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Filename:08412100.6

PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 121006
GENDATE:         950718
NNNN
TEXT:            
ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX360 MCN = 91056/01297 TOR = 910560221
OTTSZYUW RUEKJCS7224 0560218---RUEALGX.
ZNY 
HEADER O 250218Z FEB 91
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
O 251100Z FEB 91
FM COMUSMARCENT//G-2/MAFC//
TO AIG 13835
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC//INT//
RUHGOWA/CG FOURTH MEB//G-2//
RUHGOKI/THIRTEENTH MEU//S-2//
RUWDCAA/FIFTEENTH MEU//S-2//
RHOPLHA/ELEVENTH MEU//S-2//
[    b.2.    ]
INFO RUDCEKM/COMUSARCENT//G-2//
RHIUFAA/USCENTAF FWD HQS ELEMENT//G-2/MARLNO//
RULSMCA/CG MCCDC QUANTICO VA//IN//
RUDCSEM/EPAC LNO TEAM C
ZEN/FIRST MAFC
RHIGDSC/THIRD LAAMBN DET BRAVO//S-2//
RUVNSMQ/COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE DET ELEVEN
RUVNSMQ/COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE DET THIRTEEN
RHIGDSC/CG SECOND FSSG FWD//G-2//
ZEN/SECOND RPVCO
RUWJGFB/CG THIRD MAW REAR//G-2//
RHIIMDD/MWSG THREE SEVEN
RHIIMDD/EIGHTH COMMBN FWD//S-2/S-3//
RHIIMDD/FIRST ANGLICO
RHIIMDD/THIRD NCR
RHIIMDD/CG I MEF REAR//G-2/MAFC//
RHIIMBB/CG FIRST MARDIV FWD//G-2//
RHIIMDD/SECONDBN TWO FOUR MAR//S-2//
RHIIMDD/THIRDBN TWO FOUR MAR//S-2//
RUHGPEM/SECOND LAADBN//S-2//
RHIIMAA/MASS THREE
RBSWAF/HQFFMAME
RBSWBA/HQFMAME
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//IRAQ REGIONAL ITF//
RHMPOSP/SEVENTH FLT OSP
RUFTFZA/ARCENT SUPCOM//G-2//
RHIIMDD/FIRST INTEL CO FWD
RHIEFBA/354TFW DEPLOYED//IN//
RHIGAOF/CMDR 11TH SIGNAL BGDE//S2//
RHSIKMC/TF3RD160THSOARSOCCENTFWD//S2//
RUFTFZA/COMUSMARCENT FORWARD
RUCBSAA/FICEURLANT NORFOLK VA//ISSF/20//
RHFJSCC/226ASGATAQ//SPO//RO//
RHIHDAA/CDR 3RD SFGA SOCCENT DEPLOYED//S2//
RHFJSCC/JIF EAST//IAM-C-ITE/OPS//
RHSIKMC/43 ENGRKKMC//S-2//
RHFJSCC/1675THTASPDEPLOYED//IN//
RHIUFIA/1610 ALDP//IN//
RHIDFLA/1620TAWP DEPLOYED//IN//
RHIDFDA/1630TAWP DEPLOYED//IN//
RHIEFIA/1640TAWP DEPLOYED//IN//
RHIDFFA/1650TAWP DEPLOYED//IN//
RHIEFKA/1660TAWP//IN//
RHIUFKA/1670TASP//IN//
RHFJSCC/1675 TASP//IN//
RHIUFSA/1680ALCSP DEPLOYED//IN//
RHIEFAA/1681ALCSP DEPLOYED//IN//
RHIEFBA/1682ALCSP DEPLOYED//IN//
RHIIMCC/1683 ALCSP//IN//
RHFJSCC/1683 ALCSP OL-A//IN//
RHSIFCA/1683 ALCSP OL-B//IN//
RHFJSCC/1675 TASP DEPLOYED//IN//
RHIVHJA/82ND ABN DIV//G-2//
RBDAPZ/RAFDET MUHARRAQ//INT//
RBDAPI/RAFDET SEEB//INT//
RHFJSCC/101 SQNDET KKIA//INT//
[    b.2.    ]
RHIIMAA/MWSS TWO SEVEN ONE//S-2//
RUHGPEM/MWSS TWO SEVEN THREE//S-2//
RHIIMDD/MWSG THREE SEVEN//S-2//
RUHGOWA/CG FOURTH MEB//G-2//
RUHGOKI/THIRTEENTH MEU//S-2//
RUWDCAA/FIFTEENTH MEU//S-2//
[    b.2.    ]
BT
CONTROLS //N03800// SECTION 1 OF 3
PASS THROUGH FSSG TO CSSD ONE THREE ONE, ONE SIX THREE TWO, ONE 
FOUR
TWO. PASS THROUGH THIRD MARINES TO HMH FOUR SIX THREE AND FOUR SIX
FIVE. PASS THROUGH FIRST MARDIV TO CSSD TEN, CSSD ELEVEN, AND CSSD
SEVENTEEN.

