AFMIC SPECIAL WEEKLY WIRE 32-90(C) (U)

File: 961031_950825_80638041.txt
Page: 80638041
Total Pages: 3
AFMIC SPECIAL WEEKLY WIRE 32-90(C) (U)

Filename:80638041
PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 38041
GENDATE:         950622
NNNN
TEXT:            
ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX157 MCN = 90220/37678 TOR = 902202124
OTTSZYUW RUEKJCS0103 2202123-RUEALGX.
ZNY 
HEADER O 082123Z AUG 90
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
O 081600Z AUG 90 ZEX
FM DIRAFMIC FT DETRICK MD //AFMIC-SA//
TO AIG 6623
RULYSCC/BLT THREE SLANT EIGHT
RULYSCC/MACG FOUR EIGHT
RULYSCC/MAG ELEVEN //S2//
RULYSCC/MAG THIRTEEN //S2//
RULYSCC/MAG TWO FOUR
RULYSCC/MAG TWO SIX //S2//
RULYSCC/MAG THREE ONE //S2//
RULYSCC/CG FIRST MARDIV //G2//
RULYSCC/CG THIRD MARDIV
RULYSCC/THIRD MAR
RULYSCC/CG FOURTH MARDIV
RULYSCC/CG FIRST MAW //G2/MED//
RULYSCC/CG SECOND MAW //WMED/G2//
RULYSCC/CG THIRD MAW //MED/AMSO//
RUCLFVA/CG FOURTH MAW
RULYSCC/CG FIRST MEB
RULYSCC/CG FOURTH MEB //G4/MED/
RULYSCC/CG FIFTH MEB //G2/G4/MED//
RULYSCC/CG SIXTH MEB //G2/MED//
RULYSCC/CG SEVENTH MEB
RULYSCC/CG EIGHTH MEB
RULYSCC/CG NINTH MEB //G2//
RULYSCC/FIRST MEDBN FIRST FSSG
RULYSCC/SECOND MEDBN
RULYSCC/THIRD MEDBN
RULYSCC/THIRD MEDBN THIRD FSSG/
CTU SEVEN NINE PT SIX PT FIVE
RULYSCC/CO A THIRD MEDBN
RULYSCC/CG I MEF
RULYSCC/CG II MEF
RULYSCC/CG III MEF
RULYSCC/ELEVENTH MEU //S2//
RULYSCC/THIRTEENTH MEU //S2/COMM//
RULYSCC/FIFTEENTH MEU //S2//
RULYSCC/TWO TWO MEU
RULYSCC/TWO FOUR MEU
RULYSCC/TWO SIX MEU
RULYSCC/TWO EIGHT MEU
RULYSCC/BSSG ONE
RULYSCC/BSSG NINE
RULYSCC/CSSD TWELVE
RULYSCC/CSSD FOURTEEN
RULYSCC/CSSD SIXTEEN
RUWDCAA/CG FIRST FSSG
RULYSCC/CG SECOND FSSG //HSSU//
RULYSCC/CG THIRD FSSG
RULYSCC/THIRD FSSG DET ALFA
RULYSCC/MSSG ELEVEN
RULYSCC/MSSG TWO FOUR
RULYSCC/MSSG TWO SIX
RULYSCC/SECOND SRI GROUP
RULYSCC/COMCARAIRWING THIRTEEN
RULYSCC/COMCRUDESGRU FIVE
RULYSCC/COMCRUDESGRU TWELVE
RULYSCC/COMDESRON TWO
RULYSCC/COMDESRON FOUR
RULYSCC/COMDESRON SIX
RULYSCC/COMDESRON TEN
RULYSCC/COMDESRON FOURTEEN
RULYSCC/COMDESRON TWO ZERO
RULYSCC/COMDESRON TWO TWO
RULYSCC/COMDESRON TWO FOUR
RULYSCC/COMDESRON TWO SIX
RULYSCC/COMDESRON THREE TWO
RULYSCC/COMDESRON THREE SIX
RULYSCC/COMEODGRU TWO //N8//
RULYSCC/COMINERON TWO
RULYSCC/COMNAVSPECWARGRU TWO
RULYSCC/COMNAVSURFGRU MED
RULYSCC/COMPHIBRON TWO
RULYSCC/COMPHIBRON FOUR
RULYSCC/COMPHIBRON SIX
RULYSCC/COMPHIBRON EIGHT
RULYSCC/COMPHIBRON TEN
RULYSCC/COMPHIBRON TWELVE
RULYSCC/COMPHIBGRU TWO
RULYSCC/COMPHIBGRU THREE
RULYSCC/COMPHMRON TWO
RULYSCC/COMSECONDFLT
RULYSCC/COMSIXTHFLT //FMO//
RULYSCC/COMSERVGRU TWO
RULYSCC/COMSERVRON TWO
RULYSCC/COMSERVRON FOUR
RULYSCC/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RULYSCC/COMSOCLANT
RULYSCC/CJTF FOUR //J2//
RULYSCC/CJTFME //MED/SURG//
RULYSCC/CTF ONE SIX ZERO //AFZBKM-B//
RULYSCC/CTG ONE SIX EIGHT //NIC-03//
RHHMBRA/CTG ONE SIX EIGHT PT ONE
RULYSCC/CG FMFPAC //G2//
RUCBLFA/CG FMFLANT //MED OFCR//
RULYSCC/HMM ONE SIX TWO
RULYSCC/NAVSPECWARUNIT EIGHT
RULYSCC/NAVSUPPFAC ANTIGUA
RULYSCC/PATRON NINETEEN
RULYSCC/PATRON FIVE ZERO
RULYSCC/SECOND FORECONCO
RULYSCC/SEAL TEAM FOUR
RULYSCC/SEAL TEAM SIX
RULYSCC/MEDTRE FAC MERCY
RULYSCC/USS CAPODANNO
RULYSCC/USS JOHN HANCOCK
RULYSCC/USS NEW JERSEY
RUHPHKG/USS RANGER
RUFRHOV/USS SAIPAN
RULYMYU/USS SYLVANIA
RUFRNTR/USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
RULYSCC/FLTSURGTEAM ONE
RUEORDA/TCC FT DETRICK MD
BT


MACG FOUR EIGHT PASS TO LCDR MALTERS
SECTION 001 OF 002

/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
BODY SUBJ: AFMIC SPECIAL WEEKLY WIRE 32-90(C) (U)
1. (U) GENERAL
(U) THIS MESSAGE CONSISTS OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, 4ND GENERAL
MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE. IT IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A TIMELY SUMMARY 
OF

CURRENT DISEASE INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS AND ANALYSES. THE REMARKS 
ARE
PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO REVISION AND DO NOT NECESSARILY 
REPRESENT
AN AGREED DOD POSITION. CLINICAL REVIEW HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY THE
AFMIC [   (b)(6)   ][   (b)(2)   ]
2. (U) THIS SPECIAL WIRE IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION AND
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE ON A SUBJECT OF 
CURRENT
INTEREST.
3. TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. IRAQ: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) CAPABILITIES 
B. IRAQ: LASER ASSESSMENT 
C. IRAQ: MEDICAL IMPACT OF AGENT GF 
D. [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
4. INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
A. IRAQ: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CBW) CAPABILITIES 
AFMIC ANALYSTS ASSESS THAT IRAQ HAS A MATURE OFFENSIVE BW
PROGRAM. SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF BOTULINUM TOXIN LIKELY HAVE BEEN
PRODUCED AND PROBABLY ARE WEAPONIZED. IN ADDITION, BACILLUS 
ANTHRACIS
(ANTHRAX), VIBRIO CHOLERAE (CHOLERA), STAPHYLOCOCCUS ENTEROTOXIN B
(SEB), AND CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS BACTERIA OR ITS TOXIN MAY BE IN

