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File: 970725_dec96_decls42_0010.txt
Subject = SUMMARY COMMAND CHRONOLOGY OP D SHIELD 10 MAR 91
Parent Organization = MCCDC
Unit = WDID
Folder Title = MACS-2 COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 2 AUG 90-28 FEB 91 SWA 089
Document Number = 2
Box ID = BX600177
IED
Fro@m" 10-17 Dece;@l -2 functioned as an Alt@i-.iaLe
',Tactical Air Command ) at KAANB while the TACC
.:displaced from Shaikh Isa Al:@r"field, Bahrain to Jubail Airfield,
Saudi Arabia. The ATACC was'.M'anned by MACS-2 personnel witti
augmentation from 3@ MAW and'. H&HS-38 personnel. The estAI)IIshmerit
of the ATACC provided-the Tact@:Lcal Air Commander (TAC) the ability
to maintain situational awareness of the air picture throughout.
the displacement. In addition, the movement of the TACC was
transparent to all players in theater.
MACS-2 established a Jo@'nt-'Combat Operations Center at both
TAOC sites with representatives from 2dLAAMBn, 3dLAAMBn, 2d[,AADBn,
'3dLAADBn Army l@2nd/lOlat Airborne (Shorad), British Air Defense
Artillery (ADA) and the Satidi!Naval UCC. The JCOC provicip,(] z@.,@r
e ed Li
-key AAW players within al ti"7threat information requii.
Iemploy surface to air weapons'systems.
As the air interdiction phase of Operation Desert Storm
shifted to the KTO battlefield.preparation phase and all 3d MAW
OAS aircraft missions became'focused on the KTO, it became obvious
that a dedicated tanker track was required for IMEF aircraft.
MACS-2 engineered such a track, which became known as the
Gooseberry track (2833N 4831E/2845N 4850E). The maintenance of
this track permitted 3d MAW to-maintain FASTFAC, EW and SEAD/AAW
aircraft on station@@n support of OAS operations within the KTO@
MACS-2 provided assistance to aircraft and aircrews in
distress through flight-monitoring and voice coordination with this
MTACC, AWACS, AFTACC and NTDS ships in support of theatre Combat
Search and Rescue (CSAR) and Tactical Recovery of AircrAft and
Personnel (TRAP) missions. Although the TAOC did not directly
control the CSAR/TRAP missions, our coordination among control
agencies was directly responsible for the successful recovery of
three downed aircrews in the KTO. The USCENTAF Joint Rescue
Coordination Center (JRCC) and USNAVCENT CSAR aircraft exercised
overall control of all CSAR/TRAP mission!i.
MARCENT was not in control of the airspace above t.tie OCE AOR,
with the exception of HIDACZE I-le w@iich were activated it-. ti)e
request of the DASC, through higher headquarters, in resl)oit@7,e t:o
the flow of Close Air Support (CAS) and lire-planned irid on-rill
fire support missions in support of the GCE. Additiorially this
was no dedicated Marine Corps F/A-18 figliter CAPS. Despite t[iis,
MACS-2 controlled over 366 CAP missions citiriiiq Opprationn fie@eri
Shield/Storm, these CAPs accounted foi over 705 hours of TAL)IL-C
data link operations. Prior to D-Day and the air interdiction
campaign into the KTO and Iraq,:the Northern Gulf CAP was manned
twenty-four hours per day by Marine F/A-18 fighters flying out of
Shaikh Isa Airfield in Bahrain." This CAP was controlled on a time
share basis between USN AAW and Coalition Forces
(British/Australian) ships and.MACS-2. In addition, the East High
Value Airborne Asset (HVAA) CAP manned by USAF/RSAF F-15's, was
also controlled by MACS -2 durin@g"'tho@ window when the Eastern
ENCLOSURE (1)
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