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Subject: TASK FORCE BRIEFING

Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence







TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN

TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF

THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON

REQUEST.







THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS THE CIA STATEMENT THAT WAS GIVEN TO

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PERSIAN GULF WAR

VETERANS' ILLNESSES ON 1 MAY 96. IT PROVIDES OUR INTERIM

RESPONSE FROM ONGOING ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION RELATED TO

GULF WAR ILLNESSES.





DR. LASHOF, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, WE ARE PLEASED TO APPEAR

BEFORE YOU THIS AFTERNOON TO ADDRESS CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE

EXPOSURE OF OUR TROOPS TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS IN THE

PERSIAN GULF. OUR DIRECTOR PLACES AN EMPHASIS ON CIA REVIEWING

ALL AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE AND THOROUGHLY ANALYZING ITS RELEVANCE

TO THIS ISSUE. CIA HAS MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO CONDUCT A

COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE SINCE THE DECISION WAS

MADE IN MARCH OF LAST YEAR. THIS DECISION WAS BASED ON THE

RISING IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE AND THE PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR A

THOROUGH STUDY. INDEED, THIS CALL WAS THE SAME ONE THAT INITIATED

THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE.







TODAY, WE WILL BE COVERING THREE AREAS IN OUR DISCUSSION.



FIRST, WE WILL PRESENT A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CIA'S ROLE IN

DETERMINING WHETHER THERE WAS POSSIBLE CHEMICAL AND

BIOLOGICAL AGENT EXPOSURE. IN DOING THIS WE WILL ENDEAVOR TO

CLARIFY THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE TO THIS ISSUE AND DEFINE

FOR YOU THE SCOPE OF OUR CURRENT STUDY.



SECOND, WE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH SOME OF OUR PRELIMINARY

ASSESSMENTS ON KEY AREAS RELATED TO OUR CURRENT STUDY OF

POSSIBLE TROOP EXPOSURE INCLUDING THE PRESENCE, USE, AND

FALLOUT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENT IN THE KUWAIT THEATER

OF OPERATIONS.



FINALLY, WE WILL CLOSE WITH SOME OF OUR PLANS FOR THE FUTURE ON

THIS ISSUE.







FIRST, LET ME DEFINE CIA'S ROLE. CIA HAS LONG FOLLOWED IRAQ'S

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROGRAMS AS PART OF ITS MISSION TO

ASSESS CW AND BW PROLIFERATION. BEFORE THE GULF WAR, WE

ASSESSED THAT IRAQ HAD A SIGNIFICANT CW AND BW CAPABILITY,

INCLUDING CHEMICALLY ARMED SCUDS, AND HAD USED CHEMICAL

WEAPONS ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS AGAINST IRAN AND ITS OWN

CITIZENS. AFTER THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, WE ASSESSED THAT IRAQ HAD

PROBABLY FORWARD DEPLOYED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND WOULD USE

THEM IN A VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES. AT THAT TIME, WE ASSESSED

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, PROBABLY FILLED WITH AGENTS ANTHRAX AND

BOTULINUM TOXIN, WOULD BE USED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT.







AT THE START OF THE AIR WAR AND CONTINUING TO THE END OF DESERT

STORM, THE DI'S OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND WEAPONS RESEARCH

ESTABLISHED A 24-HOUR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WATCH OFFICE.

THESE ANALYSTS SCREENED INCOMING INTELLIGENCE FOR EVIDENCE OF

CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS USE AND FOLLOWED EVERY SCUD

LAUNCH. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MANY INITIAL REPORTS OF CHEMICAL

WEAPONS USE, SUBSEQUENT FOLLOW-UP NEVER PROVIDED CONFIRMATION

AND OFTEN YIELDED PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATIONS UNRELATED TO CW. SOON

AFTER THE WAR, WE PUBLISHED ASSESSMENTS CONCLUDING THAT IRAQ HAD

READIED ITS FORCES TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, DECIDED TO MOVE

THEM OUT OF THE THEATER PRIOR TO THE WAR, AND THEN NEVER USED

THEM.







WE ARE REVIEWING INTELLIGENCE REPORTING AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE

HOLDINGS IN PARALLEL WITH DOD'S PERSIAN GULF INVESTIGATIVE TEAM.

OUR STUDY IS A DETAILED INVESTIGATION INTO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION-

-NOT TROOP TESTIMONY, MEDICAL RECORDS, OR OPERATIONAL LOGS--AND

OUR CONCLUSIONS ARE OUR OWN. THE CIA'S EFFORT DOES NOT SEEK TO

DUPLICATE THAT OF DOD; HOWEVER, CIA ANALYSTS DRAW UPON AND

EXAMINE DOD INFORMATION TO CLARIFY INTELLIGENCE, TO OBTAIN LEADS,

AND TO ENSURE A THOROUGH AND COMPREHENSIVE INTELLIGENCE

ASSESSMENT.







CIA AND THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM CONTINUE TO COORDINATE OUR

WORK, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE IN ITS

INTERIM REPORT. WE INFORM THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM OF RELEVANT

INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL EXPOSURES FOR

FOLLOW-UP. LIKEWISE, THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM SHARES RELEVANT

RESULTS THAT AID OUR STUDY. FOR EXAMPLE, WE TOLD THE

INVESTIGATIVE TEAM LAST FALL THAT SOME INCIDENTS FROM VETERANS'

COMPLAINTS INVOLVING BURNING SENSATIONS CORRELATED TO KNOWN

SCUD ATTACKS COULD BE EXPLAINED AS EXPOSURE TO THE LEFTOVER

RED FUMING NITRIC ACID--A COMPONENT OF SCUD PROPELLANT. THE

INVESTIGATIVE TEAM HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN STUDYING THIS AREA

AS MENTIONED AT PAST HEARINGS.



OUR STUDY INVOLVES TWO AREAS: RESEARCH AND FOCUSED

INVESTIGATIONS. WE HAVE REVIEWED THOUSANDS OF INTELLIGENCE

DOCUMENTS. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT RELATE TO POSSIBLE

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS USE, EXPOSURE, OR LOCATION

ARE SCRUTINIZED TO DETERMINE THEIR CREDIBILITY AND WHETHER

FOLLOW-UP IS WARRANTED. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE EXPANDED AND

MORE FULLY DOCUMENTED OUR ASSESSMENTS OF IRAQI CHEMICAL,

BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES AT THE START OF

DESERT STORM. USING THIS RESEARCH BASE, AN INVESTIGATION IS

THEN MADE INTO EACH OF THE KEY AREAS--USE, EXPOSURE, AND

LOCATION--AND SPECIFIC AREAS ARE EXAMINED WHEN POSSIBLE

LEADS ARE FOUND. THIS IS A TEDIOUS BUT NECESSARY PROCESS TO

ASSURE THAT OUR STUDY IS COMPREHENSIVE.







NOW I WILL DISCUSS OUR PRELIMINARY RESULTS.







REGARDING USE: TO DATE, WE HAVE NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT

LEADS US TO CONCLUDE THAT IRAQ USED CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR

RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) WEAPONS.



REGARDING EXPOSURE: WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE SOLDIER, WE HAVE

SEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT WOULD MAKE US CONCLUDE THAT ANYONE WAS

EXPOSED TO CW AGENT AT LEVELS THAT CAUSE EASILY IDENTIFIED

SYMPTOMS. IN THE 1980s, SUCH SYMPTOMS WERE SEEN FREQUENTLY IN

THE IRANIAN VICTIMS OF IRAQI CW USE. MUSTARD USE RESULTED IN LARGE

BLISTERS ON THE VICTIM'S SKIN AND MASS DEATHS WERE SEEN FROM

IRAQI NERVE AGENT USE.



