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Subject: IRAQI'S BW PROGRAM

Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence







TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN

TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF

THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON

REQUEST.







WOULD IRAQ USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS?



          DECEMBER 1990







SUMMARY



PAST IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND STATEMENTS BY IRAQI OFFICIALS JUSTIFYING

THE USE OF ANY WEAPON TO DEFEND THEIR COUNTRY SUGGEST THAT BAGHDAD WOULD

CONSIDER USING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS UNDER CERTAIN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES, PROBABLY

AS A RETALIATORY OPTION FOR UNCONVENTIONAL ATTACKS ON IRAQ OR AS A WEAPON OF LAST

RESORT TO SAVE THE REGIME FROM FALLING. MOST IRAQI OFFICIALS--AND SADDAM HUSAYN

IN PARTICULAR--WOULD HAVE NO RELIGIOUS OR PERSONAL COMPUNCTIONS ABOUT USING

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IF THEY BELIEVED SUCH USE WOULD ADVANCE IRAQ'S POSITION. SEVERAL

FACTORS, INCLUDING QUESTIONS REGARDING THE MILITARY-POLITICAL UTILITY OF BIOLOGICAL

WARFARE AND THE FEAR OF RETALIATION, PROBABLY WILL INITIALLY RESTRAIN IRAQ FROM USING

ITS BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.





BAGHDAD PROBABLY BELIEVES THAT DETERENCE IS THE GREATEST BENEFIT IT DERIVES FROM

ITS BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY. THE DELIBERATE AMBIGUITY SURROUNDING IRAQI

INTENTIONS PROBABLY IS DESIGNED TO HEIGHTEN THIS DETERRENT VALUE. WE BELIEVE THAT

IRAQ IS MORE LIKELY TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FOR ATTACKS ON STRATEGIC TARGETS

AGAINST OPPOSING GROUND FORCES. SADDAM PROBABLY WILL RETAIN THE RELEASE

AUTHORITY FOR IRAQ'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS AT LEAST THROUGH THE INITIAL STAGES OF

HOSTILITIES.







KEY JUDGMENTS



IRAQ WOULD CONSIDER USING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AS A RETALIATORY OPTION FOR

UNCONVENTIONAL ATTACKS ON IRAQ OR AS A WEAPON OF LAST RESORT TO SAVE THE REGIME 
FROM FAILING.



BAGHDAD PROBABLY BELIEVES THAT THE GREATEST BENEFITS IT DERIVES FROM

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE THEIR DETERRENT VALUE AND THE ESCALATORY OPTION THEY

PROVIDE. SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING QUESTIONS REGARDING THE MILITARY-POLITICAL

UTILITY OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND THE FEAR OF CONVENTIONAL OR UNCONVENTIONAL 
RETALIATION, PROBABLY WOULD INITIALLY RESTRAIN IRAQ FROM RESTORING TO BIOLOGICAL

WARFARE.



BAGHDAD IS MOST LIKELY TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN A STRATEGIC ROLE AS A

TERROR WEAPON AGAINST MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TARGETS. IT IS LESS LIKELY BIOLOGICAL

WEAPONS IN TACTICAL SITUATIONS AGAINST OPPOSING GROUND FORCES. 



THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WOULD BE BASED ON SADDAM HUSAYN'S

JUDGMENT THAT IT WOULD ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES, INFLICT HARSH

RETRIBUTION AGAINST HIS ENEMIES, OR FULFILL HIS OWN SENSE OF MISSION. SADDAM PROBABLY

WOULD RETAIN CONTROL OVER ALL OF HIS STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS, INCLUDING

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, THROUGH AT LEAST THE INITIAL STAGES OF HOSTILITIES AFTER WHICH 
CONTINGENCY PLANS DELEGATING RELEASE AUTHORITY MAY GO INTO EFFECT.







WOULD IRAQ USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS?





