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File: 980227_sep96_decls2_0004.txt
Box ID = BX005616
Folder Title = 800TH MP BDE AAR 1 JUN 91
Unit = MISC
Parent Org = MISC
Annex N (Logistical Support) to 80oth MP Bde Deser-t Shield/Storm
After Action Report
b. Transportation assets need to be distributed equi-
tably through-out Theater. It is important to get the forward el-
ements (fighters) to their area of operation, yet it is just as
important to get the combat support and service support units to
their areas of operation. It needs to be a congruent operation,
as all are inter-supporting.
Recommendations:
a. The MCC should maintain sufficient assets to sup-
port the entire deploying force, not just the forward elements.
b. Allocate additional transportation assets to the
Theater, for ZAC movement support, thereby not degrading the abil-
ity of forward deploying units and equipment to move into the Com-
bat Zone.
7. Issue: No dedicated transportation assets for Classes of Sup-
ply -
Finding: The lack of a dedicated Support Company to trans-
EH*- e p
port required classes of supply to th EPW Camp in su port of
71,000 plus EPW's and 7,300 troops severely impacted on the life
support system.
Discussion:
a. with the volume of logistical supplies that was
necessary to clothe, feed, house, and sustain a population
in-excess of 71,000 EPW'S, a Direct Support Transportation Cozftpa-
ny should have been dedicated to this mission. This Brigade was
forced to go through the local servicing MCT, which proved very
unreliable. Only limited amounts of transportation assets could
be provided at any on* time, as the MCT was supporting the entire
rear area. The Brigade would have less than a 24-hour notice of
available transportation, and only then could coordinate the move-
ment of the cargo. As a result, supplies 'trickled' to the
Camps. It was not possible for the Camps to have a workable
on-hand inventory. This system was very in-effective as it
forced the Camn to be reactive instead of proactive. A scheduled
delivery syst4 could not be maintained, which would have allowed
the-on-hand balance safety level be maintained.
b. Re-supply is a continuous mission, with the
turn-over of EPW'S, and should not be crisis-managed. X Light Me-
dium Truck Company would enable the units to plan logistical sup-
port and schedule deliveries, thereby not causing a drain on Sup-
ply personnel in receiving and storing the influx of supplies.
Recommendation: A direct support Light Medium Truck Company
should be d*dicat-ia to the Brigade to support the high volume of
equipment and supplies needed at the Camps.
N-4
Annex N (Logistical Support) to 80oth MP Bde Deser-t Shield/Storm
After Action Report
b. Transportation assets need to be distributed equi-
tably through-out Theater. It is important to get the forward el-
ements (fighters) to their area of operation, yet it is just as
important to get the combat support and service support units to
their areas of operation. It needs to be a congruent operation,
as all are inter-supporting.
Recommendations:
a. The MCC should maintain sufficient assets to sup-
port the entire deploying force, not just the forward elements.
b. Allocate additional transportation assets to the
Theater, for ZAC movement support, thereby not degrading the abil-
ity of forward deploying units and equipment to move into the Com-
bat Zone.
7. Issue: No dedicated transportation assets for Classes of Sup-
ply -
Finding: The lack of a dedicated Support Company to trans-
EH*- e p
port required classes of supply to th EPW Camp in su port of
71,000 plus EPW's and 7,300 troops severely impacted on the life
support system.
Discussion:
a. with the volume of logistical supplies that was
necessary to clothe, feed, house, and sustain a population
in-excess of 71,000 EPW'S, a Direct Support Transportation Cozftpa-
ny should have been dedicated to this mission. This Brigade was
forced to go through the local servicing MCT, which proved very
unreliable. Only limited amounts of transportation assets could
be provided at any on* time, as the MCT was supporting the entire
rear area. The Brigade would have less than a 24-hour notice of
available transportation, and only then could coordinate the move-
ment of the cargo. As a result, supplies 'trickled' to the
Camps. It was not possible for the Camps to have a workable
on-hand inventory. This system was very in-effective as it
forced the Camn to be reactive instead of proactive. A scheduled
delivery syst4 could not be maintained, which would have allowed
the-on-hand balance safety level be maintained.
b. Re-supply is a continuous mission, with the
turn-over of EPW'S, and should not be crisis-managed. X Light Me-
dium Truck Company would enable the units to plan logistical sup-
port and schedule deliveries, thereby not causing a drain on Sup-
ply personnel in receiving and storing the influx of supplies.
Recommendation: A direct support Light Medium Truck Company
should be d*dicat-ia to the Brigade to support the high volume of
equipment and supplies needed at the Camps.
N-4
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