REGARDING EXPOSURE DUE TO FALLOUT: ON THE BASIS OF ALL

AVAILABLE INFORMATION, WE CONCLUDE THAT COALITION BOMBING

RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO FILLED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AT ONLY TWO

FACILITIES--THE MUHAMMADIYAT STORAGE AREA AND THE STORAGE

AREA AT THE AL MUTHANNA CHEMICAL PRODUCTION SITE. WE HAVE

FOUND NO INFORMATION THAT IRAQI CASUALTIES OCCURRED AS A RESULT

OF CW AGENT RELEASE DUE TO BOMBING. THIS IS PROBABLY DUE TO

THE REMOTENESS OF THESE TWO FACILITIES. THE MUHAMMADIYAT

AND AL MUTHANNA SITES ARE BOTH OVER 30 KM FROM THE NEAREST

IRAQI TOWNS AND 60 AND 100 KM RESPECTIVELY TO THE NEAREST

IRAQI TOWNS IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF SAUDI ARABIA. BOTH

FACILITIES WERE OVER 400 KM FROM THE NEAREST POSITION OF

COALITION TROOPS THAT WERE IN SAUDI ARABIA.



IN MOST CASES, THE IRAQIS DID NOT STORE CW OR BW MUNITIONS IN

BUNKERS THAT THEY BELIEVED WE WOULD TARGET. THE IRAQIS STORED

MANY OF THE CW MUNITIONS IN THE OPEN TO PROTECT THEM FROM

COALITION DETECTION AND BOMBING. IN ADDITION, ALL KNOWN CW

AGENT AND PRECURSOR PRODUCTION LINES WERE EITHER INACTIVE OR

HAD BEEN DISMANTLED BY THE START OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN.



AS WE ELABORATED IN THE ATLANTA MEETING, WE ARE UTILIZING

FALLOUT MODELS TO ASCERTAIN THE EXACT NATURE OF THE

CONTAMINATED AREA THAT COULD HAVE RESULTED FROM BOMBING OF

IRAQI CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL FACILITIES. AS PART OF THIS WE WILL

CONTINUE TO ASSESS THE POTENTIAL DOWNWIND HAZARD THAT COULD

HAVE RESULTED FROM THE BOMBING OF MUHAMMADIYAT AND AL

MUTHANNA STORAGE FACILITIES.



REGARDING THE CZECH DETECTIONS: ON THE BASIS OF THE

EQUIPMENT AND DETECTION METHODS USED, WE BELIEVE THE

CZECHS LIKELY DETECTED LOW LEVELS OF NERVE AGENT ON 19

JANUARY 1991 AND FOUND MUSTARD AGENT ON 24 JANUARY. THE

SOURCE OF BOTH THE NERVE AGENT AND THE MUSTARD REMAINS

UNKNOWN. BUNKERS AT AN NASIRIYAH STORAGE DEPOT WERE

THOUGHT TO BE A POTENTIAL SOURCE. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT HAVE

ANY EVIDENCE THAT CW MUNITIONS WERE IN THE BUNKERS BOMBED

ON 17 JANUARY. IN ADDITION, MODELING TO DATE RULES OUT THE

POSSIBILITY THAT ANY FALLOUT FROM THOSE BUNKERS BOMBED ON 17

JANUARY AT AN NASIRIYAH COULD REACH THE CZECH DETECTORS.



REGARDING DEPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS:

WITH ONE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT WOULD

MAKE US CONCLUDE THAT MUNITIONS WERE DEPLOYED IN THE KUWAIT

THEATER OF OPERATIONS. THE EXCEPTION IS A LARGE REAR AMMUNITION

STORAGE AREA ABOUT 20 KM SOUTHEAST OF AN NASIRIYAH IRAQ--NEAR

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE KUWAIT THEATER OF OPERATIONS. THE

TALL AL LAHM AMMUNITION STORAGE AREA--CALLED THE KAMISIYAH

STORAGE DEPOT BY IRAQ--WAS FIRST INSPECTED BY THE UN SPECIAL

COMMISSION IN OCTOBER 1991. THEY FOUND CHEMICAL MUNITIONS

INCLUDING 122MM NERVE AGENT ROCKETS AND 155MM MUSTARD

ARTILLERY ROUNDS.