PAST IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND STATEMENTS BY IRAQI

OFFICIALS JUSTIFYING THE EMPLOYMENT OF ANY WEAPON TO DEFEND THEIR

COUNTRY SUGGEST THAT BAGHDAD WOULD CONSIDER USING BIOLOGICAL

WEAPONS UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. WHILE DENYING THAT IT

POSSESSES BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, BAGHDAD HAS BEEN AMBIGUOUS ABOUT

THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH IT WOULD EMPLOY ANY UNCONVENTIONAL

WEAPONS. BEFORE THE CRISIS THE OFFICIAL IRAQI LINE--DEVELOPED IN

APRIL 1990 AFTER SADDAM'S SPEECH THREATENING TO "BURN HALF OF

ISRAEL" IN RESPONSE TO ANY ATTACK--WAS THAT BAGHDAD WOULD USE

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ONLY IN RETALIATION FOR AN

UNCONVENTIONAL ATTACK. SINCE AUGUST, SADDAM AND OTHER IRAQI

OFFICIALS HAVE THREATENED TO USE ALL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

AVAILABLE AND HAVE CLAIMED TO HOLD "SURPRISES" FOR USE IN DEFENSE

OF IRAQ. THIS AMBIGUITY ALMOST CERTAINLY IS DESIGNED TO RAISE

UNCERTAINTY AMONG THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES AND TO DISCOURAGE AN

ATTACK.



EXCEPT FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IRAQI

WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IS UNCLEAR,

NOR DOES BAGHDAD APPEAR TO HAVE A FORMAL THEORY OR DOCTRINE ON

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL UTILITY OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

IF DETERRENCE FAILS. ALTHOUGH IRAQ DOES NOT NEED SUCH DOCTRINES

TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, THEIR APPARENT ABSENCE SUGGESTS THAT

THE CHOICE TO EMPLOY THESE WEAPONS STRATEGICALLY MAY RELY ON

GENERAL CONTINGENCY PLANS OR POSSIBLY ON AD HOC DECISIONS.





FACTORS AFFECTING EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS



A DECISION BY BAGHDAD TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROBABLY

WOULD REST ON SADDAM'S DETERMINATION THAT THE WEAPON WOULD HELP

ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES OR HARSH

RETRIBUTION AGAINST IRAQ'S ENEMIES. ALTHOUGH IRAQ HAS MADE

GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT ITS WILLINGNESS TO USE ALL AVAILABLE

WEAPONS TO DISCOURAGE ATTACKS, IT HAS NOT ENUNCIATED CLEARLY ITS

VIEWS ON DETERRENCE, AND WE DO NOT KNOW HOW THESE VIEWS WILL

AFFECT IRAQI DECISIONS TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. IRAQI MILITARY

COMMANDERS DO NOT APPEAR TO VIEW BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WITH THE SAME

REVULSION AS WESTERNERS AND, GIVEN THEIR USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,

PROBABLY HAVE NO RELIGIOUS OR PERSONAL QUALMS ABOUT USING ANY

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.



IRAQ'S CLAIMS THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MAY

CONVEY BAGHDAD'S OWN VIEW THAT ITS CURRENT BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

CAPABILITIES LACK STRATEGIC REACH OR ARE MILITARILY

INSIGNIFICANT. BAGHDAD HAS PURSUED THE CREATION OF A STRATEGIC

FORCE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, IN PART, AS A DEFENSIVE

MEASURE AGAINST ATTACKS BY HOSTILE NEIGHBORS, SUCH AS IRAN,

ISRAEL, AND SYRIA. IN NEARLY ALL CASES, IRAQ HAS ANNOUNCED OR

DISPLAYED OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS TO MAXIMIZE THEIR

DETERRENT VALUE, A PRACTICE SADDAM AND FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ

AZIZ HAVE ASSERTED IS IRAQI POLICY.1



THE SIZE OF IRAQ'S INVENTORY WOULD ALSO AFFECT IRAQI

DECISIONS ON WHETHER OR NOT TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN EITHER A

STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL ROLE. WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ PROBABLY HAS

SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF BIOLOGICALLY FILLED AERIAL BOMBS AND

ARTILLERY ROCKETS THAT COULD SUPPORT AN IRAQI DECISION TO USE

THESE WEAPONS AGAINST OPPOSING GROUND FORCES. THE NUMBER OF

BIOLOGICALLY FILLED AERIAL BOMBS PROBABLY WOULD NOT SUPPORT A

DECISION TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AGAINST STRATEGIC TARGETS

BECAUSE BAGHDAD PROBABLY HAS DOUBTS ABOUT ITS ABILITY TO DELIVER

THEM WITH ANY SYSTEM OTHER THAN ITS SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES.







ALTHOUGH ONLY SMALL AMOUNTS OF AGENT

ARE NEEDED TO HAVE A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT IMPACT, BAGHDAD MIGHT

NOT USE BIOLOGICAL MISSILES UNTIL IT WAS CERTAIN THAT ENOUGH WERE

AVAILABLE FOR INITIAL AND FOLLOW-ON ATTACKS.



MILITARY-POLITICAL UTILITY. WE BELIEVE THE IRAQI DECISION TO

INITIATE USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WOULD DEPEND ON SADDAM'S

DETERMINATION THAT THEIR EMPLOYMENT WOULD PROVIDE SOME BENEFIT

AND NOT BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN THE SHORT TERM OR IMPOSE ANY

LONG-TERM COSTS.2 AS DEMONSTRATED BY ITS AIR AND MISSILE ATTACKS

ON IRANIAN CITIES, BAGHDAD VIEWS CONCENTRATIONS OF CIVILIANS AS

VIABLE TARGETS FOR A TERROR CAMPAIGN TO UNDERMINE SUPPORT FOR

THEIR GOVERNMENT. IRAQ, HOWEVER, DID NOT DELIBERATELY USE

CHEMICALS AGAINST IRANIAN CIVILIANS, PROBABLY BECAUSE ANY GAINS

IN SAPPING IRANIAN MORALE WOULD HAVE BEEN OFFSET BY LOSS OF

NEEDED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR BAGHDAD'S POSITION IN THE WAR.

IN THE CURRENT CRISIS, IRAQ MIGHT BE SIMILARLY CONSTRAINED. FOR

EXAMPLE, BAGHDAD MIGHT BE HESITANT TO CONTAMINATE ANY PARTS OF

SAUDI ARABIA WITH BIOLOGICAL AGENTS FOR FEAR THAT MUSLIMS AROUND

THE WORLD MIGHT VIEW SUCH AN ACT AS DESECRATION OF THEIR HOLY

LAND.



RETALIATION. FEAR OF US CONVENTIONAL OR UNCONVENTIONAL

RETALIATION-

MAY INITIALLY RESTRAIN BAGHDAD FROM USING

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DURING THE CURRENT CRISIS. IRAQ HAS NO

EXPERIENCE IN FIGHTING AN ENEMY CAPABLE OF EQUIVALENT OR GREATER

RETALIATION IN RESPONSE TO THE USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL

AGENTS. TWO MEDIATED AGREEMENTS BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN TO

END BOMBING AND MISSILE CAMPAIGNS IN 1984 AND 1985 SUGGEST IRAQ



1 SINCE 1987, IRAQ HAS ANNOUNCED ALL OF ITS STRATEGIC SYSTEMS          THE OPERATIONAL

SYSTEMS INCLUDE THE AL HUSAYN AND AL ABBAS MISSILES AND BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

ALTHOUGH IRAQ REFUSED TO CONFIRM ITS POSSESSION OF

CHEMICAL WEAPONS THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, THESE WERE PRIMARILY

TACTICAL WEAPONS. DIPLOMATIC CONSIDERATIONS PLAYED A PART

IN IRAQ'S EQUIVOCATIONS, BUT BAGHDAD MAY HAVE BELIEVED THAT, LACKING A RELIABLE

LONG-RANGE DELIVERY SYSTEM, THE DECLARATION OF ITS CHEMICAL

WEAPONS INVENTORY WOULD HAVE HAD LITTLE, IF ANY, STRATEGIC DETERRENT EFFECT.

