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File: 950925_84537134.txtMARCENT Sitrep Filename:84537134 Subject: MARCENT Sitrep PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 37134 GENDATE: 950623 NNNN TEXT: ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX015 MCN = 91058/18645 TOR = 910581511 OTTSZYUW RUEKJCS7305 0581508--RUEALGX. ZNY HEADER O 271508Z FEB 91 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC INFO RUEALGX/SAFE O 271104Z FEB 91 FM COMUSMARCENT//G-2/MAFC// TO AIG 13835 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC//INT// INFO RUDCEKM/COMUSARCENT//G-2// RHIUFAA/USCENTAF FWD HQS ELEMENT//G-2/MARLNO// RULSMCA/CG MCCDC QUANTICO VA//IN// RUDCSEM/EPAC LNO TEAM C RHIIMAA/FIRST MAFC RHIGDSC/THIRD LAAMBN DET BRAVO//S-2// RUVNSMQ/COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE DET ELEVEN RUVNSMQ/COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE DET THIRTEEN RHIGDSC/CG SECOND FSSG FWD//G-2// RHIIMAA/SECOND RPVCO RUWJGFB/CG THIRD MAW REAR//G-2// RHIIMDD/MWSG THREE SEVEN RHIIMDD/EIGHTH COMMBN FWD//S-2/S-3// RHIIMDD/FIRST ANGLICO RHIIMDD/THIRD NCR RHIIMDD/CG I MEF REAR//G-2/MAFC// RHIIMBB/CG FIRST MARDIV FWD//G-2// RHIIMDD/SECONDBN TWO FOUR MAR//S-2// RHIIMDD/THIRDBN TWO FOUR MAR//S-2// RUHGPEM/SECOND LAADBN//S-2// RHIIMAA/MASS THREE RBSWAF/HQFFMAME RBSWBA/HQFMAME RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//IRAQ REGIONAL ITF// RHMPOSP/SEVENTH FLT OSP RUFTFZA/ARCENT SUPCOM//G-2// RHIIMDD/FIRST INTEL CO FWD RHIEFBA/354TFW DEPLOYED//IN// RHIGAOF/CMDR 11TH SIGNAL BGDE//S2// RHSIKMC/TF3RD160THSOARSOCCENTFWD//S2// RUFTFZA/COMUSMARCENT FORWARD RUCBSAA/FICEURLANT NORFOLK VA//ISSF/20// RHFJSCC/226ASGATAQ//SPO//RO// RHIHDAA/CDR 3RD SFGA SOCCENT DEPLOYED//S2// RHFJSCC/JIF EAST//IAM-C-ITE/OPS// RHSIKMC/43 ENGRKKMC//S-2// RHFJSCC/1675THTASPDEPLOYED//IN// RHIUFIA/1610 ALDP//IN// RHIDFLA/1620 TAWP DEPLOYED//IN// RHIDFDA/1630 TAWP DEPLOYED//IN// RHIEFIA/1640 TAWP DEPLOYED//IN// RHIDFFA/1650 TAWP DEPLOYED//IN// RHIEFKA/1660 TAWP DEPLOYED//IN// RHIUFKA/1670 TASP//IN// RHFJSCC/1675 TASP//IN// RHIUFSA/1680 ALCSP DEPLOYED//IN// RHIEFAA/1681 ALCSP DEPLOYED//IN// RHIEFBA/1682 ALCSP DEPLOYED//IN// RHIIMCC/1683 ALCSP//IN// RHFJSCC/1683 ALCSP OL-A//IN// RHSIFCA/1683 ALCSP OL-B//IN// RHFJSCC/1675 TASP DEPLOYED//IN// RHIVHJA/82NDABNDIV//G-2// RBDAPZ/RAFDET MUHARRAQ//INT// RBDAPI/RAFDET SEEB//INT// RHFJSCC/101 SQNDET KKIA//INT// RBSWB/HQBFME//J2// RHIIMAA/MWSS TWO SEVEN ONE//S-2// RUHGPEM/MWSS TWO SEVEN THREE//S-2// RHIIMDD/MWSG THREE SEVEN//S-2// RHFJSCC/25RAOC//S-2// XMT CG FOURTH MEB XMT THIRTEENTH MEU XMT FIFTEENTH MEU XMT ELEVENTH MEU XMT 6 INTCOY RHEINDALEN BT SECTION 1 OF 2 PASS THROUGH FSSG TO CSSD ONE THREE ONE, ONE SIX THREE TWO, ONE FOUR TWO. PASS THROUGH THIRD MARINES TO HMH FOUR SIX THREE AND FOUR SIX FIVE. PASS THROUGH FIRST MARDIV TO CSSD TEN, CSSD ELEVEN, AND CSSD SEVENTEEN. /*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/ BODY OPER/DESERT STORM// MSGID/INTSUM/CG I MEF/112-91/FEB// NARR/COMUSMARCENT, LOC VIC 38RQS289439, SAUDI ARABIA// PERIOD/FROM: 270001C FEB 91/TO 271200C FEB 91/AS OF 271200C FEB 91// HEADING/GROUND EN LOCSTATS// 1. THE GROUND EN LOCSTATS WILL BE PUBLISHED AFTER AN ACCURATE REVIEW OF ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED. HEADING/GROUND SUMMARY// 1. 1ST PLATOON, 2ND FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY, I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, REPORTING FROM THEIR OBSERVATION POST WITHIN THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY COMPOUND IN KUWAIT CITY, STATED THAT THE ONLY ACTIVITY OBSERVED WITHIN THEIR SECTOR OF OBSERVATION DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 27 FEB WAS SMALL ARMS FIRE. 2. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 3. 2ND MAR DIV REPORTS CAPTURING EPW'S FROM THE FOLLOWING UNITS: 602 INF BDE, 56 TANK BDE, 748 TANK BDE, 38 INF BDE, 47 TANK UNIT, 667 TANK UNIT. IRAQI EQUIPMENT CAPTURED/LOCATED INCLUDED A FROG ROCKET WITHOUT TEL, T-72 TANKS, T-62 TANKS, AND POSSIBLE CHEMICAL ARTILLERY MUNITIONS. HEADING/AIR SUMMARY// 1. (U) NSTR. HEADING/BDA REPORT// 1. A CURRENT, REASSESSED BDA WILL BE PUBLISHED WHEN ACCURATE INFORMATION IS RECEIVED. 2. MARCENT FORCES NEVER ENGAGED ELEMENTS OF THE 15TH, 11TH, 19TH, AND 42ND INF DIVS. WE ASSESS MOST ELEMENTS OF THESE UNITS LEFT THE SE KTO WHEN ORDERED TO WITHDRAW BY BAGHDAD. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THESE UNITS WERE AT LEAST PARTIALLY ABLE TO ESCAPE INTO SOUTHERN IRAQ, AND COULD BE PARTICIPATING IN A DEFENSE OF BASRA. THEIR CURRENT LOCATION AND DISPOSITION ARE UNKNOWN. HEADING/NBC/MISSILE SUMMARY// 1. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]REPORTS INDICATE THAT POSSIBLE AT/AP CHEMICAL MINES ARE LOCATED AT POINT BEGINNING AT POLICE POST 2923N04738E, 500M WIDE DIRECTION N/NE AND S/SE ALONG THE "HIGHLANDS." BELTS ARE EXTENSIVE/VERY LONG. "MINES ARE WIRED". NFI. 2. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THAT A MINEFIELD CONSISTING OF CHEMICAL MINES SURROUNDED BY CONCERTINA WIRE, WAS LOCATED NEAR A ROAD VIC QT 5455. MINEFIELD WAS OF AN UNKNOWN LENGTH, 500 METERS WIDE AND HAD AT/AP AND CW MINES. [ b.2. ] HEADING/WEATHER// 48 HOUR OUTLOOK: KTO/KSA: PARTLY TO MOSTLY CLOUDY SKIES. SURFACE (28 FEB - 01 MAR) WINDS NW'LY AT 08-14KTS. VISIBILITY 4-6 MILES IN HAZE/SMOKE OCCASIONALLY DECREASING TO 2-4 MILES IN SMOKE (KTO). IZ: PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES. SURFACE WINDS NW'LY AT 06-12KTS. VISIBILITY WILL BE 4-6 MILES IN HAZE/SMOKE. KTO/KSA: 30 SCT 100 SCT 250 BKN 33008-14KTS IZ: 30 SCT 100 SCT 250 SCT 5HK 33006-12KTS 72 HOUR OUTLOOK: PARTLY CLOUDY OCCASIONALLY MOSTLY CLOUDY SKIES. (01 MAR - 02 MAR) SURFACE WINDS WILL BE W'LY AS THE NEXT SYSTEM NOW LOCATED IN THE E MED APPROACHES IZ/N KTO. KTO: 30 SCT 100 BKN 250 BKN V OVC 5HK 12008- 14KTS KSA: 30 SCT 100 SCT V BKN 250 BKN 5HK 22006- 12KTS IZ: 30 SCT V BKN 100 BKN 250 OVC 6HK 25010- 15KTS /****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/ HEADING/OTHER// 1. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HEADING/OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS// 1. 2ND MARDIV REPORTS THAT HASTY MINEFIELDS WERE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF QT 475465 AND IN THE VICINITY OF THE 1ST BN/8TH MAR AOR. NFI. 2. SEE PARA 2 IN GROUND EN ACTIVITY FOR INFO [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] REPORTED MINEFIELDS. HEADING/ENEMY CAPABILITIES// 1. SMALL UNIT ELEMENTS FROM IZ FORCES IN THE KTO ARE STILL CAPABLE OF OFFERING SOME RESISTANCE FROM ESTABLISHED OR HASTILY PREPARED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS IN AREAS ISOLATED OR BYPASSED BY COALITION FORCES. IRAQ CONTINUES TO DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT EXTREMLY SHORT WARNING SRBM ATTACKS. DESPITE THE LACK OF ANY IZ AIR ACTIVITY, IRAQ CAN POSSIBLY SORTIE INTERCEPTORS FOR LOCALIZED AIR DEFENSE AND/OR SORTIE ATTACK HELICOPTERS TO TAKE PRESSURE OFF WITHDRAWING GROUND FORCES. WITH EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT, AND IN A SENSE OF DESPERATION, IRAQ RETAINS A SMALL CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH AN AIR ATTACK AGAINST HIGH VALUE COALITION GROUND AND MARITIME ASSETS. FINALLY, IRAQ RETAINS THE CAPABILITY TO DELIVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY AIR, MISSILE, OR ARILLERY/MRL DELIVERY MEANS. HEADING/ENEMY VULNERABILITIES// 1. AS THE IRAQI FORCES CONTINUE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE SE KTO, THEY ARE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY USING MSR'S WHICH HAS GREATLY INCREASED THEIR VULNERABILITY TO AIR INTERDICTION DUE TO HEAVY CONGESTION ALONG THE ROADS. AS THEY ATTEMPT TO RETREAT, THEY WILL BECOME VERY SUSCEPTIBLE TO BOTH ENGAGEMENT AND PURSUIT OPERATIONS. VITAL LINES OF COMMUNICATION ARE EXTREMLY EXPOSED TO DESTRUCTION AND CAPTURE, WHICH WILL TRANSFORM ANY PLAN FOR ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL TO A ROUT. THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ISOLATION OF IZ FORCES IS STEADILY INCREASING AS MORE UNITS BECOME AWARE OF THEIR PLIGHT. IZ MORALE AND DISCIPLINE HAVE CRUMBLED, RESULTING IN EVEN MORE SURRENDERS. IT CAN BE ANTICIPATED THAT AS THEIR SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE, THIS VULNERABILITY WILL BECOME EVEN MORE PRONOUNCED, AND WITH THE ADDITION OF COALITION GROUND AND AIR COMBAT POWER, EQUATE TO AN EVEN HIGHER EPW COUNT. HEADING/CONCLUSIONS// 1. MARCENT ESTIMATES THAT AS THE IZ III CORPS ORDERED UNITS IN AND AROUND KUWAIT CITY TO WITHDRAW, REMNANTS OF THE 1ST AND 2ND ECHELON INFANTRY UNITS IN CONTACT WITH MARCENT FORCES (OCCUPYING THE CENTER OF MARCENT'S AO) WERE NOT INFORMED OF THE WITHDRAWAL AND REMAIN IN THEIR POSITIONS. AS PREVIOUSLY ASSESSED, THESE FRONTLINE DEFENSIVE UNITS ARE NEITHER HIGH VALUE NOR OF CONCERN TO THE IZ GHQ OR TO THE IZ REGIME. THAT THEY WERE NOT INFORMED CAN PROBABLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO DEGRADED COMMUNICATIONS, DISTANCE FROM HEADQUARTERS TO FRONTLINE, OR MERELY BECAUSE THESE UNITS WERE "OUT OF THE LOOP." FROM AN ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVE, THIS MAY HAVE BEEN AN INTENTIONAL OMISSION, FORCING THE INFANTRY UNITS TO CONTINUE TO DEFEND AND SLOW THE MARCENT ADVANCE; ALLOWING OPERATIONAL RESERVE FORCES MORE TIME TO WITHDRAW. 2. AS IZ FORCES ARE CONTINUOUSLY ENGAGED BY COALITION GROUND AND AIR ASSETS, AN ATMOSPHERE OF CHAOS AND PANIC HAS ENSUED, ERODING THEIR WITHDRAWAL INTO A ROUT. IF TRAPPED, IZ UNITS CAN BE EXPECTED TO SURRENDER EN MASSE. IT REMAINS POSSIBLE THAT IZ SPECIAL UNITS (INTEL AND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS) HAVE RECEIVED DIRECTION FROM BAGHDAD TO TAKE HOSTAGES AND COMMIT FINAL ACTS OF DESTRUCTION BEFORE DEPARTING KUWAIT. INDICATIONS OF THIS ACTION ARE THE REPORTS OF BOOBYTRAPING VARIOUS HEADQUARTERS AND THE OILFIELD FIRES. THE IZ GHQ CAN BE EXPECTED TO REORGANIZE ITS FORCES, IF POSSIBLE, TO DEFEND A PERIMETER AROUND BASRA. THE RGFC MAY ATTEMPT TO OPEN A CORRIDOR TO BAGHDAD, IN ORDER TO MOVE FORCES UP FOR A DEFENSE OF THE CAPITAL. CENTCOM ASSESSES THE IRAQIS WILL CAPITULATE OR ACCEPT ALL UNSC RESOLUTIONS WITHIN THE NEXT 96 HOURS. 3. [ (b)(6) ] and [ b.2. ] BT #7306 INFODATE: 0
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