COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR 1 DEC 31 DEC 1990

File: 102496_sep96_decls13_0009.txt
Page: 0009
Total Pages: 17

Subject: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR 1 DEC 31 DEC 1990                        

Unit: 1 MEF       

Parent Organization: FMF PAC     

Box ID: BX600009

Folder Title: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 1ST MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE DEC 1990 FOLDER 2                             

Document Number:          3

Folder SEQ  #:          5



                          UNCLASSIFIED
              ik @. Although it had been agreed in November that the MARCENT boundary would be
              expanded westward, it was not until - December that ARCENT's XVIII Airborne Corps was
              able to displace to the west. Nevertheless, at the end of the month, several "enclaves" of
              ARCENT forces still remained within the expanded MARCENT area of responsibility which
              affected the ability of MARCENT forces to use certain training ranges and areas.
                N r@TrainingmdCombinedE=Relations.IMEFcontinuedtrainingwith7
              ArmoNred Brigade, the 2d Brigade of the Saudi Arabian National Guard, and the Royal Saudi
              Marine Corps. The interoperability of the forces at the unit level improved as a result of this
              cross training. At the command level, the shift from a defensive to offensive posture required
              an even more durable and effective relationship with the Saudi military. An agreement was
              made with the Saudis to establish a Host Nation Joint Liaison Team.
                                z Eastern Province A= Command Bound@ @ Expanded MARCENT
              A= af Respgnsibility IQ ik @. The northward movement of the MARCENT boundary
              remained a complex issue. This was two-fold: the political necessity, from the Saudi viewpoint,
              of positioning its forces as the front line defense of the nation, together with the inability of
              Saudi forces to move any further north without coming within range of Iraqi supporting arms.
              This contrasted with the dual pressures on LtGen Boomer to place his forces near their
              offensive assembly areas and the need for space to accomodate the inflow of large numbers of
              reinforcements. Ultimately, Saudi concerns were overridden by the requirements of the
              offensive plan. On - December, MARCENT was granted a northward extension of its
undary into areas previously controlled by the Eastern Province Area Commander.

                N) MARCENT md the R@.d Mishab Airfield/ Port Complex. Of particular importance to
              the MARCENT offensive plan was the granting of rights to use and expand the Ras al Mishab
              Royal Saudi Naval Force airfield and its adjacent port located about - miles southeast of the
              Kuwait border. LtGen Boomer intended that the jet-capable airfield be used to accommodate a
              helicopter air group. It was estimated that the port could accept AMSEA Class ships of the
              Maritime Prepositioning Force.

                t&) Tannaiib Airfield. Although an expanded Al Mishab airfield could accommodate a
              helicopter group, in order to support the MARCENT offensive course of action, it was
              necessary to bring a second helicopter group north. In early November, the jet-capable airfield
              at Aramco's large facility at Tannajib was identified as being most advantageous for size and
              location. Despite persistent and lengthy negotiations with Aramco, the Saudi-owned,
              American- managed petroleum production enterprise - and the nation's largest - refused to
              grant MARCENT permission for its use. With time running out to complete preparations for
              offensive operations, the level and intensity of negotiations increased. Acting upon a request
              from LtGen Boomer, the Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation, LtGen Prince Khalid bin
              Abdul Aziz gave instructions that MARCENT be accommodated. Arainco continued its refusal
              to cooperate, and, at the end of the month, commandeering the site was being considered.

                N Psychological Warfare OWrations (Psy0ps) Planning. The offensive planning of I MEF
              envisioned the necessity for psychological operations. This need arose out of the desire to (1)
and (2) manage a civilian population - some of whom might
              be hostile Palestinians. Because the Marine Corps lacked psychological operations capability
              within its available assets, CINCCENT assigned Element 9-1 of the U.S. Army's 9th






                                            UNCLASSIFIED

Document 17 f:/Week-35/BX600009/COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 1ST MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE DEC 1990 FOLDER 2/command chronology for 1 dec 31 dec 1990:10119615450314
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-35
Box ID = BX600009
Unit = 1 MEF
Parent Organization = FMF PAC
Folder Title = COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 1ST MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE DEC 1990 FOLDER 2
Folder Seq # = 5
Subject = COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR 1 DEC 31 DEC 1990
Document Seq # = 3
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 11-OCT-1996