2 AN EXCEPTION MIGHT BE AN IN EXTREMIS SITUATION WHERE SADDAM OR HIS SUCCESSORS

SOUGHT REVENGE AGAINST ENEMIES PREPARING TO OVERWHELM THE REGIME.



CAN BE DETERRED FROM USING SOME OF ITS WEAPON SYSTEMS IF ITS

OPPONENT IS ABLE TO STRIKE BACK FORCEFULLY.





SADDAM AND THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS



ALTHOUGH MOST IRAQI OFFICIALS PROBABLY HAVE NO RELIGIOUS OR

PERSONAL COMPUNCTIONS ABOUT USING ANY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

IN DEFENSE OF THEIR COUNTRY, SADDAM HUSAYN WOULD BE ESPECIALLY

UNFALTERING IN CONSIDERING A RESORT TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

SADDAM IS COLD-BLOODED, RUTHLESS, AND EXTREMELY PERSISTENT IN THE

PURSUIT OF HIS LONG-TERM GOALS, IN OUR JUDGMENT. ALTHOUGH SADDAM

PROBABLY WOULD NOT ORDER THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE

EARLY DAYS OF CONFLICT, IF THE WAR GOES BADLY FOR HIM HE MAY

DECIDE TO USE THESE WEAPONS.



OUR ASSESSMENT OF SADDAM'S ATTITUDES TOWARD BIOLOGICAL

WARFARE IS BASED ON OBSERVATIONS OF HIS LIFE WHICH INDICATE HE

HAS A STABLE PERSONALITY AND IS A RATIONAL, CALCULATING

DECISIONMAKER WHO WOULD NOT USE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

IMPULSIVELY. ALTHOUGH HIS POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS VARY

FROM PRAGMATIC TO UNPREDICTABLE, WE JUDGE THAT FOR THE MOST PART

THEY ARE CALCULATED TO ENHANCE IRAQ'S AND HIS OWN POSITION.

FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT SUGGESTS HE SUFFERS FROM

ANY MENTAL ILLNESS.



ALTHOUGH SADDAM DOES NOT ACT RECKLESSLY, HE APPEARS

COMFORTABLE WIELDING ABSOLUTE POWER, USING NAKED FORCE, AND

TAKING CALCULATED RISKS. VIEWING THE WORLD AS THREATENING AND

UNDEPENDABLE, SADDAM IS WARY, OPPORTUNISTIC, AND RELIES ALMOST

SOLELY ON HIMSELF. AT TIMES, SADDAM'S SENSE OF MISSION APPEARS

TO TAINT HIS JUDGMENT, AND THIS, COMBINED WITH HIS PROPENSITY

TOWARD ISOLATED DECISIONMAKING AND IGNORANCE OF THE WEST, COULD

CAUSE HIM TO MISJUDGE THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OR CONSEQUENCES OF

HIS ACTIONS.





CIRCUMSTANCES FOR USE



IRAQ PROBABLY WOULD INITIATE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ONLY IN

EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS USE WOULD BE MOST

LIKELY IF SADDAM AND THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP BELIEVED BAGHDAD WERE

ABOUT TO BE ATTACKED BY NUCLEAR -WEAPONS OR IF GROUND OPERATIONS

WERE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZING THE REGIME. AIR STRIKES ON THE

