DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS

File: 123096_sep96_decls1_0069.txt
Page: 0069
Total Pages: 109

Subject: DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS       

Unit: OTSG        

Parent Organization: HSC         

Box  ID: BX003203

Folder Title: DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS                                       

Document Number:          1

Folder Seq  #:         21









                             f . Owing LO the variabil iLy and Iimi Led conlro IIabi IILY Of these
                             various factors, the effects of an aerosol attack cannot be confined
                             strictly to a previously designated target area.        This, in addition to
                             the delayed effect (incubation period) and the risk of secondary
                             spread, if long-persistent or transmissible agents are used, accounts
                             for the general acceptance of biological weapons as being primarily
                             useful for strategic purposes.      Tactical or terrorist use, however,
                             cannot be ruled out.

                             g.  If a nontransmissible and    nonpersiSLenL agent were disseminated.
                             the effects would be confined to a specific time period, and there
                             would be little risk of rapid epidemic spread.        Long term effects,
                             however, might occur.    The significance of ecological factors in such a
                             situation is based on the fact that certain potential biological agents
                             are the causative organisms of zoonoses, in which the natural
                             reservoirs of infection may be birds, rodents, or other species.
                             Arthropod vectors often play an important role in maintaining the cycle
                             of infection within these animal reservoirs.       The artificial spread of
                             the causal.)vp (%reanlqms ni -,-,h           z"noses, as
                             Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis, tick-borne encephalitis, etc. may
                             cause primary infections among domestic or wild animals, which,
                             wherever the ecological Situation is favourable, may lead to the
 establishment of a persistent natural focus of infection.         This might
                             happen in areas where such a focus has either never existed or where it
                             has been eradicated as a result of effective control measures.

                             h.  If transmissible human pathogens were employed, secondary cases or
                             even an epidemic might follow. The situation thus resulting might be
                             comparable to that following the natural outbreak of disease which has
                             occurred in certain war time situations, some of which have been
                             catastrophic. The resulting disorganization and chaos could reduce
                             significantly the effectiveness of generally available hygienic and
                             preventive measures. On the other hand, the institution of radical
                             hygienic and quarancine measures designed to control the spread of
                             infection could interfere with military or civil services, such as
                             transport and supply.    This is illustrated by the far-reaching effects
                             of measures instituted LO control the spread of infectious diseases
                             such as smallpox when a case is diagnosed in a nonendemic area.          The
                             effects of a biological attack cannot be evaluated solely in terms of
                             morbidity and mortality. Certain other important factors related to
                             the social situation may contribute significantly to the effects of
                             this Method of warfare.

                     CLANDESTINE ATTACK

                     113.    It is possible for an aggressor to use biological warfare agents in a
                     clandestine mannitr. A truly clandestine attack is one which is carried out
       covertly, and which cannot be readily identified as & biological warfare
                     attack. The advantage of such an attack is that it can be' used in the period
                     of transition to war.

                     114.    There is a large range of biological agents which are suitable for use
                     in clandestine attack. The effect of any one of them on the target population


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Document 109 f:/Week-36/BX003203/DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS/detection of medical defense against biological :1217960927452
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-36
Box ID = BX003203
Unit = OTSG
Parent Organization = HSC
Folder Title = DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
Folder Seq # = 21
Subject = DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996