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File: 961031_950901_0512rept_00d.txtOFFENSIVE BW RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION Filename:0512rept.00d OFFENSIVE BW RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION Iraq's biological and toxin weapons program is the most extensive In the Middle East. Large quantities of anthrax bacteria and botulinum toxin have likely been produced. We believe that these agents have been weaponized and that biological and toxin munitions already exist. Further, the deployment of biological weapons in significant numbers will take place by the end of 1990, if not already Implemented. Current capabilities Include a) production of anthrax and botulInum toxin, b) vacuum drying of agents in micron size particle suitable for aerosol dissemination, c) testing of agents and d) weaponization and e) refrigerated bunkers for storage. Iraq has demonstrated a significant competency for research, development, and production of classic Infectious agents and toxins. Iraq also has the necessary Infrastructure to develop recombinant organisms and other agents of biological origin if so desired. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] claim that Iraq has already tested BW agents and delivery systems. Generous funding, competent scientists, and construction or expansion of facilities provide full support to the program. In light of the unscrupulous use of chemical agents in the Iran and Iraq War and the record of human rights In Iraq, we postulate that given a threatening or no win circumstance, Iraq will launch a BW attack. BW PROGRAM Although the Iraqi BW program has been in existence since the 70's, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. The end of the Iran-lraq War (August 88) triggered President Hussein to direct Iraq to become a self supporting military power in regard to producing conventional weapons and to boost its CBW capabilities. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. The BW program is supported at the highest level of the government. President Saddam Hussein has direct-responsibility for all policy issues related to the program. He has boasted that his country has developed a secret weapon system which previously was held by only two other countries in the world. The Intelligence service has the responsibility for security, procurement of material, and the general direction of the program. The BW program is highly secure [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Despite signing the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Iraqis repeatedly violated this agreement by their use of CW agents during their conflict with Iran. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] PROCUREMENT [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AGENTS [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] PERSONALITIES [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] FACILITIES At least 15 separate facilities possess the technical capability to support the BW program. Of these, five facilities have been [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] with the program. Salman Pak The Salman Pak facility [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], located 25 kilometers southeast of Baghdad, Is Iraq's leading BW research facility. The Salman Pak site where the El Hazen Institute is located, has been [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] as a facility for BW R&D and production [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. These bunkers, located at Tikrit Ammo Depo, Al Fallujah Ammunition Depot South, Ad Diwahiyah Ammunition Storage Facility Southwest and Karbaia Depot and Ammunition Storage Facility, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. It is possible that such trucks could be used to transport temperature- sensitive biological munitions or agents. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that live agents (typhus (sic) probably typhoid and/or cholera) are produced in Salman Pak and loaded into 122 mm shells stored in the bunkers of the area. Taji The facility at the Taji major military industrial complex north of Baghdad, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], contains a fermentation plant which is capable of scale-up production of BW agents. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] it is producing BW agents on a small scale. The location of the facility at Taji and its control by the military affords the Iraqis the security necessary for agent production. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Abu Ghriab In 1982, an "infant formula" plant was completed at Abu Ghurayb(sic) Ghraib [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], 25 kilometer west of Baghdad. Very high security is maintained at the plant, which has barbed wire fencing and guard towers. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. The unusual security measure at the plant make it highly suspect. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that there is a possible BW center near Mosul, where basic research and development of biological agents is done. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] BIOTECHNOLOGIES AND BW The technical infrastructure necessary to support an offensive BW program exists in Iraq which is one of the few Arab countries having a strong industrial microbiology technological base. Little basic biological research currently is underway in Iraq; most of the indigenous scientific expertise is engaged in applied research for the military. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Iraq has what is claimed to be a chemical and biological warfare test grid [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], 90 NM N/NW of Samarra. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] The Iraqis can potentially disseminate biological and toxin agents in a variety of conventional ways. The are reported to have successfully tested shells which appear suitable for the battlefield delivery of BW agents. These shells are capable of generating and releasing aerosolized materials above the ground prior to impact without causing heating or extreme pressurization of the agent during dispersal. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Currently we can only surmise as to the Iraqi doctrine for the use of BW missiles. The most likely targets for the modified SCUDs would be cities, large industrial areas, airfields, and rear areas. If launched from southern Iraq or Kuwait, the missiles can reach Riyadh and Qatar. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], special groups of Iraqi were formed and trained to deploy chemical and biological weapons. The decision to use specific systems will likely be dependent or strategic or tactical requirements. Weapons deployment will likely be in the aerosol form, possibly at night or in the early morning to take advantage of favorable military and meteorological conditions. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
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