PRESIDENTIAL PALACE OR BAGHDAD-AREA COMMAND POSTS--WHICH SADDAM

PROBABLY WOULD PERCEIVE AS ATTEMPTS ON HIS LIFE--MIGHT PROVOKE A

RETALIATORY ATTACK. SUCH A DECISION PROBABLY WOULD REST ON

SADDAM'S ASSESSMENT OF HIS OVERALL MILITARY AND POLITICAL

SITUATION AND WOULD LIKELY INVOLVE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS BEFORE

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. IN A LEAST LIKELY WORST CASE, BIOLOGICAL

WEAPONS MIGHT BE USED IN REVENGE DURING THE DEATH THROES OF THE

REGIME. IN SUCH AN SITUATION, HOWEVER, IRAQI OFFICIALS MIGHT

DISREGARD SADDAM'S INSTRUCTIONS.







STRATEGIC USE. WE BELIEVE THAT BAGHDAD IS MORE LIKELY TO USE

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN A STRATEGIC ROLE AS A TERROR WEAPON AGAINST

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TARGETS THAN TACTICALLY AGAINST ENEMY

GROUND FORCES. IRAQ, HOWEVER, WOULD PROBABLY HOLD ITS BIOLOGICAL

WEAPONS IN RESERVE AS AN ESCALATORY OPTION TO DETER ADDITIONAL

STRIKES FROM AN OPPONENT OR TO LAUNCH ITS OWN SEVERE RETALIATION.

EXPLICIT THREATS OR THE ACTUAL EMPLOYMENT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

AGAINST CIVILIAN OR STRATEGIC MILITARY TARGETS MIGHT BE USED AS A

LAST RESORT TO SHOCK AN OPPONENT INTO PROVIDING AN OPENING FOR A

POLITICAL RESOLUTION.



IF BAGHDAD DECIDES TO USE UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AGAINST

STRATEGIC TARGETS, ITS CHOICE OF BIOLOGICAL INSTEAD OF CHEMICAL

AGENTS PROBABLY WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE GREATER AREA COVERAGE

THEORETICALLY PROVIDED BY BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS OR BOMBS. IRAQI

OPTIONS FOR DELIVERY INCLUDE SURFACE-TO-SURFARCE MISSILES,

AIRCRAFT, AND COVERT DISSEMINATION, BUT BAGHDAD PROBABLY WOULD

USE MISSILES AS ITS PRIMARY MEANS BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY IN

INTERCEPTING THESE WEAPONS.



TACTICAL USE. WE BELIEVE IRAQ IS LESS LIKELY TO USE BIOLOGICAL

WEAPONS IN TACTICAL SITUATIONS. BEFORE EMPLOYING BIOLOGICAL

WEAPONS IN TACTICAL SITUATIONS BAGHDAD PROBABLY WOULD EXHAUST

CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS OPTIONS. BECAUSE IRAQ'S

CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALMOST CERTAINLY SERVE BAGHDAD'S POTENTIAL

TACTICAL NEEDS, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROBABLY WOULD BE USED ONLY AS

A LAST-DITCH MEASURE TO STOP A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION THREATENING

TO TOPPLE THE REGIME. BARRING SUCH AN EXTREME SITUATION, BAGHDAD

MIGHT BE HESITANT--AT LEAST IN THE NEAR-TERM--TO USE UNTESTED AND

UNWIELDY BIOLOGICAL AGENTS. EVEN MASSIVE DELIVERIES OF AGENTS

NOW AVAILABLE OFFER FEW, IF ANY, ADVANTAGES OVER THE TACTICAL USE

OF IRAQ'S BATTLE-TESTED NERVE AGENTS, ALTHOUGH THE THRESHOLD FOR

TOXIC AGENTS WOULD BE LOWER THAN FOR INFECTIOUS AGENTS. IN

ADDITION, WE BELIEVE THE IRAQIS WOULD BE WARY OF CONTAMINATING

THEIR OWN SOIL (POSSIBLY INCLUDING KUWAIT) WITH BIOLOGICAL

AGENTS, PARTICULARLY ANTHRAX.



