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Subject: DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS       

Unit: OTSG        

Parent Organization: HSC         

Box  ID: BX003203

Folder Title: DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS                                       

Document Number:          1

Folder Seq  #:         21












                     days for viruses, and from 2 to 6 weeks to identify Most rickettsiae.         An
                     urgent need exists for development of practical melnods for accelerating
                     specific or group identification so that this task may be accomplished in a
                     period of time not Lo exceed a few hours following receipt of the specimen in
                     the laboratory.   In evaluating this problem from a practical Standpoint, one
                     Must assume that the enemy could employ an organism other than the ones
                     commonly encountered in every day medical practice.       IL is unlikely that the
                     ordinary clinical laboratory, employing routine procedures, would be able Lo
                     identify the specific agent.    With the advent Of genetic engineering, it is
                     also likely that a common organism could be used to conceal the genome of a
                     far more dangerous agent.    There are possible exceptions LO these rather broad
                     assumptions, but the only safe POSiEion is to assume that special laboratory
                     facilities will be required Lo confirm the initial diagnosis and to study the
                     biological properties ol, the BW agent.

                     TOXINS

                     605.   In addition to conventional microbial toxins, e.g., botulin,
                     SLaphylococcal enterocoxin B and T-2 mycoeoxin, the advent of biotechnology
                     has changed the magnitude of the toxin threat.      Toxins 'which are naturally
                     produced in only small amount$ can be produced in large'quanlities using
                     bioengineering techniques.    Subtle changes in the structure of toxins may have
                     no effect on their toxic properties, while they may decrease the ability of
 to normal
                     physiological compounds, which could act as carriers to deliver the toxin to
                     all cells in the body wich receptors for the compound.

                     606.   The ability co produce large quantities of formerly rare toxins, the
                     ability to manipulate their structures, and the ability to target them for
                     specific cells has greatly increased their potential threat as effective BW
                     agents.

                     DETECTION

                     607.   The following information, if available, will help in determining the
                     occurrence of a BW attack.

                            a. The number of &cutely ill military and civilian patients. A large
                            number of casualties would be expected in the first 48-72 hours and, in
                            the case Of Loxins, within minutes.      The epidemiology should be LhaL Of
                            a massive single source.

                            b. The attack rate Of clinical illness will be very high relative to
                            those at risk.
                                      i.
                            c. The illness type may be unusual or "impossible" for the geographic
                            area. For example, Venezuelan equine encephalitis in Europe.

                            d. Signature of the aerosol route of exposure. There may be an
                            unusual prevalence of respiratory involvement in diseases that, when
                            acquired in nature, almost always cause a different nonpulmonary
                            syndrome, for example: inhalation &nlhrai versus cutaneous anthrax$



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Document 109 f:/Week-36/BX003203/DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS/detection of medical defense against biological :1217960927452
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-36
Box ID = BX003203
Unit = OTSG
Parent Organization = HSC
Folder Title = DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
Folder Seq # = 21
Subject = DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996