Following publication of the first US Marine Corps Minefield Breaching Operations interim narrative in July 1997, we received comments from veterans concerning the report—including comments from the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Regiment, Fox commander and from the General Accounting Office in their report entitled, "Gulf War Illnesses, Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD’s Investigative Processes." We responded with an updated narrative that included information based on additional research, interviews with veterans, consultation with subject matter experts, and new information obtained since publication of the interim narrative. This information included:

• An analysis and assessment of the reported chemical warfare agent-related injury to an assault amphibian vehicle crewman in breaching lane Red 1, by a medical expert (a physician) in the field of chemical warfare agent injuries;
• Information regarding three other possible chemical warfare agent-related injuries to Marines in the 2d Marine Division during breaching operations;
• An examination of a chemical agent monitor (CAM) alert following minefield breaching operations, by the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Regiment Fox crew; and an examination of the possibility that M9 chemical warfare agent detection paper attached to the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Regiment Fox came in contact with chemical warfare agents during breaching operations in breaching lane Red 1;
• An analysis of possible delivery means for chemical warfare agents in breaching lane Red 1 during breaching operations; specifically, whether chemical land mines or Iraqi artillery delivered chemical warfare agents to breaching lane Red 1, and caused the Fox vehicle’s mobile mass spectrometer to alert to the possible presence of three chemical warfare agents;
• Other 2d Marine Division Fox operations during breaching operations, to address an allegation that another Fox corroborated the Fox alert in breaching lane Red 1; and other 2d Marine Division events, such as the possible detection of chemical warfare agents on 2d Marine Division unit vehicles, and reported decontamination of another unit’s vehicles by a US Army decontamination team;
• An examination of a message that GAO believes may support an assumption of chemical warfare agent use on the first day of the ground war by Iraq’s forces; and
• Tab F, which answers, "Did Iraq have chemical mines?" and Tab G, which presents additional information on Fox vapor detection capabilities in the Air/Hi method of operation.

The Presidential Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents reviewed Version 2.0 of the narrative and recommended we republish it as a final report. We have not received any new information on the material presented in the Version 2.0, nor have any additional leads developed to change the narrative’s assessments. Consequently, we made only editorial improvements to the narrative for this final report.

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