BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES LAB MEETING 3 JAN 91

File: 123096_sep96_decls25_0006.txt
Page: 0006
Total Pages: 7

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES LAB MEETING  3 JAN 91           

Unit: OTSG        

Parent Organization: HSC         

Box  ID: BX003201

Folder Title: CONFIRMATION OF ATTACK WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS                                                  

Document Number:          5

Folder Seq  #:         17









             C. (U) Disadvantages

                  (1) (U) Results may not be able to withstand the most
         severe, worldwide, scientific scrutiny. Standards and control
         procedure documentation may be in question.

                  (2) @ Time restriction. Cannot logistically procure all
         equipment/materiel, get a facility, re-calibrate analytical
         techniques, and have a fully operational lab before 15 Jan 91.

                  (3) (U) Many American civilian scientists from USAMRIID
         will be needed in the AOR lab besides military personnel.





                  (5)      Would degrade USAMRIID BW identification
         capability during the most critical time period, Jan - Mar 91.

         4. (U) Option 2.
             a.    (U) Place comprehensive BW identification capability in
         the two AOR labs for clinical decision making and screening
         environmental samples (Encl).

             b.    (U) Maintain capability for definitive analysis of BW
         samples at U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
         Disease (USAMRIID). The USAMRIID results would be able to
         withstand the most severe, worldwide, scientific scrutiny.

             C. (U) Advantages

                  (1) (U) Definitive BW analysis capability is established
         in the AOR for rapid initial assessment of potential BW attack.

                  (2) (U) Rapid assessment in AOR will permit defensive and
         appropriate measures to be taken against the identified BW threat.

                  (3) (U) Time for initial assessment is not dependent upon
         turn around time of CONUS lab analysis and reporting to AOR.

                  (4) @ Maintains CONUS worldwide scientific community
         accepted capability to analyze BW samples and provides data through
         intelligence channels to NCA. Does not degrade USAMRIID analysis
         capability.

                  (5) @ Technical Escort has established procedures for
us chemical/biological warfare sample shipment to CONUS.


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Document 7 f:/Week-36/BX003201/CONFIRMATION OF ATTACK WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS/biological warfare capabilities lab meeting 3 j:12179609281826
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-36
Box ID = BX003201
Unit = OTSG
Parent Organization = HSC
Folder Title = CONFIRMATION OF ATTACK WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Folder Seq # = 17
Subject = BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES LAB MEETING 3 J
Document Seq # = 5
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996