BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES LAB MEETING 3 JAN 91

File: 123096_sep96_decls25_0005.txt
Page: 0005
Total Pages: 7

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES LAB MEETING  3 JAN 91           

Unit: OTSG        

Parent Organization: HSC         

Box  ID: BX003201

Folder Title: CONFIRMATION OF ATTACK WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS                                                  

Document Number:          5

Folder Seq  #:         17










                                                                7 Jan 91


                        BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) ATTACK IN THE
                           AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR) -
                        ALERT AND CONFIRMATION CAPABILITY FOR
                           FOR OPERATION DESERT SHIEID (U)

         1. @ The recommended approach to provide clinically and
         operationally useful information to CINCCENT and definitive
         documentation of BW agent use in the Area of Responsibility (AOR)
         to the National Command Authority (NCA) is as follows:

             a. @ The BW Detection and Warning System in the AOR will
         provide early warning of BW attack.
             b. (U) Clinical and BW lab results in the AOR will assist in
         providing early warning and confirming potential Bw attack.

             C. (U) AOR BW samples will be shipped immediately to CONUS
         labs which are recognized by international scientific organization
         for definitive analysis of BW agents. These results will form a
         strong basis for NCA decision process.
         2. @ Office of the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) is of
         the opinion that definitive BW lab analysis (U.S. Army Medical
         Research Institute of Infectious Disease, USAMRIID) be placed in
         the AOR for rapid, irrefutable assessment of a BW attack in the
         AOR. Advantages and disadvantages are listed for such an option as
         well as an alternative option to increase AOR BW lab capabilities
         in succeeding paragraphs.

         3. (U) Option 1. Place all of USAMRIID's capability in the AOR.

             a. (U) Requirements
                 (1) (U) Place many of the military and civilian scientists
         in the AOR in a comparable USAMRIID facility.

                 (2) (U) Procure and install in the AOR sophisticated and
         basic equipment upon which BW analysis can take place.

n the
         testing of unknown BW samples.

             b. (U) Advantages

                 (1) (U) Capability is in the AOR, and transport of samples
         not have to go back to CONUS.

                 (2) (U) Turn around time is minimized.

         CIASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
         DECIASSIFY ON: OADR
                                                                @VAC L

Document 7 f:/Week-36/BX003201/CONFIRMATION OF ATTACK WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS/biological warfare capabilities lab meeting 3 j:12179609281826
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-36
Box ID = BX003201
Unit = OTSG
Parent Organization = HSC
Folder Title = CONFIRMATION OF ATTACK WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Folder Seq # = 17
Subject = BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES LAB MEETING 3 J
Document Seq # = 5
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996