FYI, CONTINUING DEVELOPMENTS/ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ BW

File: 961031_950901_0514rept_91.txt
Page: 91
Total Pages: 1
	FYI, CONTINUING DEVELOPMENTS/ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ BW

Filename:0514rept.91














[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]





DATE:	18 FEB 1990

[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

SUBJ:	FYI, CONTINUING DEVELOPMENTS/ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ BW

[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

1.	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] that the Iraqis where in the 
process of removing crates, and possibly undamaged equipment from 
what is left of the Latifiya Suspect BW facility which has been 
struck on two occasions.  A large number of crates are located on 
the perimeter of the facility and at least four fork lifts, one in 
the facility, and three scattered along the road adjacent to the 
facility, [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ].  In addition, at least one 
cargo truck was parked on the road, and a sedan possibly providing 
security was near the intersection of the main highway.  Some of 
this activity was first [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ].  the 
activity coincides (in time) with probable attempts to salvage and 
remove BW related components from the Salman Pak BW facility, [   
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ].

2.	A new release by TASS, with a byline Cairo, FEB 10, quoted 
the Cairo based newspaper AL-HAQIQA as reporting that an Egyptian 
physician working in Baghdad stated that a number of guards at a 
BW facility not far from Baghdad became ill, and died, shortly 
after an airstrike on the facility [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ].  
[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] described the Egyptian newspaper as 
being somewhat akin to the National Enquirer as far as 
reliability.  An AFMIC analysis of the report (enclosure 3) for 
the most pard debunked the article for the reasons noted in the 
enclosure.  However, two Physicians who were part of the 
interagency group, and read the AFMIC analysis, called and urged 
caution in dissemination the report.  While they agreed that -- 
the symptoms described, their rapid onset, and the general 
description of the highly contagious nature of the condition -- 
was inconsistent with Anthrax or botulinum toxin, two agents 
believed to be capable of weaponization, they independently 
suggested that some other agent, possibly Staphylococcus 
Entherotoxin B (SEB), could not be ruled out.  [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ]that the Iraqis may have been working with this 
agent, along with a number of others, [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] 
that this work was as advanced as that of Anthrax or bot tox.  The 
two physicians also noted that the symptoms reported would not be 
inconsistent with a massive dose of SEB, or for that matter some 
other agents, since massive exposures to a particular agent would 
cause widespread symptoms not necessarily characteristic of a 
nominal lethal dose.  They do not mean to suggest that this 
incident could reflect a widespread outbreak of disease as a 
result of the airstrike and agree wit the 




AFMIC analysis in this respect.  Rather, they think it possible 
that the individuals in question may have had direct exposure to a 
toxin, which would not result in contagen, but which could cause 
additional illness/death as a result of secondary transmittal 
(handling of infected individuals cloths, direct contact with 
individuals, contaminated medical instruments, etc.).  They 
indicated that in such a case the death rates would not be in the 
hundreds, but would only involve those directly exposed to the 
agent.  They also agreed that it is likely that the so called 
widespread outbreak at the various locations noted which the mixed 
symtomologies, if even true, would be a result of a number of 
different conditions such as exposure to chemicals near chemical 
plants, as well as endemic diseases which are quite likely as a 
result of the breakdown of sanitation and hygiene.  The reason for 
their concern insofar as this incident was the possibility they 
cited that Saddam has a BW agent in his arsenal that we have not 
credited him with, and that poses a threat to coalition forces.  [ 
  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]. 






[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ].


	There [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] that the Iraqis have been 
attempting to develop BW, and possibly CW submunitions (bomblets), 
for a variety of weapons including the SCUD using plastic material 
for the submunition.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] are that they 
have various size plastic container in their possession for this 
purpose.  








[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]








[    b.2.    ]

[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]