gencies in Grenada and Panama, demonstrated       Air Component Comrnander (JFACC) used
   ffiat there was considerable room for improve-    that system to develop the daily air tasking
   ment   DESERT SHIELD/STORM reflected              order  (ATO),    the  lack  of  complete
   significant progress - progress based in large    interoperability precluded timely delivery of
   measure on the lessons learned in those earlier   the ATO to naval forces afloat.
   operations.
                                                           In virtually every case where such prob-
         The unique missions and functional          lems arose, workable solutions were devel-
   capabilities of each service are complemen-       oped during the build-up of forces prior to
   tary, enabling and enhancing. Working to-         DESERT STORM. Thejoint requirements pro-
   gether generates the greatest combat capabil-     cess now in effect under the guidance of the
   ity in the shortest period of time. It represents Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
   the best, most economical use of our military     will minimize such problems in the future.
   resources. A single unified chain of command
   with clear and direct lines of communication            The Navy quickly recognized that pre-
   up and down is clearly the best way to ensure     deployment command arrangements were
   U.S. interests are translated into effective ac-  inadequate for a Navy force of the magnitude
   tion.                                             assigned to Central Command during DESERT
                                                     SHIELD. A new Navy component command
   JOINT OPiERATIONS DURING DESERT                   was identified and deployed. Nevertheless,
   SHIELD/STORM.       The Navy was able to          the advantages of a peacetime planning orga-
   quickly and effectively integrate into virtually  nizationwhichparallelswartimerequirements
   all aspects of DESERT SHIELD/STORM be-            are clear.  A revised organization is being
   cause of the significant experience gained dur-   developed to meet those requirements.
   ing extensive involvement in joint operations
   in recent years. As an integral part of Joint           DESERT SHIELD / STORM clearly dem-
   Task Force Middle East in the Persian Gulf        onstrated the tremendous importance and ben-
   du:ring the Iran-Iraq War, Navy ships rou-        efits of joint and combined operations. The
   tinely conducted complex data link and sur-       significant progress made in the conduct of
   veillance operations with USAF and Saudi          such operations over the past several years
   A)NACS aircraft - a valuable prelude to           was dramatically reflected in success on the
 - DESERT SHIELD/STORM. In other theaters,           battlefield. That success further strengthened
   joint exerQses have grown dramatically in         the Navy's commitment to the concept of joint
   scope and complexity, as the interoperable        operations.
   capabilities of all the services have matured.
                                                     THE MARITIME. INTERCEPTION CAM-
         That is not to say there were no prob-      PAIGN. Mounting a successful interception
   lems during DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The              campaign in response to U.N. economic sanc-
   communications systems of all the services are    tions against Iraq required the ability to con-
   still not as interoperable and compatible as      trol nearly 250,000 square miles of sea lanes.
   they should be. The U.S. Air Force computer       Only the United States Navy has the forces and
   assisted flight management system (CAFMS),        expertise to undertake such a monumental
   for example, was not interoperable with Navy      challenge.
   con~unicat:L.ons systems. When the Joint Force


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