/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
BODY OPER/DESERT STORM//
MSGID/INTSUM/CG I MEF/107-91/FEB//
NARR/COMUSMARCENT, LOC VIC 38RQS289439, SAUDI ARABIA//
PERIOD/FROM: 241201C FEB 91/TO 242400C FEB 91/AS OF 242400C FEB 
91//

HEADING/GROUND EN LOCSTATS//

1.  DUE TO ONGOING MARCENT OPERATIONS AND ENEMY
REPOSITIONING (DUE TO SURRENDERS, WITHRAWALS, AND BYPASSED ENEMY
POSITIONS) LOCSTATS WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED DURING THIS REPORTING
PERIOD. AS ALL-SOURCE REPORTING BECOMES AVAILABLE, INCLUDING
REPORTING UP FROM OUR DIVISIONS, THE LOCSTATS WILL BE ADJUSTED
ACCORDINGLY. SUSPECTED MOVEMENTS ARE REFLECTED BELOW IN THE
GROUND SITUATION SUMMARY.

HEADING/GROUND SUMMARY//

1.  THERE HAS BEEN MINIMAL RESISTANCE TO THE MARCENT
GROUND ATTACK. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW ISOLATED EXPRESSIONS
OF RESISTANCE, FRONTLINE INFANTRY UNITS HAVE EITHER SURRENDERED
OR ARE REPORTEDLY RETREATING. DUE TO THE FLUIDITY OF THE
SITUATION, EXACT FORCE DISPOSITIONS OF III CORPS INFANTRY
DIVISIONS ORIENTED FORWARD, ON, AND BEHIND THE SECOND OBSTACLE
BELT REMAIN LARGELY IN A STATE OF FLUX.

A. PERSONNEL OF THE THE 14TH INF DIV HAVE
SURRENDERED OR BEEN CAPTURED, WITH REMNANTS SCATTERED OR
RETREATING, AND THE 14TH IS NOT CURRENTLY ASSESSED AS COMBAT
EFFECTIVE. AT LEAST A BDE'S WORTH OF PERSONNEL OF THE 29TH INF
DIV HAVE REPORTEDLY SURRENDERED TO 1ST MARDIV (REPORTEDLY 3,000),
AND 2D MARDIV REPORTS UP TO 1,000 EPW'S. THERE ARE INDICATIONS
THAT THE REMNANTS OF THE 29TH AS WELL AS THE ENTIRE 8TH INF DIV
ARE POSSIBLY WITHDRAWING. WE HAVE NO POSITIVE CONFIRMATION OF
ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL ACTIVITY, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE IT WILL EITHER BE
ACCOMPLISHED TONIGHT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MANY OF THE
PERSONNEL/UNITS WILL JUST REMAIN IN PLACE HOPING TO SURRENDER.

B. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT THE 7TH INF
DIV MAY ALSO BE WITHDRAWING NORTH FROM THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS
ALONG THE SECOND OBSTACLE BELT. THIS REMAINS TO BE POSITIVELY
CONFIRMED, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH THE ACTIONS OF
THE OTHER III CORPS INFANTRY DIVISIONS TO THE 7TH'S LEFT FLANK.

C. IN THE EPAC AREA, THE 18TH INF DIV REMAINS
LARGELY IN PLACE BEHIND THE SECOND OBSTACLE BELT ALTHOUGH EPAC
REPORTING INDICATES AS MANY AS 1,000 EPW'S TAKEN BETWEEN THE
BORDER AND THE SECOND OBSTACLE BELT. RESISTANCE ALONG EPAC'S
LINE OF ADVANCE HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN LIGHT.

D. THERE HAS BEEN VERY LITTLE LATERAL MOVEMENT
OF ENEMY FORCES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AT LEAST ONE TNK CO. WHICH
MOVED TO ENGAGE TF RIPPER SE OF AL JABER AFLD. THE TWELVE TANKS
WERE REPORTEDLY T-62'S AND INTITAL REPORTS CONFIRM AT LEAST FOUR
WERE DESTROYED BEFORE THE OTHERS REPORTEDLY DISENGAGED. NFI.

E. IT IS CURRENTLY UNKNOWN WHERE THE
CONCENTRATIONS OF ARTILLERY THAT WERE POSITIONED TO COVER THE
OBSTACLE BELTS HAVE GONE. WHAT PERCENTAGE HAS BEEN SIMPLY
BYPASSED OR HAS WITHDRAWN NORTH IS YET TO BE DETERMINED.
ARTILLERY POTENTIALLY REMAINING ON MARCENT'S FLANKS SHOULD STILL
BE CONSIDERED A SIGNIFICANT THREAT.

2. IRAQI RESPONSE TO THE MARCENT ATTACK HAS BEEN
LIMITED AND THE ENEMY APPEARS DISORIENTED AND UNDISCIPLINED.
IRAQI III CORPS COMMUNICATIONS APPEAR TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY
DEGRADED, PROBABLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE EXTREMELY SLOW RESPONSE TO
THE MARCENT ATTACK. THERE HAVE BEEN VIRTUALLY NO INDICATIONS OF
IRAQI CHEMICAL USE, ALTHOUGH [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] 
REPORTING INDICATED THAT IZ
3RD ARM DIV UNITS WERE DONNING NBC GEAR. (IF TRUE, THIS COULD
HAVE BEEN A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLE
COALITION USE OF CW.)

3. THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS OF REINFORCEMENT
FROM UNITS OUTSIDE THE III CORPS AREA INCLUDING THE 6TH ARMOR DIV
AND/OR 1ST MECH INF DIV. LIKEWISE, THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF
ANY OTHER HEAVY UNIT (INCLUDING THE 51ST MECH INF DIV) MOVING TO
REINFORCE III CORPS. IF A DECISION TO REINFORCE III CORPS WAS
MADE TODAY, IT IS LIKELY THE MOVEMENT WILL TAKE PLACE UNDER THE
COVER OF DARKNESS. AS OF 2400C THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS OF
REINFORCEMENT FROM OUTSIDE III CORPS, NOR HAVE THERE BEEN ANY
INDICATIONS OF HEAVY FORCES MOVING FROM KNOWN POSITIONS WITHIN
III CORPS.

HEADING/BDA SUMMARY//

1. UNTIL REPORTING FROM TODAY'S ACTION IS
AVAILABLE, COMPILED, AND DECONFLICTED, THE BDA FIGURES FOR THE
VARIOUS DIVISIONS WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED.