UNSCOM FOUND THE CHEMICAL MUNITIONS IN AT LEAST TWO

LOCATIONS. AT A PIT AREA, UNSCOM FOUND SEVERAL HUNDRED

MOSTLY INTACT 122MM ROCKETS CONTAINING NERVE AGENT--

DETECTED BY SAMPLING AND WITH CAMS. THE SECOND LOCATION

WAS 5 KM FROM THE FACILITY; THEY FOUND APPROXIMATELY 6,000

INTACT 155MM ROUNDS CONTAINING MUSTARD AGENT AS INDICATED

BY CAMS. A PROBABLE THIRD LOCATION WAS A SINGLE BUNKER

CALLED BUNKER 73 BY IRAQ THAT CONTAINED 122MM ROCKETS. IRAQ

CLAIMS THE ROCKETS WERE ORIGINALLY FILLED WITH NERVE AGENT.

HOWEVER, THERE IS SOME UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THE ROCKETS

ACTUALLY CONTAINED AGENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SAMPLING OR

POSITIVE CAM READINGS.



IN MARCH 1992, UNSCOM RETURNED AND DESTROYED ABOUT 500

NERVE-AGENT-FILLED ROCKETS AT THE SITE. ELEMENTS OF THE 37TH

ENGINEERING BATTALION ATTACHED TO THE 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION

ALSO PERFORMED DEMOLITION OF MUNITIONS AT THIS FACILITY, A YEAR

EARLIER. WE ARE WORKING WITH THE DOD INVESTIGATIVE TEAM TO

RESOLVE WHETHER SARIN-FILLED ROCKETS WERE DESTROYED AT BUNKER

73 AND WHETHER SOME US PERSONNEL COULD HAVE BEEN EXPOSED

TO CHEMICAL AGENT. DETAILS ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOUND BY

UNSCOM AT TALL AL LAHM PROVIDE THE ONLY CREDIBLE INFORMATION

TO DATE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH WEAPONS IN THE THEATER.



REGARDING UNUSUAL AGENTS: WE HAVE LOOKED AT ALL THE

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL AGENTS ATTRIBUTED TO IRAQIS PROGRAMS

AND HAVE FOUND NONE DESIGNED TO CAUSE THE MOST COMMON

LONG-TERM SYMPTOMS EXHIBITED BY ILL GULF WAR VETERANS.

HOWEVER, WE HAVE AN INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF SOME IRAQI

AGENTS. WE INCLUDE WITH OUR SUBMISSION A TABLE OF THE

BIOLOGICAL AGENTS DECLARED BY IRAQ, SYMPTOMS KNOWN TO BE

CAUSED BY THESE AGENTS, AND POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENTIONS FOR USE

OF THESE AGENTS. AS YOU WILL SEE, ALL OF THESE AGENTS WERE

INTENDED TO CAUSE RAPID DEATH OR INCAPACITATION--WITH THE

POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF AFLATOXIN. THE ONLY DOCUMENTED EFFECT

OF AFLATOXIN IN HUMANS IS PRODUCTION OF LIVER CANCER MONTHS TO

YEARS AFTER IT IS INGESTED. EFFECTS OF AEROSOLIZED AFLATOXIN ARE

UNKNOWN. UNSCOM HAS IRAQI STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS THAT

INDICATE THAT ALFATOXIN WAS LOOKED AT FOR ITS LONG TERM

CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS AND THAT TESTING ALSO SHOWED THAT LARGE

CONCENTRATIONS OF IT CAUSED DEATH WITHIN DAYS. WE HAVE NO

INFORMATION THAT WOULD MAKE US CONCLUDE THAT IRAQ USED

AFLATOXIN OR THAT IT WAS RELEASED IN THE ATMOSPHERE DUE TO

BOMBING.







REGARDING RADIOLOALCAL WEAPONS: ALTHOUGH IRAQ CONDUCTED

RESEARCH ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, WE ASSESS THEY NEVER

PROGRESSED INTO THE DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE. SMALL QUANTITIES OF

RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WERE RELEASED DURING TESTS IN AREAS NORTH

OF BAGHDAD. THESE TESTS TOOK PLACE TWO YEARS BEFORE THE GULF

WAR, AND ANY RADIOACTIVITY FROM THOSE TESTS WOULD HAVE

DECAYED AWAY BY THAT TIME. IN ADDITION, IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES

BOMBED DURING THE GULF WAR PRODUCED ONLY MINIMAL

CONTAMINATION NORTH OF THE KUWAIT THEATER OF OPERATIONS, WITH

NO RELEASES DETECTED BEYOND THOSE FACILITIES.







