34                                   U.S. MARINES IN TIlE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991


Williams, the executive officer, and Sergeant Swalick, the company's forward
air controller, were in the communications LAV located midway along but
slightly back of the main line. Captain Pollard was on the right flank in his
LAV-25.
   While Company D prepared to confront the approaching force, Lieutenant
Colonel  Myers    informed the  other company  commanders  of events. He
instructed Captain Pollard not to leave his position for the moment; Myers did
not want to commit Company D until the enemy made his intentions clear.
   He did not have long to wait.    Myers was still notifying his company
commanders when the reconnaissance platoon at OP 4 began firing its heavy
machine guns and LAAWs at the on-rushing Iraqi column. Captain Pollard could
see that the platoon's fire stopped one tank and slowed the attack, but it was
obvious that the Iraqis were determined to capture the police station.60
   Captain Pollard immediately advised Lieutenant Colonel Myers that the Iraqis
were at OP 4 in large numbers and seemed intent on continuing the attack into
Saudi Arabia. Myers passed this assessment to General Myatt, along with an
urgent request for air support. The Task Force Shepherd commander then
prepared to defend in sector. Myers alerted his artillery batteries and he moved
Company A slightly north to Checkpoint 25, a location that was within sight and
supporting distance of Company D. Myers wanted Company D to develop the
situation while he moved Companies A and B into position. Company D would
then fall back, Company A would attack, and Company B would act as a
blocking force.~'  Me next shifted his attention to coordinating the defense of
OP S and OP 6, where another enemy threat had begun to develop.
   Upon observing the reconnaissance platoon's distress flare, Captain Pollard
began moving his vehicles within cannon range of OP 4. The maneuver shifted
the company from a southeast to an eastern alignment. The formation remained
essentially as it had been, with  1st Platoon occupying the left half of the
company line and 2d Platoon the right half.   The three LAV-AT vehicles
followed in trace.
   Once in range of the Iraqi force, the LAV-25s opened fire and almost
immediately an Iraqi tank exploded. It would conveniently burn for some time
and provide American forces with an excellent reference pOint. The burning
tank illuminated the police station area. Within minutes, three T-55 tanks from
the attacking force emerged out of the darkness and a furious firefight opened
between the tanks and the reconnaissance platoon. For a while, the Marines
managed to keep the tanks at a distance, however, they quickly expended their
supply of LAWs and, by 2130 hours, it was time for the platoon to withdraw.
   Captain Pollard decided to attempt a rescue. Leaving Lieutenant Williams
in charge of 1st Platoon, Captain Pollard took 2d Platoon and advanced toward
the station. Mis direction of movement soon put 2d Platoon partially in front of
1st Platoon's position. As he got closer to the police station, Pollard could see
that Iraqi fire on the reconnaissance platoon had gotten so intense that it
threatened the break-out attempt. He decided to upset the Iraqi assault by an
attack of his own.