HEADING/AIR SUMMARY//

HEADING/AIR SUMMARY//

1. SIGNIFICANTLY, THERE WAS NO IRAQI AIR ACTIVITY
IN RESPONSE TO G-DAY.

MARCENT COMMENT: AS TIME GOES ON, THE LIKELIHOOD THAT IRAQ
WILL EMPLOY AIR ASSETS AGAINST COALITION FORCES DIMINISHES. SOME
GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT ALONG WITH SOME ATTACK HELOS MAY STILL BE
AVAILABLE FOR SELECTIVE USE AGAINST COALITION GROUND FORCES,
HOWEVER, AND CANNOT BE TOTALLY DISCOUNTED AS A THREAT. THERE IS

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
A GREATER LIKELIHOOD THAT THESE LIMITED ASSETS WILL BE MADE
AVAILABLE TO FORCES DEFENDING IRAQI TERRITORY RATHER THAN KUWAIT.

2. CENTAF REPORTS THAT ON 24 FEB, TWO MIG-23
FLOGGERS AND ONE BOEING 737 FLEW FROM THE BAGHDAD AREA TO
PROBABLY HAMADAN OR DEZFUL (3226N04824E), IRAN. PROBABLE DESERT
STORM AIRCRAFT WERE IN PURSUIT BUT DID NOT REACH THE AIRCRAFT
ENTERING IRANIAN AIRSPACE. AN IRANIAN F-5 FROM DEZFUL WAS
SCRAMBLED, POSSIBLY IN REPONSE TO THE IRAQI AIRCRAFT.

MARCENT COMMENT: IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT
IRAQ DOES NOT INTEND TO WASTE ITS REMAINING AIR ASSETS IN
SUICIDAL OFFENSIVE ACTIONS. THOSE AIRCRAFT THAT ARE STILL
`CAPABLE OF THE FLIGHT WILL PROBABLY BE SHUTTLED TO IRAN AS
OPPORTUNITIES PRESENT THEMSELVES.

3. AIR DEFENSE. THE GROUND OFFENSIVE HAS REVEALED
SOME NEW AIR DEFENSE LOCATIONS. CINCCENT REPORTED A LARGE NON-
STANDARD SA-6 SITE AT 302637N0472055E CONTAINING SIX CONFIRMED
SA-6 TELS, SIX CONFIRMED SA-6 TRANSLOADERS, 24 CONFIRMED
MISSILES, 12 PROBABLE MISSILES, TWO BOX-BODIED VANS AND FOUR U/I
VEHICLES. THIS SITE MAY DEFEND A POSSIBLE C3 SITE SOUTHWEST OF
AL BASRAH. IN ADDITION, FIRST MARDIV REPORTED AT 1345C ON 24
FEB, THAT AN SA-9 BTRY WAS LOCATED 10 KM NORTH OF AL JABER AFLD,
AND 3D MAW REPORTED THREE S60'S AT 2905N04732E. FINALLY, RPVS
OBSERVED POSSIBLE S-60 AAA FIRE AT 39RTN184373.

HEADING/MARITIME SUMMARY//

1. (U) NSTR.

HEADING/NBC/MISSILE SUMMARY//

1. THE FOLLOWING SCUD LAUNCHES WERE NOTED DURING
THIS REPORTING PERIOD:

- AT 240132Z FEB, A SCUD MISSILE WAS LAUNCHED FROM NEAR
3014N04743E, AND WAS INTERCEPTED BY PATRIOT MISSILES NEAR
RIYADH. (NFI).
-AT 240917Z FEB, ONE SRBM LAUNCH OCCURRED FROM THE VIC OF
BAGHDAD (3318N04429E). A DETONATION, PROBABLY ASSOCIATED
WITH A PATRIOT INTERCEPTOR, WAS DETECTED AT 0923Z, JUST
NORTH OF KING KHALID MILITARY CITY (2800N04530E). (NFI).
-AT 241823Z FEB, AT LEAST ONE, (POSSIBLY TWO OR THREE),
SRBMLAUNCHESOCCURREDFROM THE VICOFSAFWAN(3015N04744E)
IZ, HEADED ON A BEARING OF 190DEGREES,TOWARDRIYADH.
INITIAL INDICATIONS ARE THAT ONE SRBM WAS PROBABLY INTER-
CEPTED BY PATRIOT MISSILES. (NFI).

2. ADDITIONAL REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE TWO MAZ
SCUD TELS WITH MISSILES WHICH HAD BEEN AT WADI AR RUTQA SINCE AT
LEAST 12 FEB, HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. THE TELS WERE LAST OBSERVED
INTACT ON 17 FEB.

MARCENT COMMENT: IT IS CURRENTLY UNKNOWN EXACTLY HOW MANY
MAZ-543 TELS IRAQ HAS LEFT, HOWEVER, CURRENT ASSESSMENTS ARE THAT
MOST IRAQI MAZ SCUD TELS HAVE BEEN EITHER DAMAGED OR DESTROYED.
HOWEVER, THE PRECISE NUMBER OF MAZ 543 TELS THAT IRAQ HAD AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE WAR IS UNKNOWN DESPITE FIGURES RANGING FROM 12
TO 22. THE NUMBER COULD HAVE BEEN HIGHER SO THIS SYSTEM MUST
STILL BE CONSIDERED A THREAT TO MARCENT FORCES, PARTICULARLY
SINCE THEY STILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SCUD-B MISSILES.

HEADING/WEATHER SUMMARY//
(48) HOUR OUTLOOK: KTO/KSA: PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES. SURF WINDS NW'LY
(25-26 FEB) AT 10KTS. VIS 3-6 MILES IN HAZE/SMOKE OCCAS
DECREASING TO 1-3 MI IN SMOKE.
IZ: PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES. SURF WINDS EAST'LY AT
05-10KTS. VISIBILITY WILL BE 4-6 MI IN
HAZE/SMOKE.
KTO/KSA: 20 SCT 100 SCT 250 SCT V BKN TEMPO 1-3
HK 31010KTS
IZ: 30 SCT 100 SCT 250 BKN 5HK 14010-15KTS

(72) HOUR OUTLOOK: MOSTLY CLOUDY SKIES WITH SE/SW'LY WINDS AS THE
(26-27 FEB) SUBTROPICAL JET BRINGS MOISTURE TO THE AOR.
KTO: 20 SCT 100 BKN 250 BKN 4HK 24008-14KTS
TEMPO 15 BKN 3RW
KSA: 20 SCT 100 SCT V BKN 250 BKN 5HK 25006-
12KTS 20 BKN 3RW VICINITY
IZ: 30 SCT V BKN 100 BKN 250 BKN 6HK 14010-
15KTS

HEADING/OTHER//

1. ACCORDING TO DIA, A REVIEW OF INFORMATION ON THE
FIRES IN KUWAITI OILFIELDS REVEALS A LESSER HAZARD FROM HYDROGEN
SULFIDE AND ANHYDROUS AMMONIA THAN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. THE
MAJOR HAZARDS CREATED BY IRAQI SABOTAGE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF
OILWELLS REMAIN INTENSE HEAT AND THICK, OILY, BLACK SMOKE.
CHEMICAL BY-PRODUCTS CONTAINED IN THE SMOKE ARE ASPHYXIANTS AND
IRRITANTS. THESE INCLUDE SOOT, CARBON MONOXIDE, AND SULFUR
DIOXIDE. THIS SMOKE, HOWEVER, DOES NOT CONTAIN TOXIC HYDROGEN
SULFIDE, WHICH IS CONSUMED IN THE FIRE. ANY ANHYDROUS AMMONIA
GAS IS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS, BUT IS A NEGLIGIBLE COMPONENT OF THE
POLLUTION. THE PLUMES OF SMOKE FROM THE BURNING WELLS ARE RISING
ABOUT TWO KMS AND DRIFTING WITH THE WIND. SOME RESIDUAL SMOKE IS
PROBABLY REACHING THE GROUND APPROXIMATELY 7 TO 10 KMS DOWNWIND.
FURTHERMORE, HYDROGEN SULFIDE IS NOT PREVALENT IN ALL OF KUWAIT'S
OILFIELDS, AND ONLY 97 OF THE 1,100 OIL WELLS HAVE SIGNIFICANT
CONCENTRATIONS OF THIS TOXIC GAS. HYDROGEN SULFIDE WOULD BE
RELEASED IF THESE WELLS WERE DAMAGED, BUT NOT IGNITED. VIRTUALLY
ALL OF THE WELLS CONTAINING THIS GAS ARE LOCATED IN THE AL
MANAQISH AND UMM GUDAIR OILFIELDS, LOCATED IN SOUTH-CENTRAL

