DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS

File: 123096_sep96_decls1_0103.txt
Page: 0103
Total Pages: 109

Subject: DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS       

Unit: OTSG        

Parent Organization: HSC         

Box  ID: BX003203

Folder Title: DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS                                       

Document Number:          1

Folder Seq  #:         21











                                                 NATO UNCLASSIFIED


                                                     CHAPTER 10

                                      EPIDEMIOLOCY AND PUBLIC HEALTH ASPECTS


                 EPIDEMIOLOGY

                 1001. The detection of a BW attack or     sabotage with a biological agenc will
                 probably first and foremost depend on a quick and reliable epidemiological
                 reporting system.   A day to day system, which allows military as well as civil
                 health authorities to monitor outbreaks and cases of infectious diseases and
                 toxicoses, is required.

                 1002. In the case of a disease being endemic in an area, a sudden peak of the
                 epidemic curve will indicate a locus, which will almost always be a
                 common-source infection.   The common source will have to be contaminated wacer
                 or food or a biological cloud."

                 1003. The same will be the case if the disease does not exist in the area.
                 In this situation the diagnosis of the disease and the identification of the
                 agent will probably be much more difficult and time consuming.

                 1004. The efficiency of such a reporcing system during war or mobilization
                 depends highly on the peacetime setup Of che system.       The saying that nothing
                 can be done in war that has not been trained for in peace is true in this
                 connection too.  There must be close cooperation between civil and military
                 systems, and this cooperation must be a mulcidisciplinary one, involving
                 professionals such as epidemiologists, physicians, veterinarians,
                 entomologists, ecologists, statisticians, laboratory technicians and wildlife
                 technicians. Only a well-established close cooperation between such
e co reach a rapid probable diagnosis and thus
                 to decide whether any directed action should be scatted.

                 1005. It is essential to get an idea of the attack rate, the mortality rate,
                 and to know whether there is a secondary spread.      Without chis knowledge it
                 will be impossible to decide on the type of directed action such as isolation,
                 mass immunization, mass prophylactic treatmenc, and environmental concrol.

                 1006. Much effort should be put into uncovering whether the infectious agent
                 is a zoonotic one, in order to minimize contact with evencual carrier
                 animals. If symptoms of mass disease occur in any group of animals, some of
                 these should be sacrificed for the purpose of thorough gross pathology,
                 hiscology and microbiology. Isolation of an agent should lead to rapid
                 tescing for ancibiotic sensitivity and for sensitivity to other possible
                 antimicrobials and disinfectants.

                 1007. Various typ(A of animals in the area should be killed and examined in
                 virological and bacteriological laboratories in order co determine a possible
                 reservoir of infection and to find out whether passages in various hosts will
                 eventually change the virulence of the pathogen.
                 )08. Epidemiological cencres should have in their Computers all available
                             ADOLIL a'; characceriscics of infectious diseases and toxicoses in


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Document 109 f:/Week-36/BX003203/DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS/detection of medical defense against biological :1217960927452
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-36
Box ID = BX003203
Unit = OTSG
Parent Organization = HSC
Folder Title = DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
Folder Seq # = 21
Subject = DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996