater.
9. 'Issu*: Substandard Communication support
Findinq: EAck of organic communication within the 800th MP
BriliaB-a-Ham-por*d the G-4's ability to support the EPW camps in
their EPW Operations.
Discussion: Information exchanges between the Brigade and
the Tamps@wls@nearly impossible, with the communications system
in-place being sporidic-at best. This caused delays in ascertain-
in4-critical life-support requirements, such as water, food, and
N-5
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