WE PLAN TO COMPLETE OUR STUDY IN THE COMING MONTHS AND

PUBLISH AN OPEN REPORT LATER THIS YEAR. IN THE INTERIM, IF WE FIND

ANY DEFINITIVE INFORMATION POINTING TO CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL

AGENT EXPOSURES OR IMPACTING SIGNIFICANTLY ON THE ISSUE OF

GULF WAR VETERAN'S ILLNESSES, WE WILL WORK WITH THE DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE TO ANNOUNCE THOSE FINDINGS.







ORGANISMS IRAQ HAS ADMITTED TO INCLUDING IN ITS BW PROGRUN





AGENT



BACILLUS ANTHRACIS



PATHOGENIC EFFECTS



CAUSATIVE AGENT FOR THE DISEASE

ANTHRAX. NORMALLY A ZOONOTIC

DISEASE OF GOATS, CATTLE, SHEEP AND

HORSES. ALL HUMAN POPULATIONS

SUSCEPTIBLE; TRANMISSION

THROUGH SKIN ABRASIONS,

INHALATION OF SPORES OR INGESTION

OF CONTAMINATED MEAT.

DEPENDING ON FORM OF DISEASE,

ONSET IS GRADUAL AND NONSPECIFIC.

INITIAL SYMPTONS OF INHALATION

ANTHRAX INCLUDE FEVER, MALAISE,

NONPRODUCTIVE COUGH, AND MILD

CHEST DISCOMFORT. INITIAL SYMPTONS

OF INHALATION ANTHRAX

ARE OFTEN FOLLOWED BY A SHORT

PERIOD OF IMPROVEMENT FOLLOWED

BY ABRUPT DEVELOPMENT OF SEVERE

RESPIRATORY DISTRESS, DYSPNEA, AND

CYANOSIS. SHOCK AND DEATH

USUALLY FOLLOW WITHIN 24-36

HOURS AFTER ONSET OF RESPIRATORY

DISTRESS.



POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT



IRAQ HAS ADMITTED TO RESEARCHING,

PRODUCING, AND WEAPONIZING

ANTHRAX FOR BW PURPOSES IN

AERIAL BOMBS AND MISSILE

WARHEADS.



AGENT



BOTULINUM TOXIN



PATHOGENIC EFFECTS



NEUROTOXIN PRODUCED BY BACILLUS

CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM.

PRODUCES SIMILIAR EFFECTS WHEN

INHALED OR INGESTED, ALTHOUGH THE

TIME COURSE MAY VARY DEPENDING

ON ROUTE OF EXPOSURE AND DOSE

RECEIVED. TOXIN BLOCKS

NEUROTRANSMISSION. ONSET OF

SYMPTOMS CAN OCCUR WITHIN 24

HOURS TO SEVERAL DAYS. SYMPTOMS

INCLUDE BULBAR PALSIES AND

BLURRED VISION. SKELETAL MUSCLE

PARALYSIS FOLLOWS WITH A

SYMMETRICAL DESCENDING AND

PROGRESSIVE WEAKNESS THAT MAY

CULMINATE IN RESPIRATORY FAILURE.



POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT



IRAQ HAS ADMITTED TO RESEARCHING,

PRODUCING, AND WEAPONIZING

BOTULINUM TOXIN IN AERIAL BOMBS

AND MISSILE WARHEADS.



AGENT



AFLATOXIN B1



AFLATOXINS ARE COMMONLY

PRODUCED BY FUNGAL-CONTAMINATED

FOOD GRAINS. IRAQ PRODUCED

AFLATOXINS FROM FUNGUS

ASPERGILLUS. AFLATOXIN IS KNOWN

TO CAUSE LIVER CANCER BUT NO ACUTE

PATHOGENIC EFFECTS HAVE YET BEEN

DETERMINED.



POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT



IRAQ HAS ADMITTED TO RESEARCHING,

PRODUCING, AND WEAPONIZING

AFLATOXIN IN AERIAL BOMBS AND

MISSILE WARHEADS.



AGENT



RICIN



PATHOGENIC EFFECTS



RICIN IS A POTENT TOXIN DERIVED

FROM THE BEANS OF THE CASTOR

PLANT; IT ACTS BY PROHIBITING CELL

PROTEIN SYNTHESIS. PATHOGENIC

EFFECTS OCCUR WHEN TOXIN IS EITHER

INHALED OR INGESTED. SIGNS AND

SYMPTOMS AFTER AEROSOL EXPOSURE

DEPEND ON THE DOSED INHALED.

HUMAN LETHALITY DATA AFTER

AERSOL EXPOSURE HAVE NOT BEEN

DESCRIBED, BUT ANIMAL DATA

SUGGEST SEVERE INFLAMMATION OF

THE RESPIRATORY TRACT, INTERSTITIAL

PNEUMONIA, AND ALVEOLAR EDEMA.

TIME TO DEATH IN ANIMALS IS DOSE

DEPENDENT AND HAS OCCURRED IN

18-72 HOURS. INGESTION CAUSES

SEVERE GASTROINTESTINAL SYMPTOMS,

VASCULAR COLLAPSE, AND DEATH

DEPENDING ON THE AMOUNT OF RICIN

INGESTED.



POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT



IRAQ RESEARCHED RICIN, PRODUCED

IT AND CONDUCTED WEAPONS TRIALS.

THOSE TRIALS WERE CONSIDERED A

FAILURE, ACCORDING TO THE IRAQIS

AND NO FURTHER WORK WAS DONE.



AGENT



ROTAVIRUS



ROTAVIRUS CAUSES ACUTE VIRAL

GASTROENTERITIS, DIARRHEA,

DEHYDRATION AND DEATH IN YOUNG

CHILDREN.



POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT



ROTAVIRUS WOULD ACT AS AN

INCAPACITATING AGENT. IRAQ

RESEARCHED AND TESTED ROTAVIRUS,

BUT ABANDONED ITS PROGRAM.



AGENT



ENTEROVIRUS 70



PATHOGENIC EFFECTS



CAUSES HEMORRHAGIC

CONJUNCTIVITIS, AN ACUTE, HIGHLY

CONTAGIOUS SELF-LIMITED DISEASE OF

THE EYE. CHARACTERIZED BY SUDDEN

ONSET OF PAIN, PHOTOPHOBIA

CONJUNCTIVITIS, SWELLING OF THE

EYELIDS. AND SUBCONJUNCTIVAL

HEMORRHAGES.



POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT



IRAQ RESEARCH HEMORRHAGIC

CONJUNCTIVITIS, BUT REPORTEDLY

ABANDONED THE PROGRAM.



AGENT



CAMEL POX



PATHOGENIC EFFECTS



CAUSES FEVER AND SKIN RASH IN

CAMELS



POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT



IRAQ RESEARCH CAMEL POX BUT

REPORTEDLY ABANDONED THE

PROGRAM. CAMEL POX RARELY

INFECTS HUMAN, BUT COULD

POSSIBLY SERVE AS A RESEARCH

MODEL FOR SMALLPOX.



AGENT



WHEAT RUST



PATHOGENIC EFFECTS



PRODUCES A BLACK GROWTH ON



WHEAT AND OTHER CEREAL GRAINS;

CONTAMINATED GRAIN CANNOT BE

USED AS FOODSTUFF.



POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT



IRAQ RESEARCHED AND PRODUCED

LARGE QUANTITIES OF WHEAT RUST,

CONTAMINATED GRAIN, AND

HARVESTED IT AS A POSSIBLE

ECONOMIC WEAPON. HOWEVER, THE

PROGRAM WAS REPORTEDLY

ABANDONED IN 1990 AND THE

CONTAMINATED GRAIN WAS

DESTROYED.



AGENT



YELLOW FEVER VIRUS



PATHOGENIC EFFECTS



AN ACUTE IN

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