THE ADVANCED STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OR AVAILABLE FOR WEAPONIZATION.
UNCONFIRMED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS CLAIMED THAT IRAQI FORCES
USED BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS DURING THE
IRAN/IRAQ WAR. IT IS ASSESSED THAT IRAQI FORCES WILL USE BW ONLY 
AS A
LAST RESORT.
THE BW RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION FACILITY AT
SALMAN PAK (33-04-30N 44-35-01E) IS BELIEVED TO BE THE MAJOR
PRODUCTION AND STORAGE FACILITY FOR BW IN IRAQ. AT LEAST ONE 
BUILDING
AT THE SITE HAS THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF BIOHAZARD CONTAINMENT FOR
WORKING WITH THE MOST DANGEROUS INFECTIOUS AGENTS. THE IRAQI ARMY
FACILITY AT TAJI (33-31-40N 44-16-20E), A FACILITY AT ABU GHURAYB
(EAST OF BAGHDAD), AND THE IRAQI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION FACILITY 
AT
TUWAITHA (NEAR BAGHDAD) ALSO ARE SUSPECTED OF ENGAGING IN RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT AND POSSIBLY PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN
AGENTS. AGENT TESTING HAS BEEN REPORTED AT A FACILITY LOCATED IN 
THE
MARSHES SOUTHEAST OF AN NASIRIYAH (31-02-41N 46-16-21E).
VARIOUS MECHANISMS ARE AVAILABLE TO IRAQ FOR DISSEMINATION
OF BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN AGENTS: AEROSOL GENERATORS WHICH CAN BE
TRANSPORTED BY TRUCK, BOAT, HELICOPTER, AND OTHER CONVEYANCES;

CLUSTER BOMBS; SPRAY TANKS FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT; 
ARTILLERY
SHELLS; AND VARIOUS MISSILES. THE USE OF SUBMUNITIONS FOR 
INCREASED
AREA COVERAGE IS LIKELY.
IRAQ IS NOT EXPECTED TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN AREAS OF
CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THEIR OWN TROOPS. THESE WEAPONS LIKELY WILL BE
DEPLOYED AT NIGHT OR IN THE EARLY MORNING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
FAVORABLE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS.
BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN AGENTS PROBABLY WILL BE DELIVERED IN
AEROSOL FORM. MASKS ALONE PROBABLY WILL OFFER SUFFICIENT 
PROTECTION
AGAINST KNOWN AEROSOLIZED WET OR DRY BW AGENTS; HOWEVER, THE
POSSIBILITY FOR RE-AEROSOLIZATION OF THE AGENT EXISTS. COMPLETE
DECONTAMINATION BEFORE MASK REMOVAL IS CRITICAL. DELIVERY OF
BIOLOGICAL TOXINS OR INFECTIOUS AGENTS BOUND TO A SILICA MATRIX
CAPABLE OF PENETRATING PERMEABLE PROTECTIVE SUITS MAY BE WITHIN 
IRAQI
CAPABILITY. SUCH AN AGENT POSSIBLY COULD WORK ITS WAY THROUGH THE
FABRIC OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND BECOME IMBEDDED IN THE SKIN.
[   (b)(6)   ][   (b)(2)   ]

B. IRAQ: LASER ASSESSMENT 
IT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT LASER EYE INJURIES OCCURRED IN THE
IRAN/IRAQ WAR, BASED ON NUMEROUS REPORTS OF SUCH INJURIES AND THE
KNOWN PURCHASE OF LASERS FOR THE IMPLIED PURPOSE OF WEAPONIZATION.
THE TYPES OF LASERS PURCHASED ARE AMENABLE TO ANTIPERSONNEL OR
ANTISENSOR APPLICATIONS.
THE INJURIES, DESCRIBED AS RETINAL BURNS AND HEMORRHAGES,
REPORTEDLY WERE CAUSED BY A LASER DEVICE ASSOCIATED WITH IRAQI 
TANKS.
THE REPORTED INJURIES COULD HAVE BEEN INFLICTED BY A VISIBLE OR 
NEAR-
INFRARED LASER, MOST LIKELY A TANK-MOUNTED RUBY OR NEODYMIUM/GLASS
LASER RANGEFINDER.
OUR OVERALL ASSESSMENT IS THAT LASER EYE INJURIES PROBABLY
OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE USE OF TANK-MOUNTED LASER RANGEFINDERS 
OR
OTHER LASER SYSTEMS. THESE SYSTEMS POSSIBLY WERE USED IN AN
OFFENSIVE, ANTIPERSONNEL MODE, WITH THE EXPLICIT PURPOSE OF 
BLINDING
TROOPS. HAND-HELD LASER RANGEFINDERS AND DESIGNATORS ASSOCIATED 
WITH
ARMOR OR ARTILLERY COULD BE USED IN AN ATTEMPT TO DAZZLE, 
DISORIENT,
OR BLIND PERSONNEL IN LOW-FLYING AIRCRAFT (FIXED AND ROTOR WING).
LASERS ALSO HAVE BEEN PURCHASED BY IRAQ PRESUMABLY FOR MILITARY

