Logistics entail procuring, storing, and distributing materiel. During Gulf War military operations, distribution shortcomings frequently thwarted otherwise well-planned logistics. Distribution problems — i.e., getting materials to the units requesting them — affected pesticide availability and contributed to US forces’ widespread local purchase of certain pesticides in Saudi Arabia.

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps authorized medical units to deploy with pesticide stocks; Air Force civil engineering units had the option to do this also. Evidence indicates Navy and Marine Corps medical units either deployed with pesticides or were able to obtain pesticides stockpiled in the theater before deployment.^[798]

The Army authorized its units (companies, batteries, troops, and detachments) to establish field sanitation teams (FSTs) and stock pesticides for each team’s use. However, many units did not deploy with any pesticide stocks. The military authorized Army FSTs to stock the quantities in Table 133 in accordance with Field Manual (FM) 21-10-1.

For the most part, Army units deploying from US installations were under the command of the Army’s Forces Command (FORSCOM) before deployment. Consequently, FORSCOM Regulation 700-2 authorized certain medical units and elements with a preventive medicine mission to pre-stock pesticides.

The Army used letter designations to distinguish the various medical detachments’ missions. "LA" meant the unit had an entomology mission. The 714^th Medical Detachment (LA) was the only Army entomology unit to deploy. "LB" meant the unit performed more general preventive medicine missions and did not include entomologists. Tables 134 through 137 list these units’ pre-stocked pesticide allowances.^[800]

Units that ordered pesticides experienced military supply distribution problems virtually across the board. In November 1993, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) gave the Armed Forces Pest Management Board (AFPMB) data about the pesticides ordered for the Gulf War. Table 138 summarizes that data by service.^[801]

A report from the US Navy Environmental Health Center’s preventive medicine team, which deployed between August 24 and October 14, 1990, summarized pesticide supplies as of October 25, 1990. The report did not identify quantities of pesticides by source. Supplies may have accompanied units deploying from home stations. Units also might have obtained supplies pre-positioned in Bahrain or other Navy locations, or may have ordered supplies specifically for Operation Desert Shield and received them in the Gulf.^[802]

Because of the problems associated with using mists or fogs in desert winds, the Disease Vector Ecology and Control Center, Jacksonville (DVECC-JAX) emphasized residual and barrier emulsifiable concentrates (ECs). DVECC-JAX judged the 30 gallons of Dursban 4E and 200 gallons of 90 percent malathion EC stocked in the operations area (probably in Bahrain) was adequate to support six months of operations. DVECC-JAX believed residual wettable powders for use around latrines were en route, even though the quantities were not specified. DVECC-JAX reported the supplies on hand: 50 pounds each of two percent diazinon dust and one-percent lindane dust, 20 pounds of Talon rodenticide, and 10,800 tubes of DEET repellent cream. The sprayable permethrin repellent (also called permanone) for spraying uniforms, was on order, but the quantity was unspecified. Two thousand pounds of Fly Tek, a fly bait, were also on order.^[803]

Table 138. Pesticides ordered from DLA

Table 139 shows the distribution of ordered pesticides by service. Table 140 shows the pesticides each service reported using based on analysis of the preventive medicine interviews.

Table 139. Summary of distribution of pesticides ordered from DLA

These two tables show that Army and Air Force personnel apparently used diazinon EC extensively, despite the DLA records showing these same services ordered little or none. Similarly, the Army and Air Force ordered pest strips, but the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps primarily reported using them.

Supply distribution system shortcomings resulted in units facing shortages of many supply items, including pesticides. From the beginning of unit deployments through the end of combat operations, pesticide shortages were prevalent in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Information available on Air Force problems is limited. However, Air Force units generally were co-located with Royal Saudi Air Force units, and several Air Force contacts have mentioned host nation pest control was prevalent on the Saudi Air Force bases.

When supplies were unavailable through military channels, organizations and individuals purchased pesticides locally. Preventive medicine and pest control personnel said fly control products were the pesticides most frequently purchased locally, followed by rodent control products. The Navy’s local purchase requirements varied more than the other services’ requirements, probably due to greater mosquito exposure.

