ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM COALITION

File: 961031_950811_015me_91d.txt
Page: 91d
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ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM COALITION

Filename:015me.91d

DATE:   09 JAN 1991

TO:     DISTRIBUTION LIST

FROM:    IRAQ INTERAGENCY BIOLOGICAL WARFARE WORKING
         GROUP, FUSION COMMITTEE

SUBJ:    ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM COALITION
         AIR STRIKES ON IRAQI BW RELATED FACILITIES

1.             Ongoing analysis of this issue leads us to believe 
that the original estimates of potential Iraqi casualties 
resulting from U.S. and coalition air strikes on BW related 
facilities was far too high. Further, we now believe that contrary 
to these original estimates, that there is little liklihood that 
there would be any threat to coalition forces as a result of these 
strikes.

2.             One of the areas of greatest concern in attacking 
Iraqi BW facilities has been the amount of collateral damage that 
could be inflicted on the Iraqi' population, and potentially 
coalition forces, as a result of inadvertent aerosolization of 
Biological spores and toxins: It is believed that based on a 
thorough review of the information and exploitation of
expertise available the original estimates, those appearing in the 
IIBWWG final report, are far to high and are the result of the 
very, even overly, conservative methodology applied. The original 
estimate assumed a total Iraqi anthrax inventory of about 3000 
kgs. After a review of the available information, and the 
methodology used to derive that figure, it is believed that the 
estimate was three times too high, [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    
] would indicate the actual size
of agent inventory.  Additionally, the methodology assumed 
virtually all of the Iraqi stockpile to be located at any one 
facility at any given time (a highly unlikely scenario), thus the 
absolute worst case situation is derived, in terms of collateral 
casualties, for the area surrounding that facility.
Finally, two alternate cases were developed where it was assumed, 
lacking better data at the time, that either 1O% or 1% of the 
agent present would be aerosolized.  Such factors as wind 
direction, inversion conditions, spore degradation due to 
environmental factors, etc., were then cranked into the model and 
the resultant high and low casualty figures were derived for each
BW facility. Here unfortunately, more as a result of presentation 
than anything else people seeing the data assumed that the figures 
for each location were cumulative and interpreted them 
accordingly. Unfortunately what in fact happened as a result of 
the method of presentation is that the entire Iraqi inventory is 
placed in each facility, casualty figures are derived for each, 
but then added up cumulatively. The resultant figure is 
representative of the entire Iraqi Anthrax inventory x the number 
of facilities used, a far from accurate picture.




3.             To further complicate the issue it turns out that 
the figures used for aerosolization of agent that would result 
from a coalition-strike, 1 to 10 %, is much to high based on 
experience with the U.S. BW program in the 196Os. In consultation 
with individuals with considerable experience in this area it was 
determined that the actual amount of anthrax spore that
would likely be released, and then aerosolized, as a result of an 
attack by high explosive munitions using an optimized attack 
profile would be no greater than 0.001 - 0.1, (10 grams - 1 kg), 
and probably less.

4.             The attached chart shows a comparison of the newly 
derived figures which represents the official position of the 
IIBWWG with the previous worst case model. Note that the figures 
are not cumulative, but are stand alone for each facility noted. 
The holders of the IBBWWG final report should add this chart to 
the Collateral Risk Assessment section of that report and either 
remove the existing charts or accurately reflect that the 
collateral casualty estimates are not valid

								  [   (b)(2)   ]

                                          CA, Senior Intelligence
                                          Officer: Chairman IIBWWG
                                          Fusion Group



DIST:  HOLDERS OF IIBWWG FINAL REPORT

            DIA-  DR
                  DD
                  ED
                  CA
                  VP
                  JS/J2


		  [   (b)(2)   ]
		  [   (b)(2)   ]
            AFXX  
            AFMIC




Facility                             Estimated Casualties*
                              Worst case**        Probable case***


Bunkers/No.

Salman Pak (2)                  39-61,000             Hundreds

Al Fallujah (2)                 24-56,000             Hundreds

Ash Shuaybah (1)                10-17,000             Hundreds

Ad Diwaniyah (3)                 5-17,000             Hundreds-
										    thousands

Kirkuk (1)                      4-10,000-             Hundreds

An Nasiriyah (4)                  2-3,000             Hundreds-
							                   thousands

Karbala (2)                      1-6,500              Hundreds

Qabatiyann (1)                  500-2,500             Hundreds

Tikrit                          500-3,000             
Tens-hundreds

Habbaniyah (1)                        DNA                   DNA

Production

Taji                        120-224-, 000             Less than 	
											5,000

*Assumes uniform population distribution outside of Baghdad.

**A night time attack with high explosive weapons resulting in
heavy damage/total destruction with the release of 10-100 kg
anthrax spores.

"`Pre-dawn attack with high explosive guided muntion through the
entrance of the bunkers with 0.001-0.1% (10 grams-I  kilogram)
anthtax spore release.