ASSESSMENT OF REMAINING IRAQI CHEMICAL AND SRBM

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ASSESSMENT OF REMAINING IRAQI CHEMICAL AND SRBM CAPABILITY 

Filename:615rpt.91m

[ (b) (1) sec. 1.3 (a) (4) ][   (b)(2)   ] [   (b)(6)   ]




SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF REMAINING IRAQI CHEMICAL AND SRBM 
CAPABILITY 



I. SRBMs

1.  We are unable to accurately estimate Iraq's remaining 
short range ballistic missile (SRBM) capabilities. This 
results fnom uncertainty about Iraqi inventories of missiles 
and mobile launchers at the start of hostilities, as well as 
levels of destruction achieved during the war.

2.  Except for the 86 SRBMs expended against Israel (40 
launches) and against targets in Saudi Arabia and Gulf States 
(46 launches) since 18 Jan, no other degrading of this asset 
with the exception of the fixed erector/launchers -- can 
presently be confirmed. Of the 28 fixed erector/launchers 
estimated to be operational on 18 Jan at the SRBM launch sites 
in western Iraq, only four are now assessed  as capable of 
launching a missile. However, there is no evidence that any 
launches were carried out from these launchers, and there have 
been no reported efforts at their repair. The more significant 
component of the western Iraq SRBM force, the mobile launchers 
-- transporter erector launchers (TEL) or mobile erector 
launchers (MEL) -- likely remain operational, despite numerous 
claims of destruction of launch vehicles and missiles. 
However, the reduced frequency of launches in the latter days 
of the war suggests that this SRBM force was experiencing 
difficulties. It is not known if these were due to successful 
coalitian air attacks, Iraqi attempts to avoid Coalition air 
attacks, or shortages in key supplies or components. We assess 
that an unknown number of operational mobile launchers and 
missiles likely remain in western Iraq, nontheless, they are 
probably capable of launching only the sporadic attacks which 
characterized the last week of the war.

3. The key question for the Iraqi mobile SRBM force in 
southeastern Iraq opposite the KTO is the status of mobile 
launchers, reload missiles, and missile fueling/checkout 
facilities in light of the rapid coalition ground advance. 
There is still no information if these:

a. Were destroyed by allied ground forces but not reported. 

b. Abandoned by their Iraqi crews and are mixed in with other 
derelict equipment.





c. Escaped to the sasrah area where they are currently hidden 
d. Managed to escape elsewhere, perhaps to the north.

we have no confirmation of mobile SRBMs escaping the KTO or of 
reported disooveries of SRBM mobile launchers, missiles, or 
support equipment destroyed by air attacks and subsequently 
abandoned, or depot areas and missile fueling/checkout 
facilities. In any case, the SRBM assets in the southeast 
which remain operational are probably disorganized and short 
of essential supplies or equipment. Consequently, they would 
be of little military significance if hostilities were to 
resume. Even if they were able to successfully conduct one or 
even several launches, missile accuracy is likely to be below 
even the previausly demonstrated standards of the past several 
weeks.

4. The failure of Baghdad to employ chemical or biological 
warheads with their SRBMs in the last days of the war suggests 
technical problems, inability to target Coalition foroes 
accurately, and fear of retaliation.

5. Finally, the Iraqi capability to support and sustain their 
launchers andlmissiles at a ready state, has been severely 
degraded. The majority of the support facilities such as at 
Taji and Muhammadi were successfully struck several times 
during the air campaign. Additionally, the Iraqi capability to 
modify their SCUD-B missiles into extended range versions has 
also been severely degraded.

II. Chemical Warfare

1.  Iraq's ability to produce chemical agent has been severely 
degraded but not eliminated. It is assessed to have the 
equipment necessary to produce 50-70 metric tons of nerve 
agent per month and about 5 metric tons of precursor material 
or mustard agent per month. In order to produce this agent 
over time, Iraq will need to import several precursor 
chemicals. It will also need to bring the sysbem back into a 
rational order, e.g. powering up production lines, getting 
chemical precursors into the system, supplying casings for 
weaponizing, etc. Assuming that equipment, such as the filling 
lines, has been relocated and precursor chemicals are still 
available in country, Iraq could be making chemical nunitions 
as soon as the power grid is back in operation. Same 
munitions, such as aerial bombs, could be filled using field 
expedients regardless of the availability of specialized 
filling equipment.

2.  CW production areas included the Samarra Chemical Weapons 
Production and Storage Facility, and the Habbaniyah I, 
Habbaniyah II, and Habbaniyah III precursor production 
facilities. Production at Samarra occurred in 6 unbunkered 
buildings and 4 bunkered buildings. Five of six unbunkered 
buildings and none of the bunkered buildings were destroyed. 
About 70% of Samarra's total production capacity was 
destroyed. Nonetheless, of the four surviving bunkered 
production buildings the most significant was P-6, which is 
capable of producing 60 MT of Sarin per month. The three







Habbaniyah facilities were destroyed.

3.  Three buildings at Samarra were dedicated to CW munitions 
filling and all three of these buildings were destroyed. 
However, at least one of these buildings appears to have been 
empty at the time of destruction. It is not clear whether this 
particular building had any filling equipment before the 
bombing campaign. If it did have filling equipment, this would 
indicate that Iraq has preserved at least part of its chemical 
munitions filling capability and probably other chemical 
related equipment as well. If Iraq has relocated equipment to 
preserve it, we have incomplete information on the location of 
Iraq's present facilities. This cannot be confirmed, but 
leaves doubt abaut the extent of damage to Iraq's ability to 
nake chemical weapons.

4. CW storage capability was in the form of 8 cruciform 
bunkers at Samarra and 22 "S-shaped bunkers at 14 locatians. 
Of the 8 cruciform bunkers one was destroyed and the remaining 
7 sustained only superficial damage. Of the 22 "S"-shaped 
bunkers 16 were destroyed and 6 suffered serious damage. 
Although these bunkers were identified as CW related bunkers 
and included in the CBW target set, bunker architecture is not 
relevant to its ability to store agent or weapons, which would 
have an important impact on Iraq's ability to reconstitute its 
CW storage system.

5.  In order to detennine the time and expense necessary to 
reconstitute the pre-war CBW system, it is necessary first to 
define what is meant by reconstitution of the system. To 
rebuild the system to the level where Iraq would have some 
capability to produce a significant amount of biological and 
chemical agent would require far less time and expense than to 
reproduce the system identical to that which existed on 15 
January 1991.

[   (b)(6)   ]