COVERT USE. COVERT DISSEMINATION BY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES OR

BY TERRORISTS IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY, IN OUR JUDGMENT, BECAUSE OF THE

DIFFICULTY IN CONTROLLING THESE FORCES AND THE LIKELIHOOD THAT

SADDAM WOULD WANT TO RETAIN TIGHT CONTROL OF THESE SPECIAL

WEAPONS FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. WE CANNOT RULE OUT THAT BAGHDAD

MAY HAVE CONTINGENCY PLANS TO USE BIOLOGICAL AGENTS COVERTLY.

BOTULINUM TOXIN AND, TO A LESSER DEGREE, ANTHRAX BACTERIA







MOREOVER, IN. SEPTEMBER IRAQI RADIO

THREATENED POSSIBLE COVERT RETALIATORY ATTACKS, SAYING "IRAQIS

WILL TAKE THE WAR INTO THE CITIES OF THE ATTACKING NATION, IF IT

IS ATTACKED".



WE BELIEVE CONCERNS ABOUT RELIABILITY OF THIS METHOD OF

DELIVERY AND CONCERN OVER CONTROL OF THE AGENT WOULD DETER

BAGHDAD. INFLITRATING IRAQI SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES TO CONDUCT

"STRATEGIC" ATTACKS BY COVERTLY DISSEMINATING BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

AGAINST STRATEGIC TARGETS SUCH AS SAUDI OIL FACILITIES OR CENTCOM

HEADQUARTERS IN RIYADH WOULD POSE SERIOUS PLANNING, CONTROL,

SECURITY, AND TIMING PROBLEMS FOR BAGHDAD. TERRORISTS BACKED BY

IRAQ FACE SIMILAR PROBLEMS, AND BAGHDAD PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE

ENOUGH CONFIDENCE IN SUCH GROUPS TO ENTRUST THEM WITH BIOLOGICAL

WEAPONS. MOREOVER, UNLESS FORCES WITH AGENT WERE ALREADY IN

POSITION, IRAQ, AFTER DECIDING TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, WOULD

NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE A TIMELY AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT RESPONSE.







RELEASE AUTHORITY



WE BELIEVE THAT SADDAM HUSAYN ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD

JEALOUSLY RETAIN THE RELEASE AUTHORITY FOR ALL OF IRAQ'S

STRATEGIC WEAPONS. MILITARY LEADERS, SUCH AS DEFENSE MINISTER

JABBURI AND CHIEF OF STAFF RASHID, ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD NEED

SADDAM'S APPROVAL TO ORDER THE EMPLOYMENT BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND MILITARY

INDUSTRIES HUSAYN KAMIL, FEW, IF ANY, SENIOR IRAQI CIVILIAN

LEADERS ARE LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED IN THE DECISION PROCESS, AND

NONE COULD ACT UNILATERALLY. BAGHDAD CLAIMS THAT CONTINGENCY

PLANS EXIST FOR THE WARTIME DELEGATION OF RELEASE AUTHORITY TO

THE MILITARY FOR MISSILES, AND, IF TRUE, THESE PLANS MAY INCLUDE

ANY BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARHEADS IN IRAQ'S INVENTORY. THIS

AUTHORIZATION, HOWEVER, MIGHT NOT OPERATE AUTOMATICALLY BECAUSE

SADDAM'S ABSENCE--WHETHER DUE TO DEATH OR LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS-

-WOULD POSSIBLY SPARK A FIGHT FOR POWER OR AT LEAST GREAT

UNCERTAINTY.



IF SADDAM DECIDED TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TACTICALLY, HE

PROBABLY WOULD BE MORE FLEXIBLE WITH THE RELEASE AUTHORITY.

DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, FOR EXAMPLE, SADDAM DELEGATED THE

RELEASE AUTHORITY FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO HIS

CORPS COMMANDERS. A SIMILAR DELEGATION DURING FUTURE HOSTILITIES

IS LIKELY AND MIGHT INCLUDE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.







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