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File: 961031_950901_0502bkg_00d.txtEstimated Collateral Damage from Attacks on Iraqi Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Facilities Filename:0502bkg.00d SUBJECT: Estimated Collateral Damage from Attacks on Iraqi Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Facilities 1 PURPOSE To provide background information on the collateral damage that could result from an attack on Iraq's biological, chemical and nuclear weapons facilities. 2 POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST a. An attack on the Iraqi biological agent storages could result in the release of virulent microorganisms and/or toxins that could result in exceedingly high casualties/fatalities. If biological agents are released from storages in the southern part of Iraq, there is a risk friendly forces could become casualties. b. Attacks on chemical or nuclear facilities are not expected to cause significant injury or death beyond the limits of the facility. c. Destruction of the nuclear facility could result in 3 - 5 percent of the core radionuclide release, depending on core proximity to weapon detonation, structural fallback and blockage, etc Iodine, cesium, and radioactive gases would be the most volatile. Overall, the site will probably experience some level of local contamination with the highest activity around reactor core material concentrations. Minimal impact is expected outside of the research facility boundary. d. Contamination caused by destruction of chemical facilities would likely be contained within the destroyed structure. Release of chemical agent would be retarded by absorption in the debris and rubble resulting from the destruction of the facility, subsequent fires and the gradual release of the chemical agent from the vessel or munitions in which it had been stored. 3. EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS: A complete evaluation of the consequences of an attack requires a rigorous evaluation of a great deal of information about population density, weather, and current information on activity in the facilities: expect to be completed NLT 4 January 1991. COORDINATION: None PREPARED BY: [ (b)(2) ][ (b)(6) ] APPROVED BY: 4 Enclosures 1. Working Paper: Biological Facilities 1 Cy 2. Working Paper Iraq-Chemical Warfare Facilities 1 Cy 3. Working Paper: Implication of an Attache on Iraqi Nuclear Research Facility 1 Cy 4. Working Paper: Chemical Agent Persistence Isotherms 1 Cy BIOLOGICAL FACILITIES OVERVIEW There are at least three biological warfare (BW) production facilities in Iraq and seventeen refrigerated bunkers capable of storing BW agents/munitions. Anthrax and botulinum toxin are confirmed BW agents which are believed to have been weaponized. The Iraqis have shown interest in the development of a number of other infectious agents and toxins for BW purposes but the status of development is not known. It also is not known what types of munitions have been filled with BW agent but could include missile warheads, aerial bombs with and without cluster submunitions, the super gun, artillery, and spray and aerosol generating devices. BW agents are likely stored in bulk and spray and aerosol generating devices. BW agents are likely stored in bulk containers and in munitions as dried powders and/or liquids. The Iraqis have had cultures of the anthrax bacterium (Bacillus anthracis) and the bacterium (Clostridium botulinum) which produces botulinum toxin since early 1986. The necessary equipments for production of the agents has been in place for a longer period. In the interim, significant quantities of these BW agents, and possibly others, are believed to have been produced. Anthrax spores would pose the greatest risk to humans of any of the confirmed or suspect Iraqi BW agents due to its ability to survive in the environment. Based upon the technical capability of the Iraqis, it is well within their capacity to have produced and stored 1,000 kilograms of dried anthrax spores. This will be used as the amount of agent which could be stored in bulk containers or munitions in any one of the seventeen refrigerated bunkers for the purpose of estimating collateral damage. TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] OTHER CONSIDERATIONS [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] PHYSICAL TARGET VULNERABILITY [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] IRAQ- CHEMICAL WARFARE Facilities Iraq has three primary chemical facilities: the production plant at Samarra, another at Habbaniyah/Al Fallujah, and the research center at Salman Pak. The Samarra facility is well known as the world's largest chemical agent production complex. At Habbaniyah, precursor chemical and possibly chemical biological warfare research. There are also at least 26 bunkers which may store chemical weapons located throughout Iraq. Current Status At present, Iraq is most likely not producing significant amounts of nerve agent. Their product quality has been very poor, and has limited their shelf life for their agents to a period of 4 to 6 weeks. Their production cycle has typically been to gear up production about a month prior to anticipated use. This pattern was observed prior to the offensives in the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Based on the activity seen at Samarra, it is likely that Iraq does not have a significant in-process inventory of chemical agent in its production facilities at this time. The Binary Factor in April 1990, Saddam made a speech threatening to "burn half of Israel" with his "dual chemical weapon", implying he had a binary weapon. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]that Saddam has made good on this boast, and what he now has at least a limited binary capability. This would give Iraq a chance to improve their agent quality, and thus its shelf life for demilitarization of the poor quality chemical ammunition now in the Iraqi arsenal. These significant logistical advantages would more than compensate Iraq for the reduced amount of agent in each shell. Weapons which might be good candidates for the binary would be multiple rocket launchers, artillery and missile warheads. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. Iraq may have a combination of both high-tech and low-tech binary at this time, trying to move toward an exclusively high-tech stockpile. The high-tech is essential for small fill weight munitions such as artillery and MRL's; the low-tech can be used for missiles and aerial bombs. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Both high-tech and low-tech binary are easy to demilitarize since neither contains complete chemical agent. However, low-tech can be extremely nasty to handle once militarization of the round has begun. In the low-tech weapon, reaction mixture becomes quite hot since the reaction to form sarin from the DF and isopropyl is exothermic (emits heat). There is a significant amount of free hydrofluoric acid (HF) in the low-tech munitions as well, which is corrosive to most common metals and glasses. The combination of nerve agent, free acid and heat is a particularly deadly combination. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. If Iraq anticipates an offensive, or determines that a friendly force attach is imminent, they will probably resume production and filling operations at Samarra and at Habbaniyah. ESTIMATED DAMAGES At present, we estimate that little or no chemical agent would be released as a result of an attack on the chemical agent production and filling lines at Samarra and Habbaniyah. If the plants become active, and begin to produce agent, naturally more agent would be present. However, any attach on operating plants would still be unlikely to result in significant agent release to the environment. The rubble of the collapsed building would help to contain any agent release, and fires which would be likely consequence of an attack would consume the chemical agents. All the chemical warfare agents have high fuel values and will burn quite well. In any event, destruction of the production building is not comparable to the explosive detonation of a munitions. The agent in the building is in unpressurized tanks which would release agent over a period of time through cracks or other physical means of tank failure. Filling buildings are also unlikely to release significant amounts of chemical agent if attacked. Little agent is kept in these buildings. Any release would likely be contained in the immediate area of the building. An attack on chemical facilities at Salman Pak is also estimated to result in minimal risk of collateral damage due to chemical release. Agent quantities are probably limited to kilograms in this facility since it is a research facility. Storage Facilities There are at least 26 bunkers located throughout Iraq which have been associated with chemical weapons storage. These bunkers have been [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] as earth-mounded reinforced concrete (EMRC) drive-through bunkers. Due to the large amount of earth covering these bunkers, its is likely most released agent would be absorbed in the dirt if the bunker were to be attached. The offset doors would also help to contain agent inside the bunker. While these bunkers could contain a significant quantity of chemical agent and weapons, most of the agent in these bunkers would probable remain in the bunker following destruction of the bunker rather than being released. The munitions themselves ,are relatively immune to a series of sympathetic detonations following bunker destruction, and would be most likely to release agent through cracks in the shell casings rather than an explosion. The agent would have to leak from a damaged munitions and then get through the dust, debris and fire that would be the probable result of an attack. Therefore, escape of chemical agent from a storage bunker is not likely. Effects of an Attack Assuming Samarra and Habbaniyah are the primary chemical agent production plants in Iraq, elimination of both plants would stop Iraqi production of unitary and binary chemical weapons. The introduction of binary weapons could complicate location of production plants in the future, but it is likely these are the only two at this time. If binaries are integrated into the Iraqi arsenal, the chemicals needed for binary are easier to make, and could be made at many locations without the need for extensive additional security and safety and hygiene features. Successful attacks on storage facilities would eliminate Iraq's ability to launch chemical attacks. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. Subject: Implications of an Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Research Facility 1. Purpose: To provide information on implications of an attack on Iraq's Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Facility 2. Discussion. a. Conventional destruction of the Iraqi nuclear research facility would probably result in extremely small amounts of plutonium and some radioactive fission products being released into the environment, causing some local site contamination and minimal effects outside of the research facility. b. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] c. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] d. Some very minor release might occur from the destruction of associated laboratory facilities. 3. Expected Developments: Destruction of either reactor facility could result in 3 - 5 percent of the core radionuclide release, depending on core proximity to weapon detonation, structural fallback and blockage, etc Iodine, cesium, and radioactive gases would be the most volatile. Overall, the site will probably experience some level of contamination with the highest activity around reactor core material concentrations. Minimal impact is expected outside of the research facility boundary. PREPARED BY:[ (b)(2) ][ (b)(6) ] 14 December 1990 Chemical Agent Persistence Isotherms [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Other important factors in determining persistence are the type of weapon used, the fuzing of the weapon, and the general condition of terrain and vegetation. there is some general information on these factors in [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. POC is [ (b)(2) ][ (b)(6) ] IRAQI BW STORAGE FACILITIES AD DIWANIYAH AMMO STOR FAC SW 3 BUNKERS [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AN NASIRIYAH AMMO STOR JAC SW 4 BUNKERS [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] ASH SHUAYBAH AMMO STOR DEPO NE 1 BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] FALLUJA AMMO DEPO SOUTH 2 BUNKERS [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] KARABALA DEPO & AMMO STOR FAC 2 BUNKERS [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] KIRKUK AMMO DEPO WEST 1 BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] QABATIYAH SPECIAL 12-FRAME STOR BNK 1 BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] SALMAN PAK CBW RSCH, PROD A STOR FAC 2 BUNKERS [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TIKRIT AMMO DEPO 1 BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] PROBABLE IRAQI CW STORAGE SITES [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Mosul Afld Bunkers [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Qayyarah West Afld Bunkers [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Kirkuk Ammo Depot West 3 Bunkers [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Kirkuk Afld Bunkers [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Baghdad Ammo Depot Taji Bunkers [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Al Taqaddum Afld Bunkers [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Ubaydah Bin Al Jarrah Afld 2 Bunkers [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] An Nasiriyah Ammo Stor Fac SW Bunkers [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Tallil Afld Bunkers [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Ash Shuaybah Ammo Stor Depot NE Bunkers [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] H-3 Afld 4 Bunkers [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Qayyarah West Ammo Depot 4 Bunkers [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Qayyarah West Airfield [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Salman Pak CBW Rsch Prod & Stor Facility [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Samarra CW Rsch Prod & Stor Facility [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Samarra Chemical Weapons Storage [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Biological Storages 17 special storage bunkers have been identified at a total of 9 different locations which could function as BW storages. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. This would be helpful in maintaining favorable storage for the organisms or toxins. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. The most likely bunkers to be used for BW storage are the two at Salman Pak Research Center. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Chemical Bunkers There are two types of CW-associated bunkers- a cruciform storage and an S-shaped bunker. The cruciform storage is found only at the primary chemical production facility at Samarra (8 of these bunkers are located here). There are about 22 S-shaped bunkers throughout Iraq. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. These bunkers are large enough to accommodate a large truck. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. BAGHDAD NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER BAGHDAD NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
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