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File: 980227_sep96_decls1_0002.txt
Box ID = BX005618
Folder Title = AFTER ACTION REPORT 403D MP PW CAMP
Unit = MISC
Parent Org = MISC
AFKB-AC-CA 2 April 1991
SUBJECT: After Action Repart7 403rd MP PW Camp
through the United States Army Correctional Brigade. The most significant
problem encountered at MOB Station involved the shipment of equipment. The
403rd received notification the evening of 11 December that all mission
essential equipment had to be loaded by 14 December. The equipment was to
be shipped by rail on 15 December to the Port of Houston with lst INF DIV
equipment.
b. The equipment was to be transported via ship to Saudi Arabia.
Estimated departure date was 17 December with a mid-January ETA in Saudi
Arabia. The timeline described above represented a change. Instead of the
week to load equipment we had expected, we only had three days. The
loading was accomplished on time; the equipment arrived at the Port of
Houston an schedule but sat in port -For over a month. The 403rd was in
Saudi Arabia before our mission essential equipment even left Houston.
This equipment included all vehicles, generators and water buffalos. The
fact'that we did not have this equipment significantly hampered both the
units ability to move to the EPW site and its ability to accomplish the
mission. Although we were able to work around this equipment problem, it
diverted time and effort that could have otherwise been directed toward
mission and resulted in delays that could have been critical to mission
accomplishment.
C. A second problem encountered at MOB Station was lack of
communication with both the eOOth MP Brigade and subordinate units. Prior
to mobilization the 403rd was Capstaned to the 300th MP Brigade.
Immediately upon notification of pending activation two officers from the
403rd, the S-3 and an Enclosure Commander, were assigned as liaison to the
800th. These liaison officers arrived in country on 10 December 1990.
HoweverI communications with both the lidison officers and the BOOth were
infrequent and unschedulable. This made planning beyond MOB Station
difficult. This was a particular problem for the S-4 who didn't know what
to order, what was available in country, what the 800th was planning to
provide, etc. None of the nine subordinate units assigned to the 403rd
were in its premobilized Capstane trace. One of the subordinate units, the
346th Escort Guard Company, also mobilized at Fort Riley, but communication
with the other units was difficult. All units were given mission guidance
and their readiness monitored. However, lack of dependable information
regarding the mission and lack of good communications resulted in
inefficient use of valuable MOB Station training time.
d. The mission given to the 403rd was to establish and operate an EPW
camp for up to 12,000 EPW and, upon order, be ready to expand the camp to
hold 24,000 EPW. When the 403rd arrived in Saudi Arabia on 15 January an
EPW site had been selected but construction had not begun. Therefore, the
403rd immediately starting planning for the construction of an EPW camp.
The MTOE under which the 403rd is organized is configured to maintain an
existing EPW facility. Prior to mobilization the 403rd had been assigned a
CONUS EPW mission. Construction of a camp at a remote field site was a
task for which the 403rd was neither well equipped nor well trained. In
spite of a lack of preparation and training, construction of the camp by
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