Preventive medicine and pest control personnel most frequently mentioned SNIP^� fly bait as the top local purchase item. According to the 1^st Force Service Support Group entomologist, who was the 1^st Marine Expeditionary Force’s pesticide purchase approval authority, SNIP^� and Alfacron^� were the only two products authorized for Marine units’ local purchase.^[804] Though he did not recall the product’s name, an officer who served with the 2^nd Battalion, 505^th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82^nd Airborne Division, recalled purchasing a fly bait he described as yellow granules, a description consistent with SNIP^�. This officer did not recall who had briefed him on his duties as a purchasing agent, but said he received no guidance on pesticides he could or could not purchase.^[805] The commander of a maintenance unit with the Army’s 2^nd Armored Cavalry Regiment reported his unit used SNIP^�. He believed his unit received SNIP^� on a "push" basis, i.e., the regiment issued it to the unit.^[806]

In an April 1991 situation report, the 12^th Medical Detachment reported that insect infestations, especially fly infestations, were increasing, and "few, if any, pesticides...[were] available in the supply system." The 12^th Medical Detachment advised the units it supported about local pesticide purchasing sources.^[807] In an undated, single-page flyer, the 983^rd Medical Detachment recommended substitutes available from the local economy in the Dammam area. This flyer identified three rodenticides, two fly baits, and a larvacide (for mosquito larva) available from two different suppliers in Dammam. The flyer stated that ordering officers had to obtain approval to purchase these items "through normal channels."^[808]

A Navy entomologist recalled the local purchase of 95% malathion, pyrethroids (possibly cypermethrin or deltamethrin), fly baits (including Fly Tek^� and SNIP^�), and a brand of permethrin.^[809] A second Navy entomologist reported purchasing SNIP^� only,^[810] while a third recalled both SNIP^� and Alfacron^�, the wettable powder form of azamethiphos. A Navy environmental science officer mentioned Baygon^� (propoxur) and malathion as being locally purchased. The only other locally purchased product mentioned by Navy preventive medicine personnel was Ficam^� (bendiocarb).^[811] Air Force pest controllers most prominently mentioned fly bait and rodenticide.^[812] The only product mentioned that was not a fly bait or rodenticide was an aerosol containing permethrin.^[813]

In August 1991, the Army’s Preventive Medicine Detachment, Southwest Asia, distributed a memorandum cautioning unit commanders to ensure that untrained personnel did not procure, possess, or apply pesticides, except for Permanone^� (permethrin) and d-phenothrin. This guidance permitted field sanitation teams (FSTs) to apply chlorpyrifos and use fly baits, such as Flytek^� and Apache^�.^[814] The memorandum’s author, an entomologist, wrote it because the flyer identifying locally available substitutes had listed pesticides that untrained personnel (those who were not certified pest controllers) could not legally purchase in the United States. This memorandum also enabled the entomologist to monitor pest control requirements beyond FSTs’ qualifications.^[815]

Locally purchased pesticides were sometimes labeled in Arabic. A Navy entomologist and an Army environmental science officer both said without qualification that US forces used pesticides labeled in Arabic.^[816]

Pest controllers and preventive medicine specialists and technicians dealt with the problem of labels they could not read in various ways. In some cases the label identified ingredients in English so applicators used that information to determine what to do.^[817] Several applicators obtained demonstrations or translations by local personnel.^[818] Others relied on senior personnel for guidance.^[819] One applicator stated she handled an unknown pesticide without guidance.^[820]

The US military supply system included a variety of pesticides and repellents used throughout the Kuwait Theater of Operations. However, it became necessary to purchase locally available pesticides due to depleted inventory supplies or delays in distribution. As a result, US servicemembers purchased a variety of pesticides from local vendors. Some pesticides, including fly baits, may have been similar to those in the US supply system. In addition, some of these local pesticides may not have been registered with the EPA or may have had labels requiring translation into English. In 1999, The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology published guidance on the local purchase of pesticides during military deployments that provides for the proper review and approval of locally purchased pesticides.^[821]