WITH THE I MARINE EXPEDrrIONARY FORCE iN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM 39 during testing. After taking steps to improve fuse reliability, Marine combat engineers retained them for use in the assault. However, the engineers were not able to adequately test the chain flail bulldozers which they nicknamed "Ninja Dozers." Every Marine understood the inherent dangers of the obstacle belts. While they believed they could handle mines, barbed wire, and even fiery trenches, the time required to do so meant that the assaulting forces would be vulnerable to the enemy's many indirect fire weapons.27 Force ratios were another worry. Conventional planning normally required at least a 3:1 ratio of attackers to defenders to assure success. In a preliminary I MEF analysis made on 23 December, MarCent and NavCent amphibious forces would not attain parity with the Iraqis except in anti-tank weapons. The relative strengths of MarCent forces, including brigades afloat, compared to estimated Iraqi forces in both southeastern Kuwait and in the MarCent sector were: Item MarCent SE Kuwait MarCent Area Personnel 83,000 202,355 (1: 2.4) 98,755 (1:1.2) Tanks 389 1,596 (1: 4.1) 1,137(1: 2.9) Artillery 264 1,206 (1: 4.6) 648 (1: 2.5) APC 969 1,309 (1:1.4) 922 (1:1.1) Antitank 725 324 (2.2:1) 108 (6.?: 1) For I MEF's assault to succeed, it was imperative that the force achieve overwhelming ratios locally at the breach points. At the same time, the force had to prevent Iraqi reinforcements from closing. One key to these requirements was the use of deception to prevent the Iraqi commanders from forming an accurate picture of the situation on the battlefield.~ Deception and Psychological Waffare' Deception planning began in mid-December when the force received a draft of the CentCom deception plan. General Schwarzkopf wanted to deceive Iraqi forces as to his intentions and the actual location and identities of his units and their sectors. Colonel Charles M. Lohman, the force operations officer, formed a planning cell under Lieutenant Colonel Franklin D. Lane that included representatives of the principal staff, major subordinate commands, the psychological operations suppofl element, the electronic warfare section, and the 1st Radio Battalion. The cell based its planning on several assumptions: that real assets would be used, that the enemy would be able to interpret the deception, that the main deception effort would have to occur prior to the first stage of the ground campaign, that there would be no more than a 24-hour advance notice of that stage, and that human resources and electronic intelligence were the main and secondary enemy collection capability. By 23 December, the cell had developed three deception courses of action: an attack along the Iraqi III and IV Corps boundary near Al Manaqish to seize objectivesFirst Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |