Q&A's

File: 961031_950811_0106pgv_91p.txt
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Q&A's

Filename:0106pgv.91p
[   (b)(2)   ]

Respond to Task 3864
PASS TO THEITF OPS OFFICER
31 JAN 91, 1625 HRS,  SENT BY; [   (b)(6)   ]

Subject: Q&A's
 
Question 1: Launching and dispersal capability:

A.  What is DIA's assessment regarding the possibility of the 
weaponization of anthrax an botulinum in air bombs (unitary and 
cluster)?

Answer 1A: It is possible that anthrax and botulinum toxin has 
been weaponized in aerial bombs.  We have no positive information, 
however, to indicate that the Iraqis have done this.  In our 
opinion, cluster munitions would be the choice of munitions  for 
best dispersal.  Cluster munitions would give wider area coverage 
and could be dropped from altitude around 8,000 meters.

B.  Have there been field tests in the disperal of BW elements in 
air bombs in addition to the tests carried out in the Al Hadrah 
site during May-August 1989 (where botulinum was apparently 
dispersed)?

Answer 1B:  We have no information beyond that provided at the [  
 (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] CBW exchange.

C.  Were powder or liquid agents dispersed during these field 
tests and are there data regarding the results of the tests and 
the size of the infected area?

Answer 1C:  We have no additional  information beyond what was 
presented during the [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] .

D.  Are structural data available regarding these bombs (opening 
altitude, number of bomblets.)?

Answer 1D:  There are no positive data available on any type of BW 
munition.  It is known, however, from previous experience that 
cluster bombs can contain 500-550 individual cluster munitions.  
The larger munition with clusters inside can be dropped from 
altitudes around 12,000 meters with release of clusters as high as 
9,000 meters.  This gives a distribution of cluster munitions over 
10-11 hectares.

E.  What is DIA's assessment regarding BWA dispersal capability by 
means of an SSM warhead, on the basis of current Iraqi Operational 
SSM's?

1E:  We believe that Iraq has the technical capability to have 
produced BWA warheads for SSM's but have no positive information 
to indicate that this has been done.  We operate under the 
assumption that such warheads are available.  In our judgment, 
cluster munitions with contact fuzes would be the best method of 
dissemination.  Expected height opening of the warhead for cluster 
release could be in the range of 7,500-15,000 meters for good 
distribution.

F.  Have there been any SSM launching attempts with a BWA warhed 
(or BWA simulant)?  If positive, details regarding these 
launchings and their degree of success would be appreciated.

Answer 1F:  There have been no launches of SSM's known to have a 
BW warhead containing either actual BW agent or simulant.  We 
would consider any launch with a detonation above 7-8,000 meters 
suspicious, but design jproblems in the SSM cause unintentional 
warhead separation and possible detonation below 15,000 meters.

G.  What are the sizes of the particles which can be dispersed by 
the aerosol generators procured by Iraq?  Who is the procurement 
body in this case.

Answer 1G: The particle size varies depending upon whether the 
agent is wet or dry.  Liquid suspensions of acillus globigil 
spores can only be placed in aerosol particlesin 100-200 
micrometer diameter atteh highest pressure setting and smallest 
orifice size (0.8 mm).  This, of course, is of no use for covering 
large areas with aerosols.  It could be used to contaminate soil 
by spraying it on the ground but seconary aerosolization is not 
considered a problem with anthrax.  Preliminary study indicates 
that dry BG spore aerosols can be generated in the 1-2 micrometer 
range at teh rate of approximately one kilogram per minute.  More 
testing is required, however, before we are certain of this.  The 
procurement body is not known.

Question 2:  BW elements  and production capability.  As far as is 
known to us, [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] the supplier was 
asked to develop a dryer according to the special requireemtns set 
by TSMID.  We know that the newly designed spray dryer is 
different from the one in Taji Facility, it is not clear to us 
whether the Taji spray dryer is clear cut evidece for DIA's 
conclusion that spores are being dried at the Taji Facility.  We 
would be grateful for your comment.

Answer 2: We have no reason, at this time, to assume the [      
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] is different from the one at the Taji 
Production Facility but at the same time do not consider ti clear 
cut.  Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge the Taji fermentor 
had a dedicated spore drier believed to be used for anthrax 
spores.

Question 3:  BWA production and storage faciilties:

A.  There are a number of facilities in the Abu Gharib site.  As 
far as is inown to [   (b)(1) ] only the production facility for 
clostridial vaccines served as a BWA production facility.  Near 
this facility is another vacine production facility which in 
practice produces veterinarian and human vaccines and is not 
connected to BW[      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] has no knowledge 
of any type of involvement of the infant formula plant in the BW 
project.  What information is there regarding the infant formula 
plant which was hit?  Since when has DIA considered this facility 
to be involved in the BW project?  What equipment is installed in 
this facility?



