IRAQ'S PERFORMANCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR (U)

File: 961031_950825_002mc_91.txt
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IRAQ'S PERFORMANCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR (U)

Filename:002mc.91

Subj: IRAQ'S PERFORMANCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR (U)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Throughout the entire Gulf crisis, Saddam Hussein made serious 
errors in political, strategic, and tactical calculations that 
ultimately resulted in his forces being driven from Kuwait 
leaving the Iraqi military and economy in virtual ruin.

- Seriously misjudged international response
Political and military

- Unsuccessful attempt to link Kuwait with Palestinian issue

- Military-industrial base devastated
SRBM and CBW capability decimated

The Arab coalition's contribution to the overall effort was 
superb. Although numerous problems were initially encountered, 
these problems were eventually overcome allowing the Arab 
forces to contribute significantly to Desert Storm/Shield in 
accomplishing all assigned objectives.

Desert Storm left the Iraqi Air Force totally ineffective as a 
military force and the Iraqi Navy was virtually destroyed 15 
days into the air campaign.

Iraq's chemical and biological production capabilities were 
near entirely destroyed and it will take years and millions of 
dollars to rebuild its capability back to pre-war levels.

- Numerous theories could explain Baghdad's failure to use 
these weapons

Although initial expectations that the Iraqi SRBM force could 
be quickly subdued, it remained a powerful threat throughout 
the crisis period.


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Iraq's Chemical and Biological Warfare Capability and Response

Coalition air forces struck Iraqi biological weapon research, 
development, and storage facilities and chemical weapon 
research and development, production, filling, and storage 
facilities through the duration of the air campaign.

Coalition forces initially identified and targeted four BW 
R&D/production facilities. A fifth facility was identified in 
February. Coalition bombing destroyed 11 of the 13 buildings 
associated with BW R&D/production and severely damaged the 
other 2 buildings. All five facilities are assessed to be 
unable to support BW R&D or production. Additionally, BW 
storage initially included 19 12-frame refrigerated bunkers at 
11 locations. In February, two more bunkers were identified. 
All of the original 19 bunkers were destroyed, however, the 
final two bunkers were discovered too late in the campaign to 
be attacked.

CW production facilities were located at two sites. Of the 10 
buildings located at Samarra, 6 were destroyed, incapacitating 
Iraq's CW production capability by 70 percent. Additionally, 
all three facilities at Habbaniyah were destroyed. CW storage 
facilities consisted of 8 cruciform bunkers at Samarra and 22 
S-shaped bunkers at 13 locations. One of the 8 cruciform 
bunkers was destroyed while the remaining 7 sustained only 
superficial damage. Of the 22 S-shaped bunkers, 16 were 
destroyed and 6 suffered serious damage.

Reproducing Iraq's entire prewar BW system would require 
spending $100-200 million and a minimum of 5-8 years. Iraq 
could, however, reestablish a significant BW capability within 
3-4 years for less than S100 million. To rebuild Iraq's prewar 
CW capabilities would take $400-600 million and 3-5 years.

Iraq's failure to use its chemical weapons cannot be 
completely understood without a full accounting of the Iraqi 
military and political leadership's plans in preparation for 
the war and the execution of those plans. Information on this 
subject remains limited, and analysis of the reasoning is 
still preliminary. The following is an estimate of the 
influence of several factors that may have contributed to 
Iraq's failure to use these weapons:


If Iraq did not deploy its chemical weapons to the KTO, two 
possible explanations are likely. First, Iraq believed that 
both Israel and the Coalition had chemical and nuclear weapons 
and would use them if provoked. Iraqi leaders also realized 
that these weapons could be delivered anywhere in Iraq with 
accuracy. Saddam probably concluded that the consequences of 
attacking with chemical weapons would be too severe to justify 
their use, and this may have led to an early decision not to 
use them. Saddam may also have assumed that Iraqi use of CW 
weapons would cause Coalition forces to seek his removal as a 
top priority including the liberation of Kuwait.

Second, it is just as likely that the leadership made a 
fundamental miscalculation about how the Coalition would 
prosecute the war and how effectively its own forces would be 
able to respond. Baghdad may have expected the Coalition 
forces to fight much like the Iranians did (attacking first 
with infantry followed by mobile armor). They perceived that 
this would have given them days or even weeks to move chemical 
munitions into the KTO once the offensive had begun.

Based on the initial assumption that Baghdad did not move 
chemical weapons into the KTO prior to the offensive, the most 
likely reason for their non-use was the speed and violence of 
the Coalition advance reaching objectives deep in Iraq in four 
days which precluded their movement much less their use. Iraqi 
forces were kept constantly off balance, and Coalition air 
supremacy made effective concentration of artillery against 
Coalition ground forces virtually impossible.

Also, Iraq's C3 system had been heavily damaged at this point. 
Iraqi commanders could not control their forces, in part 
because of their intelligence system's complete failure. This 
inability to accurately depict the disp~ planning extremely 
difficult could also have added to the reasons that chemical 
weapons were not used.

Additionally, destruction of Iraqi CW production and storage 
centers may also have precluded their use. The chemicals made 
earlier may have deteriorated in storage and/or been 
destroyed. Iraq may also have miscalculated that its defenses 
would allow time to produce and deploy chemicals later in the 
conflict. Loss of their production facilities prevented them 
from making the agents as needed, which was the practice 
during the Iran-Iraq War.

Other factors which could have deterred their use are:

o Loss of their ability to be delivered by air due to 
Coalition air supremacy.
o Artillery and MRL losses were extremely high by the time the 
ground offensive began limiting their use fcr chemical 
delivery.
o SCUD technical problems in their long range versions made 
the use of chemical warheads extremely inexact, and again the 
speed of the Coalition advance may have precluded their use of 
the SCUD-B for delivery.
o Damage to the logistics infrastructure may have made their 
transportation impossible.
o Weather conditions at the outset of the ground offensive was 
poor for chemical usage. Winds were strong, generally from the 
south, and there was rain in the area.

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