COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 11TH MARINES 13 MAR 91

File: 970725_dec96_decls29_0015.txt
Page: 0015
Total Pages: 61
Subject = COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  11TH  MARINES  13 MAR 91                    

Parent Organization = SECDEF      

Unit = HQMC        

Folder Title = 11TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  JAN  FEB  91  SEC 1 OF 2                                       

Document Number =          1

Box ID = BX600135



                                        UNCLASSIFIED@:@@)

          post. Although critical in-Formation could always   be passed via
          satellite communications (SATCOM) or through the airborne relay,
          the rapid advance of the m@tneuver force -Frequently outdistanced the'
          range D-F the FSC net. In spite of the division main's
          communications limitations, fire support to the division was not
          significantly degraded due to the redundancy of FSCC9 (one with the
          forward Combat Operation Center and a fire support representative
          in the mobile command post).



                                        Logistics

              The Ilth Marines ForwArd Logistics Base (FLB) was designed to
          provide a forward platform to facilitate quick resupply of
          committed artillery battalions. The concept was developed under a
          centralized environment where battalions requested through the
          regiment (regt) and the regiment, as the one customer, coordinated
          with the supporting Combat Service Support Detachment (CSSD).

              For Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm the Force Service
          Support Group (FSSS) mandated decentralization requiring     I
          battalions' resupply requests to be routed straight to the CSSD.
          The previously centralized assets were no longer necessary. Thus,
          those refuel and water resupply assets of the regimental
          Headquarters (HQ) battery (btry) were limited to primarily
          resupplying the regt HQ btry. These assets had a secondary mission
          for emergency resupply of not more than one artillery battalion at
          a time within a 24 hour period.

              The movement of the FLB proved to be a three to four day event.
          The middle of January was the -First complete move and the lack of
          internal Logistics Vehicle Systems (LVS) lift Ljas a limiting
          factor. All lift assets were required to mrke shuttle runs.
          Throughout the Operations, five moves were made to facilitate the
          forward resupply concept. The FLB was generally positioned close
          to the -egt COC.

              As maneuver elements started moving past the second obstacle
          belt, CSSD support failed. Out of necessity, a mobile resupply
          concept from the FLB equipment was assembled for classes I (food
          and water), III (fuel) and V (.Rmmunition). This proved to be a
          decisive move which ensured logistics support to all artillery
          battalions. This concept involved the establishment of an FLB base
          camp at which all non-essential L-quip.nent was down loaded and
          staged in order- to provide the mobile train with the lift aslets of
          seven 5-tons and +our LVSS.

              Emergency resupplies of ammunition were obtained by collecting
          unexpended ammunition that had been laid an the deck. Ammt-inition
          was laid oi the deck and later picked up at the battalion's
          overmatch, attack, and second obstacle breach positions.

              The hectic pace of the operation stretched the abilities of all
          logistics lines. Through quick innovative thinking and the FLB



                                                                  ENCLOSURE (1)
                                    UNCLASSIFIED