wfrH THE I MARINE EXPEDrTIONARY FORCE IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM 23 force in January. The story of their deployment was typical of the Marine Reserve experience in the Gulf. The regiment mustered about 1,716 personnel and consisted of a headquarters company and three rifle battalions spread throughout drill sites in the mid-west. Its commander was Colonel George E. Germann, a regular officer and graduate of the U.S. Military Academy with a devotion toward physical fitness. The battalions received their activation orders on 13 November and most of the officers reported on 22 November. The enlisted personnel-- many of them college students--arrived by 29 November. Some members of the regular inspector-instructor staff deployed with the unit, some reported to combat replacement companies, and others remained at their stateside posts. The regiment's 1st Battalion deployed to Okinawa where it filled a vacated slot as part of the unit deployment program. After administrative and medical screening at 14 local training centers in places like Danville, Illinois, and Johnson City, Tennessee, the remaining companies drew their equipment and flew to Camp Lejeune during the first week in December. There, they formed into their usual battalions, the 2d under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Francis A. Johnson, and the 3d under Lieutenant Colonel Ronald G. Guwil- liams. After a brief training cycle that included weapon firing and chemical warfare training, the regiment flew into Jubayl on 1-3 January l99l.~~ Expanding the Area of Operations General Boomer moved his command post out of the commercial port to an unused auxiliary police post in the industrial city of Jubayl on 27-29 November. The `police station" was a short walk from Camp Gray. The terrible heat of August and September had broken, and the living was as good as it would ever get at I MEF. This was the first of four moves that the force headquarters would make over the next three months. As the planning evolution and buildup proceeded, the force Operating area for both training and maneuver space became increasingly constricted. From the beginning, there had been no live fire ranges available to Marines and therefore no way the 1st Marine Division could zero in its weapons, especially the ones that had come off the ships of the Maritime Pre-Positioning Force. The subject seemed to be a particularly delicate one for the Saudis who at first were nervous with the idea of any foreign weapons being fired within the kingdom at all. Eventually, the Saudis realized the importance of the ranges and a mobile train- ing team from the Marine Air-Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, under Colonel John W. Moffett, commissioned the first sites in November. Moffett's range organization was good, and the Saudis were sufficiently impressed to soon become the sites' second-best customers. Another concern of this period was corps boundaries. To the west the U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ArCent) area of operations compressed Marine forces into a 30-kilometer-wide band along the coast to Manifah Bay. The ArCent commander, Lieutenant General John G. Yeosock, USA, did not yetFirst Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |