24 U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991 have the logistical capability to move his forces any further west. The issue reached a critical stage as preparations began for a three-division Marine Expeditionary Force. General Boomer--as ComUSMarCent--met with General Yeosock at Jubayl in late November to discuss the expansion of the MarCent area of responsibility. Yeosock was sympathetic, but without the benefit of Maritime Pre-Positioning Force shipping, his forces could not match the initial logistics flow rate of the Marines. The Army's VII Corps, scheduled to conduct the ArCent main attack from bases near Hafar al Batin, more than 500 kilometers from its main port at Dammam. The XVIII Airborne Corps' tactical assembly areas were to be even further west. As it was, VJI Corps was just beginning to get substantial amounts of equipment in-theater and could not be expected to displace soon. To the north, relations with the Saudi and other Arab allies were still in a delicate and evolving state through November. Talks with the Saudis revealed two issues. First was the political necessity of positioning Saudi forces between the Iraqis and the Marines for the time being. Second, the Saudis were unable to move much further north without coming within range of Iraqi supporting arms. This contrasted with the triple pressures on General Boomer: to place Marine forces near offensive assembly areas, to gain space to accommodate large numbers of reinforcements, and to position the logistics support for offensive operations forward. To solidify relations with the Arab allies, General Boomer stepped up the force's cross-training program. From October through December, company- sized units from the 1st Marine Division plus reconnaissance and ANGLICO teams from the 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group (SRIG) conducted continual cross-training with Arab units to the north of the force. The bonds formed between Marines and Arab soldiers during this time contributed greatly to building mutual confidence and later success in combat. Operation Imininent Thunder Central Command conducted a five-phase combined exercise known as Operation Imminent Thunder from 15 to 21 November 1990. General Schwarzkopf wanted to provide "an environment within which jointicombined operational issues c(ould) be identified, analyzed, and resolved" by faithfully simulating theater situations and conditions in a defensive scenario.16 It was the first major joint and combined force exercise in-theater to have fully integrated air, ground, and naval activity. For their part, Marine forces conducted fire support coordination and linkup operations with the 2d Brigade of the Saudi Arabian National Guard and an amphibious landing force of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. General Boomer also used the exercise as an opportunity to shakedown his staff in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and interoperability (C4I2). Unlike his subordinate units which had been stable in personnel for months, Boomer needed an event like this to weld his "composited" staff into a warfighting headquarters.17First Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |