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File: 950925_83300226.txtUSAFE EARLY BIRD 91-21 (U) Filename:83300226 NNNN TEXT: ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX559 MCN = 91031/05000 TOR = 910310332 PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS0057 0310330-RUEALGX. ZNY HEADER P 310330Z JAN 91 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC INFO RUEALGX/SAFE P 310450Z JAN 91 FM UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE//INOA// TO BT BODY SUBJ: USAFE EARLY BIRD 91-21 (U) [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] SECTION "B" ANALYTICAL NARRATIVES: ITEM 1. IRAQ: POSSIBLE IRAQI RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ACCORDING TO WESTERN PRESS REPORTS ON 14 JANUARY, IRAQ CLAIMS TO HAVE SECRET WEAPONS THAT WOULD CAUSE TENS OF THOUSAND OF ITS FOES TO DIE BEFORE THEY COULD REACH IRAQI DEFENSES. THE IRAQI DEFENSE MINISTRY NEWSPAPER AL-QADISIYA ASSERTED THAT, "IRAQ'S ARSENAL CONTAINS SURPRISES WHICH WILL ASTONISH OUR ENEMIES AND FASCINATE OUR FRIEND." OTHER PRESS REPORTS HAVE REFERRED TO "UNUSUAL" WEAPONS. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AND IRAQ'S ACCESS TO RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL INDICATE IT WOULD BE FEASIBLE FOR THE IRAQIS TO BUILD A FUNCTIONING NUCLEAR BOMB BUT THAT THE IRAQIS COULD HAVE OBTAINED RADIOCATIVE MATERIAL FROM OPERATION OF THEIR RESEARCH REACTORS AND MAY PLAN TO DISPERSE THIS MATERIAL USING A CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVE CHARGE. SUCH AN IRAQI EXPLOSIVE RADIOLOGICAL DEVICE WOULD NOT BE A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WEAPON. IT WOULD CREATE NO SPECIAL BLAST EFFECT, AND IT COULD NOT CAUSE WIDESPREAD RADIATION SICKNESS. THAT WOULD BE TRUE EVEN IN THE WORST CASE, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE IF SUCH WEAPONS WERE USED AGAINST UNPREPARED AND UNPROTECTED CIVILIANS IN A CITY. THERE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE A SUBSTANTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT, NOT ONLY ON THE TARGETS BUT ON THEIR LEADERS. IN THE FOG OF WAR, MOREOVER, THE RADIOACTIVITY CAUSED BY THE DETONATION OF A RADIOLOGICAL DEVICE COULD LEAD TO A CONCLUSION THAT IRAQ HAD USED A NUCLEAR DEVICE. THAT MIGHT TRIGGER ESCALATORY MOVES AMONG COALITION MEMBERS. IF IRAQ HAS EXPLOSIVE RADIOLOGICAL DEVICES, WE BELIEVE SADDAM WOULD TRY TO USE THEM IN A WAY THAT WOULD MAXIMIZE THEIR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. ALTERNATIVELY, IN VIEW OF THE POTENTIAL FOR OVERREACTION, SADDAM MIGHT CONSIDER THEM TO BE WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT. [ (b)(2) ][ (b)(6) ]
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