AFTER ACTION REPORT ODS 14JUN91

File: 123096_sep96_decls21_0012.txt
Page: 0012
Total Pages: 14

Subject: AFTER ACTION REPORT ODS  14JUN91                                

Unit: 22D SUPCOM  

Parent Organization: ARCENT      

Box  ID: BX005555

Folder Title: 1ST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP                                                           

Document Number:          2

Folder Seq  #:          1










             S. Command and Control. Fragmented operations at all levels were
             the norm from response team through group. Ability to direct and
             manage was limited and great reliance was placed on individual
             ability   and   initiative.    In   the busy period during and
             immediately after the ground war I was able to move detachments
             into critical areas and provide support as needed.

             9. EOD Tools. Very limited or no use of most tools. Resupply of
             EOD tools would have been z4-lch through normal channels.

             10. Publications. As might be expected the lag in keeping up
             with new ordnance meant there were items encountered not in the
             pubs. This would have been more important had we been dealing
             with more fired Iraqi ordnance. Some units did not have or did
             not bring enough copies with them. One per team/CP is a
             reasonable issue level. A normal L MTOE requires 5 for teams and
             I for the CP, a total of 6.

             11. Vehicles.

                   a. CUCV's are a compromise on/off road vehicle and as such
             were inferior to         s for off road use. In addition to their
             poor   performance and durability off road CUCVs were more
             difficult to have repaired or obtain parts.

                b. Organic hauling capac4-ty is not adequate for the amount of
             equipment units have. A 2 1/2 Ton or 5 Ton Truck with trailer
             would go a long way toward solving the problem and providing a
             mobile CP.

             12. Supply. Few equipment items ordered from CONUS arrived in
             Saudi Arabia. This theater never matured and other than a few
             items such as LORAN/GPS and HMKV that were pushed, little
             arrived in country. Distribution of common items and supplies
             was a constant problem. There were often short term spot
shortages of water, uniforms, aaps, etc. An item could be non
             existent at one location while a few miles away there would be
             an over supply.

             13. Maintenance. Also spotty - very good for some; terrible for
             others. Addition of a mechanic and a more extensive PLL would
             improve equipment operational readiness rates. The mechanic
             (63B) in the L-M.TOE is required but not authorized.

             14. Administration: It proved difficult to get orders cut,
             actions input or anything else done through PERSCOM in Riyadh.
             Within Group reports and information were sometimes late but on
             the whole were satisfactory. Most units worked actions through
             their home station because that is where their records were kept
             and no-one in country could accomplish the necessary actions.


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Document 14 f:/Week-46/BX005555/1ST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP/after action report ods 14jun91:121796111636108
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-46
Box ID = BX005555
Unit = 22D SUPCOM
Parent Organization = ARCENT
Folder Title = 1ST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP
Folder Seq # = 1
Subject = AFTER ACTION REPORT ODS 14JUN91
Document Seq # = 2
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996