38 U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, I99O~l99I b. In Stage B, 2d Marine Division was to pass through 1st Marine Division and effect a link- up with two brigades of Marines of a NavCent landing force whose first objective was to be the Kuwaiti port of Ash Shuaybah. C. In Stage C, both divisions were to destroy Iraqi forces in-zone and seize two I MEF objectives: the area surrounding the Al Jahra main supply route intersections, plus another blocking position about 10 miles southwest of Al Jahra. d. In Stage D, Marine forces were to prevent Iraqi withdrawal from southeastern Kuwait and to be prepared to assist forward passage of Arab forces to take Kuwait City.~ The decision in favor a single-division breach was because of the limited engineering equipment available as well as the brief time available for 2d Marine Division to conduct training. To resolve the breaching gear issue, the Marine Corps Research, Acquisition, and Development Command at Quantico actively pursued additional breaching equipment but was frustrated by the long lead times required. As it turned out, by mid-February, enough breaching equipment was in-theater to permit a second set of breaches. Forming a precise picture of the obstacle belts was a difficult task as General Boomer lacked detailed imagery and first-hand reconnaissance. The intelligence community believed that the barriers contained antipersonnel, antiarmor, and possibly chemical mines surrounded by barbed wire. Imagery revealed that substantial amounts of oilfield piping had been placed in trenches in front of parts of the first barrier. These were rigged to sources of crude oil that could be ignited to create a flaming barrier. The techniques of breaching obstacles ranged from the conventional to untried schemes. Each received great scrutiny. In November, Marines tested aerial fuel/air explosive weapons (FAIS) against mines on a nearby range. Unfortunately the overpressures generated were not high enough to reliably detonate mines and had little effect on wire obstacles. During the air campaign, U.S. Air Force Boeing B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers made several strikes against sections of the obstacle belts, but they had little effect. Thus, aircraft delivered means would not be a major breaching aid. This left a combination of single and triple-segment line charges flung across the belts by rockets, chain flails attached to armored Caterpillar D7 bulldozers, and track-width mine plows attached to M6OA 1 tanks and D7 bulldozers. In addition, there was the traditional and hazardous technique of manually probing and disarming mines. The line charges experienced a number of fuse failuresFirst Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |