Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search

Box ID = BX005616

Folder Title = 800TH MP BDE AAR 1 JUN 91                                                                       

Unit = MISC        

Parent Org = MISC        









             Annex N (Logistical support) to 800th MP Bde Desez!@t Shield/Storm
             After Action Report


             KCT was identified for this mission after start of hostilities.
             Due to the large number Of EPW's captured, the 49th MCT resorted
             to a system of pushing vehicles for4dard with no defined sched-
             ule. From a control stand-point, it was very unorganized, but
             necessary, to support the mission. The capabilities of the equip-
             ment put into service ranged fro% one extreme (luxury coach buses
             to thi other flatbed trailers 4 Cowboys.) As some vehicles were
             configured to handle large amounts of EPW'S, a road system to sup-
             port their size needed to be in-place.
                 -Recommendation: The supporting Command should enforce the
             current doctrine on EPW Evacuation and use available retrograde
             transportation assets.
             12. issue: Time Phased Force Deployment Listinq(TPFDL) was inac-
             curaE-e.-
                  Finding: The TPFDL did not accurately forecast Units arriv-
             als.
                  Discussion: All troop movements made into Theater were made
             pursuan!E-Eo--Effe-TPFDL. Thit TPFDL, which originated out of FOR-
             scom, was intended to accurately schedule a unit's arrival. This
             was not the case, due to: 1) Units being moved forward or back
             without Brigade being notified. 2) No means of communicating
             with CONUS to verify a unit's departure. 3) The Movement
             control Activity not being able to furnish mission nor tail
             numbers, prior to a unit's arrival. As a result, a unit's arriv-
             al in-Theater could fluctuate up to a week and the first notifica-
             tion received (from the 23rd Replacement Detachment) that a Unit
             had arrived in-Theater was sometimes as late as 5 hours after
             they had landed. 4) There was no unit reception in place to pro-
             vide arriving units with specific instructions, causing confusion
             and movement delays.

                  Recommendation:
                         (a) The Movement Control Activity needs to provide
             the gaining Major Command with real-time troop movement data.
             This can be accomplished with a unit representative stationed at
             the Movement control Activity or a reliable communications system
             being in-place.











                                               N-7








             Annex N (Logistical support) to 800th MP Bde Desez!@t Shield/Storm
             After Action Report


             KCT was identified for this mission after start of hostilities.
             Due to the large number Of EPW's captured, the 49th MCT resorted
             to a system of pushing vehicles for4dard with no defined sched-
             ule. From a control stand-point, it was very unorganized, but
             necessary, to support the mission. The capabilities of the equip-
             ment put into service ranged fro% one extreme (luxury coach buses
             to thi other flatbed trailers 4 Cowboys.) As some vehicles were
             configured to handle large amounts of EPW'S, a road system to sup-
             port their size needed to be in-place.
                 -Recommendation: The supporting Command should enforce the
             current doctrine on EPW Evacuation and use available retrograde
             transportation assets.
             12. issue: Time Phased Force Deployment Listinq(TPFDL) was inac-
             curaE-e.-
                  Finding: The TPFDL did not accurately forecast Units arriv-
             als.
                  Discussion: All troop movements made into Theater were made
             pursuan!E-Eo--Effe-TPFDL. Thit TPFDL, which originated out of FOR-
             scom, was intended to accurately schedule a unit's arrival. This
             was not the case, due to: 1) Units being moved forward or back
             without Brigade being notified. 2) No means of communicating
             with CONUS to verify a unit's departure. 3) The Movement
             control Activity not being able to furnish mission nor tail
             numbers, prior to a unit's arrival. As a result, a unit's arriv-
             al in-Theater could fluctuate up to a week and the first notifica-
             tion received (from the 23rd Replacement Detachment) that a Unit
             had arrived in-Theater was sometimes as late as 5 hours after
             they had landed. 4) There was no unit reception in place to pro-
             vide arriving units with specific instructions, causing confusion
             and movement delays.

                  Recommendation:
                         (a) The Movement Control Activity needs to provide
             the gaining Major Command with real-time troop movement data.
             This can be accomplished with a unit representative stationed at
             the Movement control Activity or a reliable communications system
             being in-place.











                                               N-7

Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search