AFTER ACTION REPORT ODS 14JUN91

File: 123096_sep96_decls21_0013.txt
Page: 0013
Total Pages: 14

Subject: AFTER ACTION REPORT ODS  14JUN91                                

Unit: 22D SUPCOM  

Parent Organization: ARCENT      

Box  ID: BX005555

Folder Title: 1ST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP                                                           

Document Number:          2

Folder Seq  #:          1









            15. Technical Intelligence. The rapid conduct of the war did not
            permit any Tech Intel documents to be received, although a great
            deal of first seen ordnance was collected for exploitation.
            Detachments did a good job of detecting Tech Intel items. When
            personnel arrived from indianhead NOS, MD and Picatinny Arsenal,
            NJ they systematically searched Iraqi Ammunition Supply Points
            for first seen ordnance.

            16. ADPE/Computers. A necessary equipment item for keeping up
            with administrative requirements. Dust and shock were problems
            as   many of the systems were too delicate for the harsh
            environment. Repair for systems that went down was not available
            in the Corps areas. There was a repair facility in Dhahran.
            17. Mail. Many units made frequent moves from one nameless spot
            in the desert to another and in the process often changed APOs
            as well. The controls moved less frequently and if I had to do
            this again I would not have mail delivered below the Control
            Team level. The Postal units worked hard but mail service was
            not a Desert Shield success story.

            18.  VIP Support. Only a few missions were pulled out of country
            but  the administrative travel arrangements were difficult. It
            was  a major distraction to pull troops out of the field and get
            them launched on a VIP trip.

            19.  Load out for deployment. Most units were at the bottom of
            the  learning curve and experience varied widely in terms of
            support from the home post and how smooth or effective the
            process was. Lots of confusion, misinformation, and inadequate
            lead times made the move more difficult than it should have
            been. This lead to units coming in country and spending long
Cement City " in Dhahran.
            Existence there was on a par with refugee camps anywhere -
            stupefyingly boring, mindless, and dull.

            20. Unit Personnel. The L series MTOE with its increased
            personnel and equipment is a big improvement over the H series.
            In general an L unit could do as much as two R units and do a
            better job of sustaining itself in the field.
            21. Individual Weapons for Security. There was a wide variety of
            weapons in the Group. : M1911AI and M9 Pistols, M-14 and M-16AI
            and A2 rifles. Some of the rifles were modified with telescopic
            sights. Only Major Zeugner and SFC Scholz had actual contact
            with Iraqi forces and with a pistol and a rifle apparently took
            on several light machine guns and a dozen or more riflemen. No
            weapons they could have been supplied would probably have made
            any difference.



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Document 14 f:/Week-46/BX005555/1ST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP/after action report ods 14jun91:121796111636108
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-46
Box ID = BX005555
Unit = 22D SUPCOM
Parent Organization = ARCENT
Folder Title = 1ST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP
Folder Seq # = 1
Subject = AFTER ACTION REPORT ODS 14JUN91
Document Seq # = 2
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996