	Answer 3A:  We have considered the infant formula a suspect 
BW facility for several years but were never able to locate it. We 
believe the facility served as a back-up BW production plant.  
Since the last [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] , we were able to 
locate it preisely.  The presence of four guard towers, a fence, 
and controlled access strengthened our suspecions.  Just prior to 
the outbreak of war, the Iraqis camouflaged the facility which 
indicated they considered it of high value.  Review of the plant 
from 1983 to the present indicates little day-to-day activity 
further indicating its back-up function.  It also indicates that 
the plant was not producing large quanities of infant formula as 
depicted in the news media other wise heavy vehicular traffic 
would be expected as supplies were imported and product 
transported from the plant.  After the plant was attacked, large 
18-wheeler trucks were noted at the facility probably trying to 
salvage equipment considered important.

Question 3A: continued:  Was the production facility for 
clostridal vaccines (suspected of being connected to the BW 
project)  been point located?  Has it been hit during coalition 
air sorties?  If positive-what is the extent of the damage?  We 
would appreciate the precise location of this production facility, 
if available.

Answer 3A continued:  Since the last [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] 
, we were able to locate the Clostridium Vaccine Plant.  There is 
no damage as of this date to the facility.

	B.  We estimate that the production of anthrax was also 
carried out at the production facility at Abu Gharib since the 
production facility at Taji is not enough to achieve the 
production of hundreds of kilograms in 3-4 years of production.  
We have no information regarding any production at the Salman Pak 
facility.  Answer 3B:  We have no information to indicate that the 
Clostridial Vaccine Plant has produced anthrax but agree with your 
assessment that anthrax production could have occurred there.  We 
also have no firm information regarding any production at Salman 
Pak but believe it possible.  In early Januarny 1991, a stake bed 
truck was noted leaving the Salman Pak facility with material.  
Two objects may have been large vessels, possibly fermentors.  
This, however, has not been confirmed.  LIkewise, the five 
refrigrerated trucks departed Salman Pak sometime during the last 
two weeks of December 1990.  It is not known if this was to 
protect them or for BW agent dispersal to other sites.  Since the 
last [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]  , seventeen refrigeration units 
have turned up at the new area of construction south of the 
research and engineering area.  Some of the refrigeration units 
have been connected to the buildings.  It may be possible these 
are the refrigeration units involved in project 324 which in our 
mind would tie these buildings to TSMID  and BW.  

D.  We provided [   (b)(2)   ] a drawing of the cast 
infrastructure of the Taki deep freeze storage and b.1 assessment. 
 Does DIA still stand by its designation of this facility?  Was 
this facility bombed and what was the extent of the damage?  We 
would appreciate the precise location of this facility?

Answer 3D:  We believe we have determined the location of the deep 
freeze facility depicted in the [   (b)(1) ]  sketch.  We are 
uncertain of what your understanding is of our designation of this 
facility.  
So that you understand--we have no information which ties the deep 
freeze storage directly to BW.  This is why we asked if the [   
(b)(1) ] had additional information.   Its proximity to the Taji 
production facility makes it suspect for storage of liquid agent. 
 There is, however, no evidence of increased security measures.

E.  Does DIA know for certain, as previously reported, of cooling 
equipment having been installed in all the nineteen bunikers 
suspected os storing BWA?  What is the extent of the hits in each 
of these bunkers?

Answer 3E:  We are certain that refrigeration has been installed 
at nineteen 12-frame bunkers scattered throughout Iraq.  The 
collective storage capacity of these bunkers is far in excess of 
what we believe the Iraqis need for BW.  Our position is that 
these bunkers are capable of storing BW agents/munitions but can 
also be used to store other heat-sensitive materials as well.  
Four of the refrigerated bunkers (two at Salman Pak, one at 
Karbala, one at Qabitiyah) has [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] 
associated with them.  All four with special security have been 
destroyed along with three others (one additional at Karbala and 
two at Ad Biwaniyah).

F.  What types of vaccines are produced in Iraq and which of them 
can be related to BW.

Answer 3F:  The answer to this question has not yet been 
determined.

G.  According to [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ], the production 
of veterinarian anthrax vaccines has been taking place in  Iraq 
since 1970's.  Does DIA have any information regarding the 
production of human anthrax vaccines?

Answer 3G: The answer to this question has not yet been 
determined.

POC:  [   (b)(6)   ]