(U) Gulf War Health Issue; Evidence against use of

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(U) Gulf War Health Issue; Evidence against use of chemical or 
biological warfare (CBW) during Desert Storm

Filename:0614rpt.00


POSITION PAPER

SUBJECT: (U) Gulf War Health Issue; Evidence against use of 
chemical or biological warfare (CBW) during Desert Storm

PURPOSE: (U) To provide the Secretary of Oefense the basis of 
OIA's assessment that no chemical or biological weapons were 
used during Desert Storm, and are therefore not the cause of 
the Gulf War Mystery Illness.

MAJOR POINTS: (U) DIA's assessment that no chemical or 
biological weapons were used during Desert Storm/Shield is 
based on the following:

1.  [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ]
During its war with Iran, Iraq moved chemical munitions from 
production and filling facilities in Samarra, to intermediate 
storage areas in southern Iraq, and finally, to forward 
deployment areas. This activity was accomplished within a 
relatively short period (roughly 2-3 weeks), just prior to 
Iraqi use of CW on the battlefield. The Iraqis operated in 
this way in order to overcome a short shelf life problem -- 
due to low purity levels -- they had with their nerve agent. 
[      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ]

2.  Unanimous statements of [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] 
POWs stating no intent.
Ten Iraqi [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] POW's unanimously 
opined that there was no intent to use CBW against the 
coalition for two main reasons: the fear of massive 
retal1ation -- we created the ambiguity of possible 
retaliation with nuclear weapons -- and, their belief that the 
coalition was far better prepared to fight in a CBW 
environment than Iraq, thus there was no advantage in their 
using CW.

3. (U) No CBW munitions found in the Kuwaiti Theater of 
Operations (KTO) to this day.  Immediately after the ground 
war, a massive effort to collect and destroy remaining Iraqi 
equipment was underway. Thorough searches of the entire 
occupied Iraqi territory and Kuwait were accomplished. Not one 
chemical munition nor any bulk agent was ever found. 
Moreover, the Tampa based firm CMS Inc., primary U.S. 
contractor for unexploded ordinance removal in Kuwait, stated 
recently that to date, the company had discovered and removed 
over 14,000 tons of all types of ordinance (including 350,000 
mines) and found no CBW weapons.

4. (U) No CBW related casualties reported.
(U) During the entire Persian Gulf crisis, not one soldier, 
sailor or airman was treated, hospitalized, or died, as a 
result of CBW exposure. If CBW had been used, even on a 
limited basis, this most certainly would not be the case. The 
army private, mentioned on the recent NBC news program NOW, 
who received the Bronze Star after experiencing burns while 
searching bunkers, is the only known case with symptoms 
similar to CBW exposure. However, advanced laboratory analysis 
of his flak jacket, shirt, the swab used to clean his wound, 
and subsequent urinalysis indicate conclusively that this was 
not a CW event.



5. (U) No confirmed CBW detections.
(U) The determination that CW is present is a two step process: detection
and confirmation. Detection is characterized by alarms 
sounding. The equipment is very sensitive by design, causing 
the resulting problem of many false alarms. A conservative 
estimate of the number of false alarms during the Gulf War 
crisis would number in the hundreds, if not, thousands. It is 
very important to point out that despite this large number of 
supposed detections, the second step, confirmation, using 
simple wet chemistry equipment and techniques available at the 
platoon level, never resulted in a single confirmation, except 
for the Czech reports on 19 and 24 January 91. In this case, 
the U.S. can not independently verify these events, and
essentially, is taking the Czechs at thelr word based on 
assessments of their technical competence and sensitivity of 
equipment.

6. (U) Advanced laboratory analysis of suspected CW samples 
all proved negative.  Before, during, and after the war, a 
variety of soil, liquid and air samples were analyzed. This 
analysis took place at state-of-the-art labs in the U.S. and 
UK. All samples were found negative.

7. (U) Long term low level exposure defies the laws of 
physics.
(U) A popular theory suggests the cause of the mystery illness 
to be long term exposure of our troops to low, i.e. 
undetectable, levels of CW. The law of diffusion states that 
any substance, particularly a gas or liquid, naturally moves 
from an area of greater concentration to lesser concentration. 
If in one area or time the concentration is low -- as in the 
Czech detection -- at some other area or time the 
concentration must be high. Therefore, other detections would 
be expected near by, possibly resulting in casualties; this 
did not happen. Further, the only possible explanation for 
long term low level exposure below detection range is the 
deliberate, continuous, release of very small amounts of agent 
throughout the area where exposure was to have occurred; in 
this case, much of the
Saudi Arabian peninsula. The facts simply do not support this theory.

8.  The Czech detection was not the result of a release from 
bombed CBW targets.  In addition to the law of diffusion, the 
weather during the time further argues against this 
possibility. The winds were in the wrong direction and it 
rained throughout the region the day before the detection. 
Even under ideal conditions, our models indicate that 80 tons 
of nerve agent would have to have been released from the 
closest known bombed CBW target, An Nasiriyah, to register at 
the low levels detected by the Czechs 140 miles away. Such an 
80 ton release of nerve agent in Iraq would have resulted in 
an area of certain death or casualty that covers hundreds of 
square kilometers. Also, detection equipment all over the area 
would have alarmed and some additional confirmations would 
have been expected; neither happened. Even a release caused by 
a bomb from coalition aircraft striking a secondary target -- 
an unknown CW storage site or convoy near the border for 
example -- must still obey the law of diffusion. People nearby 
would die or become casualties, detection alarms would sound 
and confirmations would be made. As stated before, this simply 
did not happen.

RECOMMENDATION: (U) None.