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/
KUWAIT. GAS MASKS AND PROTECTIVE CLOTHING PROVIDE PROTECTION
FROM HYDROGEN SULFIDE. HOWEVER, THE MASKS DO NOT PROVIDE
PROTECTION FROM ASPHYXIANTS, WHICH DISPLACE OXYGEN. SOOT ALSO
CAN CLOG THE MASKS, REDUCING THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. THIS
INFORMATION IS CONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS MARCENT REPORTING.

HEADING/OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS//

1. DIA REPORTING OF 22 FEB REVEALED A LARGE GRID
PATTERN IN SOUTHEAST IRAQ, BOUND BY THE COORDINATES 3021N04633E,
3021N04650E, 3011N04650E, AN 3011N04633E. [      (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)    ]INDICATES THAT THIS IS NOT A MINEFIELD AS PREVIOUSLY
REPORTED. THIS PATTERN, INSTEAD, REPRESENTS A SEISMIC GRID USED
FOR OIL EXPLORATION. THIS GRID WAS ALSO NOTED ON 29 JULY 1990
AND IS JUST WEST OF AN ACTIVE OIL FIELD.

HEADING/ENEMY CAPABILITIES//

1. THE IRAQI III CORPS RETAINS THE CAPABILITY TO
CONDUCT A MULTIPLE HEAVY DIVISION COUNTERATTACK ON COALITION
FORCES WITH UNITS FROM THE 3D ARMORED DIVISION AND WITH HELP FROM
IV CORPS HEAVY FORCES (1ST MECH DIV, AND 6TH ARM DIV). THE
REMNANTS OF 5TH MECH DIV (-) ARE CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING A LOCAL
COUNTERATTACK TO STAUNCH THE NORTHERN FLOW OF MARCENT OR EPAC
FORCES. IRAQ CONTINUES TO DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT
EXTREMELY SHORT WARNING SRBM ATTACKS, AND DESPITE THE LACK OF ANY
AIR ACTIVITY ON G-DAY, COULD POSSIBLY SORTIE INTERCEPTORS FOR
LOCALIZED AIR DEFENSE AND/OR SORTIE ATTACK HELICOPTERS TO ASSIST
ANY MAJOR COUNTERATTACK. WITH A CONCERTED EFFORT, IRAQ RETAINS
THE CAPABILITY TO MOUNT AN AIR ATTACK AGAINST HIGH VALUE
COALITION GROUND AND MARITIME TARGETS. FINALLY, IRAQ RETAINS THE
CAPABILITY TO DELIVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY AIR, MISSILE, OR
ARTILLERY/MRL DELIVERY MEANS.

