COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 11TH MARINES 13 MAR 91

File: 970725_dec96_decls29_0014.txt
Page: 0014
Total Pages: 61
Subject = COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  11TH  MARINES  13 MAR 91                    

Parent Organization = SECDEF      

Unit = HQMC        

Folder Title = 11TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  JAN  FEB  91  SEC 1 OF 2                                       

Document Number =          1

Box ID = BX600135




                                        UNCLASSIFIED"-z@

          A and C and against a suspected enemy counterattack in the vicini4-,-
          of the Al Burqan oil field.

              The clearance of fires  was expected to be, and certainly was,
          one of the biggest challenges in providing fire support to the
          division's scheme of maneuver. In maneuver warfare, the fixed
          boundaries which clearly Delineate fire support responsibilities
          frequently changed. In addition, as maneuver units rapidly
          advanced with other task forces -Following in trace, the danger&, of
          fratricide increased. In the fire support plan, task force
          commanders could choose to establish their policy of clearance
          between their fire support coordinator and firing units prior to
          each mission. Fires were cleared, normally, by one of two means
          within the division, either over the division Fire Support
          Coordination (FSC) 1 net, or over lower level FSC nets. It was not
          unusual during the war for the division FSCC to deny clearance
          based on proximity of friendly troops or lact@ of communications
          with affected friendly units. Direct communications between fire
          support coordinators by entpring an adjacent unit's FSC net also
          enabled fires to be cleared at the lowest -Feasible level. The vast
          majority of friendly-on-+riendly fires were prevented through
          established clearance procedures. The few instances in which this
          did not occur resulted in :, check-fire by llth Marines headquarters
          until the problem could be resolved.

              Naval gunfire had a limited but positive impact on the war
          effort. Initially, the USE Missouri (BB63) was in general support
          of I MEF. Using her organic Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV), the
          battleship conducted missirns in support of MARCENT operations. On
          26 Feb, the USS Wisconsin (BB64) was assigned the mission of
          general support to lst MarDiv with priority of fires to TF
          Shepherd. Eight targets were identified east of Kuwait
          International Airport for attack on the morning of 26 Feb. Using
          an OV-10 as an aerial observer platform, a fire mission wRs also
          called in on an Army barracks east a-F the Kuwait International
          Airport. After two adjustment rounds, fire for effect was
          initiated. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) subsequently confirmed
          three direct hits of 16" rounds on the target. Due to very poor
          visibility (smole from oil fires) and the unavailability of an air
          platform, no tdditional missions were conducted by a battleship
          supporting Ist MarDiv units.

              The majority of the division FSCC"s targeting effort was
          conducted prior to the ground offensive. The Target In-Formation
          Officer 4c3cused the bombing campaign to shape the battlefield in
          accordance with the intent of tt-.e division commander. At the onset
          of the ground war, reactive targeting claimed the majority of the
          division's engagement assets, although deliberate targeting was
          still conducted through intelligence channels.

              One limitation of -Fire support coordination conducted through
          the division main FSCC was caused by the lack of effective radio
          communications between the division main FSCC, forward task force
          FSCCS, and at times, with the division forward FSCC/ mobile command



                                                                 ENCLOSURE (1)
                                    UNCLASSIFIED