WrrH TIlE 1ST MARINE DWISlON IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM            33


the attached antitank section, and  1 LAV-C2 on high ground of what was
essentially a basin approaching the police station. The company faced generally
north and it was arranged in a single line along a 4,000-meter frontage. The 1st
Platoon was on the northern left flank and the 2d Platoon was on the right. The
right flank was located about 2,500 meters northwest of the police station. From
all appearances, the evening of 29 January 1991 promised to be another cold,
overcast, uneventful but tense winter night for the Marines around OP 4.
   The engagement that occurred at OP 4 took place in three distinct phases.
The reconnaissance platoon came under attack and withdrew. Company D moved
to cover the platoon's withdrawal and attempted to delay or halt the Iraqi
advance, took casualties, and withdrew. Companies A and B from Task Force
Shepherd replaced Company D and drove out Iraqis from OP 4 which concluded
the engagement.
   Spotters using night vision scopes observed a column of about 30 Iraqi
armored vehicles moving toward the Kuwaiti police station. The time was about
2000. Within 15 minutes of the first report, they reported a force of five T-62
tanks followed by several BMP infantry fighting vehicles moving in their
direction. The Iraqi advance moved slowly, feeling its way to the American
position. The Recon platoon immediatdy called for an air strike and advised
Captain Pollard of events. As the tanks neared OP 4, the first aircraft arrived
and attacked, but failed to halt the Iraqi advance. Once they entered small-arms
range, 2d Thatoon opened fire with a combination of M203 grenade launchers,
LAAWs, AT-4s, and machine guns. One M-203 shooter dropped an illumination
round on the lead tank, while a combat engineer fired two LAAW rockets into
another tank, causing it to halt. Cuhat tank would later be destroyed in an A-
10 attack.)~
   When 2d Platoon began firing, the Iraqi tanks returned fire with discarding-
sabot penetrator rounds that went through the police station building the platoon
occupied. At that point it was time to leave, and the platoon leader fired the red
star-cluster as he attempted to rally the platoon with their vehicles behind the
horseshoe berm. Iraqi tanks were within the complex of OP 4 when they began
firing on the berm. As rounds passed overhead or were deflected by the berm,
Company D engaged the Iraqi armor, causing it to pause long enough for the
platoon to withdraw several kilometers from OP 4, where it later linked up with
Company A. The platoon remained at that site until Company D withdrew
several hours later.S9
   At 1926, Company D spotted the approaching Iraqi force. Captain Pollard
immediately put the company on full alert and radioed Lieutenant Colonel Myers
that there were approximately 50 vehicles heading south. He judged them to be
about seven kilometers from his position and four to five kilometers from OP
4. He then withdrew south to gain room to maneuver and reconfigured the
company against the armored threat. In place of the lengthy single line, Pollard
created two lines, one for attack and one for support. In the main line facing the
station to the northeast were 13 LAV-25s and 3 LAV-ATs. Behind the main
line, the smaller second line consisted of the TOW section's remaining 4 LAV-
ATs. The company's two supply vehicles fell back to the west. Lieutenant