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File: 123096_sep96_decls1_0068.txt
Subject: DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
Unit: OTSG
Parent Organization: HSC
Box ID: BX003203
Folder Title: DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
Document Number: 1
Folder Seq #: 21
1 1 1. From the above consideral ions i L wi II be obvi ous that the concepts Of
biological operations need no longer be limited to the artificial reproduction
of an epidemiological model observed under natural conditions.
FACTORS AFFECTING BIOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
112. Dissemination of a biological agent by the airborne route is an
established technical feasibility., -The prediction of ultimate effects of such
dissemination remains uncertain, however, since the subsequent spread and
occurrence of infectious disease is governed by multip'e factors, some of
which follow:
a. Prediction must be based, on the one hand, on extrapolations from
epidemiological studies or experimental infection of animals or humans,
and on the other, on aerobiological studies in the laboratory and in
the field (see Chapter 3).
b . AparL I roM E he phvsical and hi o Ioi?i cAi characceri sr i rs of rho
agent, there are numerous other factors pertaining to the target
Population which influence the effects of the exposure to
microorganisms artificially disseminated in an,aerosol. Speci ic
resistance is among the most important of these factors. For example,
Yellow Fever virus would be a potentially effective agent for use
against the civilian population of European and North American
countries but probably would not be as effective in those countries
where intensive immunization campaigns against this disease have been
conducted.
esponse
LO such an artificial infection. This resistance will certainly be
diminished in the case of combined injury, particularly injury
following a nuclear explosion, (e.g. radiation, etc.). Other factors
which will affect nonspecific resistance are the use of antibiotics
that alter the colonisation resistance, drugs that interfere with the
immune mechanisms, malnutrition, and fatigue.
d. The wide individual variation in the State of specific or
nonspecific resistance obviously adds LO the unpredictability of the
outcome of an attack. This situation might be altered by the
dissemination of infectious agents in concentrations which would exceed
(by several orders of magnitude) those encountered in a naturally-
occurring airborne exposure.
a. IC is possible that more than one agent way be used in such an
attack. For example, an aggressor might combine a virus which produced
a disease*with a short incubation period and a rickettsial organism
producing one With a long incubation period. The virus disease would
not respond to antibiotics. Thus, specific therapy@sight be withheld
from the second illness since it was not recognised as being due to a
different organism. These considerations justify the expectation that
the effects of the dissemination of agents in an artificially produced
aerosol, though unpredictable, may be very serious.
5
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Document 109 f:/Week-36/BX003203/DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS/detection of medical defense against biological :1217960927452
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-36
Box ID = BX003203
Unit = OTSG
Parent Organization = HSC
Folder Title = DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
Folder Seq # = 21
Subject = DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996