APPLICATION. SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THAT IRAQ FIELDED THESE LASERS 
AS
ANTISENSOR OR ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONS; HOWEVER, NO DIRECT OR THIRD
PARTY CONFIRMATION EXISTS TO SUPPORT THIS REPORT. [   (b)(6)   ]  
[   (b)(2)   ]

C. IRAQ: MEDICAL IMPACT OF AGENT GF 
IN 1988, UNCONFIRMED REPORTS CLAIMED THAT AGENT GF
(CYCLOHEXYLMETHYLPHOSPHONOFLUORIDATE) WAS USED BY THE IRAQIS 
DURING
THE AL-FAW OFFENSIVE. THIS REPRESENTED THE FIRST REPORTED USE OF 
GF
IN COMBAT. IRAQ LAUNCHED MORE THAN 1,500 ROCKETS CONTAINING SARIN
(GB) AND GF ON THE IRANIAN TROOPS DURING THE 2-DAY ATTACK, CAUSING 
AN
ESTIMATED 5,000 CASUALTIES AND MASS FLIGHT OF IRANIAN TROOPS FROM 
THE
BATTLEFIELD (A PHENOMENON THAT DID NOT OCCUR IN EARLIER BATTLES).
GF IS A "G" SERIES NERVE AGENT PREVIOUSLY STUDIED BY THE U.S.
THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS, THERAPY, AND METHODS OF PROTECTION AND
DETECTION ARE THE SAME AS FOR SARIN. SOAP AND WATER IS RECOMMENDED

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
FOR DECONTAMINATION. THE EFFECTS OF GF DIFFER FROM SARIN IN TWO 
MAJOR
RESPECTS: GF IS MORE PERSISTENT AND MORE READILY ABSORBED THROUGH 
THE

SKIN.
GF IS A LIQUID AGENT THAT WILL REMAIN IN THE TARGET AREA FOR
SEVERAL HOURS (AT 20 DEGREES CENTIGRADE, VAPOR PRESSURE IS 0.06
MILLIMETERS AND VOLATILITY IS 600 MILLIGRAMS/CUBIC METER), WHILE
SARIN WILL DISSIPATE IN A FEW MINUTES (VAPOR PRESSURE 2,200
MILLIMETERS AT 25 DEGREES CENTIGRADE AND VOLATILITY 40.000
MILLIGRAMS/CUBIC METER AT 35 DEGREES CENTIGRADE) AT THE 
TEMPERATURES
FOUND IN THE MIDDLE EAST. GF IS NOT AS TOXIC AS SARIN BY 
INHALATION,
BUT IS MORE TOXIC BY PERCUTANEOUS ABSORPTION (ESTIMATED 
PERCUTANEOUS
LETHAL DOSE 50 FOR GF IS 45 TO 50 MILLIGRAMS/90 KILOGRAM MAN, AND 
FOR
SARIN IS 1,700 TO 3,500 MILLIGRAMS/MAN).
BASED ON THE SEVERAL-HOUR PERSISTENCE OF GF, WE BELIEVE THIS
AGENT WOULD BE USED IN AREAS THAT ARE NOT TARGETED FOR IMMEDIATE
OCCUPATION. HOWEVER, SINCE GF WILL ONLY PERSIST IN THE AREA FOR
HOURS, WE ASSESS THAT THE AGENT WOULD LIKELY BE USED ON TARGETS 
IRAQ
INTENDS TO OCCUPY WITHIN ONE DAY. SINCE THE PERSISTENCE OF GF WILL
NECESSITATE THAT FORCES REMAIN IN PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR FOR 
LONGER
PERIODS THAN FOR SARIN, PERSONNEL WILL EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT HEAT
STRESS AND DEGRADATION OF PERFORMANCE. [   (b)(6)   ][   (b)(2) ]


D. [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ][   (b)(6)   ][   (b)(2)   ]

BT

#0104


INFODATE:        0