AFTER ACTION REPORT ODS 14JUN91

File: 123096_sep96_decls21_0011.txt
Page: 0011
Total Pages: 14

Subject: AFTER ACTION REPORT ODS  14JUN91                                

Unit: 22D SUPCOM  

Parent Organization: ARCENT      

Box  ID: BX005555

Folder Title: 1ST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP                                                           

Document Number:          2

Folder Seq  #:          1











             4. Support.

                a. Life Support. EOD detachments had to attach themselves to
             larger organizations in order to be part of a viable base
             cluster. in general, combat service support units were better
             hosts than combat support or combat units. They had more
             resources and were more willing to share. National Guard and
             Reserve units were also good to co-locate with because they
             expected to provide service and had a good attitude about doing
             SO.

                   b. Mission Support. other organizations had very little
             understanding of EOD's capabilities. As noted in the As Salman
             Airfield incident some units did not know their own. EOD
             specific supplies and equipment need to be with the teams. Some
             detachments arrived with a full load of explosives, others with
             none.

             5. Communications. Generally not good. A combination of AM and
             FM radio and telephone (.aicrowave)

                   a. FM radios had   too short a range to be effective even at
             the detachment level.     On 1008 CUCV's the commo rack is located
             in a position making     adjustments difficult particularly if the
             vehicle is loaded out.

                   b. AM radios were  not available to every unit and some were
             not complete working     sets. Since these radios are almost never
             used   in   peacetime,    personnel were unfamiliar with their
             operation. Some units did manage to get their 193s working and
             use them. The two 31C Radio Operators lst Group received in
             February made repairs, improved installations and antennas and
             made it possible to reach the 542nd and 543rd by radio. The
             512th's AM radio could not be made to work in time to be of any
             use.

ied on by telephone. Although
             not   reliable   it was often the best/only means available
             especially for classified information. When a unit moved or its
             switch moved it would be out of touch for several days until
             service could be restored.

             6. COMSEC. Without the various COMSEC devices for the radios
             secure comm with the supported units was not possible. National
             Guard units deployed with only one or two FM radios and no
             COMSEC equipment.

             7. ceor. Two problems First, getting units included in the CEOI
             listing and second, securing copies of the published hard copy.
             Solutions  to both problems tended to involve long lead times and
             in a short scenario like this  one it can easily  take to long.

Document 14 f:/Week-46/BX005555/1ST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP/after action report ods 14jun91:121796111636108
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-46
Box ID = BX005555
Unit = 22D SUPCOM
Parent Organization = ARCENT
Folder Title = 1ST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP
Folder Seq # = 1
Subject = AFTER ACTION REPORT ODS 14JUN91
Document Seq # = 2
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996