HEADING/ENEMY VULNERABILITIES//

1. IRAQI VULNERABILITIES REMAIN IN THE AREAS OF
EXPOSED LOC'S, LOGISTICS, COMMAND-AND-CONTROL, AIR INTERCEPT,
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, DISINTEGRATING MORALE/DISCIPLINE, AND A
DEGRADED EARLY WARNING/TARGET ACQUISITION CAPABILITY. WITH THE
LARGE NUMBER OF IRAQI SOLDIERS SURRENDERING ON G-DAY, IT IS
BECOMING INCREASING CLEARER THAT MANY IRAQI SOLDIERS AND WHOLE
UNITS HAVE LOST THEIR WILL TO FIGHT. AS THE IRAQIS TRY TO
REGROUP AND STEM THE COALITION GROUND OFFENSIVE, THEIR MECH AND
ARMOR ASSETS WILL HAVE TO LEAVE THEIR CAMOUFLAGED AND COVERED
POSITIONS TO ENGAGE COALITION FORCES, MAKING THEM VULNERABLE TO
ATTACK FROM COALITION AIR ASSETS AS THEY MASS AND MANEUVER. C3
APPEARS TO BE MORE DEGRADED THAN EVEN ANTICIPATED, AND MOVEMENT
OF WITHDRAWING IZ III CORPS FORCES DURING THE NIGHT WILL
COMPLICATE ALL ASPECTS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR THE III CORPS
COMMANDER, AS WELL AS LOGISTICS SUPPORT. FINALLY, THE III CORPS
COMMANDER MUST ASSUME THAT MANY OF HIS OVERALL DEFENSIVE PLANS
HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED.

HEADING/CONCLUSIONS//

1. TONIGHT THE MOST LIKELY IRAQI COURSE OF ACTION
IS TO TRY AND REESTABLISH SOME TYPE OF HASTY POSITIONAL DEFENSE
ALONG A LINE RUNNING FROM THE VIC OF THE 36TH INF DIV AT THE
DOGLEG, TO AN AREA NORTH OF THE ICE TRAY (VIC QT639230), SE ALONG
THE SOUTHERN TRACE OF THE 3RD ARM DIV, SOUTH TO THE BURQAN
OILFIELDS AND OVER TO THE COAST VIC AL AHMADI. THE SECOND MOST
LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION INCLUDES THE ABOVE ACTIONS WITH THE
ADDITION OF A COUNTERATTACK BY ELEMENTS OF THE 3RD ARM DIV AND/OR
THE 1ST MECH INF DIV. A NUMBER OF FACTORS MITIGATE AGAINST A
COUNTERATTACK DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS, AND IF THIS COURSE OF
ACTION IS CHOSEN, IT WILL LIKELY TAKE PLACE IN THE MORNING RATHER
THAN DURING THE NIGHT. DEGRADED C3 AND MOVEMENT OF REPOSITIONING
IRAQI FORCES UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS, COMBINED WITH LACK OF HARD
INTELLIGENCE ON EXACT MARCENT DISPOSITIONS, MAKES THIS COURSE OF
ACTION VERY DIFFICULT. FINALLY, MASSED ARTILLERY/ROCKET FIRES,
INCLUDING CW MUNITIONS, SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED AT AL JABER
AIRFIELD AND/OR OTHER PREREGISTERED LOCATIONS THAT MARCENT FORCES
HAVE UNCOVERED. CW COULD STILL BE DELIVERED BY AIR OR MISSILE
AGAINST OTHER KNOWN FIXED LOCATIONS INCLUDING MARCENT C3 AND
LOGISTICS NODES. AS THE MARCENT OFFENSIVE CONTINUES, APPLICATION
OF SUPERIOR COMBAT POWER SHOULD LEAD TO INCREASED NUMBERS OF
EPW'S, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IRAQI SOLDIERS REALIZE THAT COALITION
FORCES ARE NOT KILLING/MISTREATING EPW'S. ATTEMPTS TO REINFORCE
III CORPS WITH THE 6TH ARM DIV, 10TH ARM DIV, AND/OR THE 51ST
MECH INF DIV, WILL BE EXTREMELY VULNERABLE TO AIR INTERDICTION.
AS THE III CORPS DEFENSE CONTINUES TO CRUMBLE, THE CORPS
COMMANDER CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTEMPT TO WITHDRAW INTO KUWAIT CITY
OR TO THE MUTLA RIDGE.
2. (U) POC: I MEF G-2 PROD/OPS: [    b.6.    ]


MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
RELEASER NAME:
[    b.6.    ]
BT

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