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File: 123096_sep96_decls21_0005.txt
Subject: AFTER ACTION REPORT ODS 14JUN91
Unit: 22D SUPCOM
Parent Organization: ARCENT
Box ID: BX005555
Folder Title: 1ST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP
Document Number: 2
Folder Seq #: 1
The Group concept functioned well enough during the
build-up and draw down activities but was most valuable from the
latter part of February through the end of April. I could move
teams and units wherever needed most. At one point only three
teams were left in the F-AC area. All the rest were north of the
Tapline Road supporting one of the Corps or Task Force Freedom
clearing Kuwait. I could anticipate requirements and react
quickly to emergencies without the approval/acquiescence of the
Corps or other organizations detachments were supporting.
This was important because the Corps, Divis,-'ons, and
Brigades had very little understanding of what EOD could or
should be doing for them. Having EOD around on a just in
case/contingency basis was the norm for them. on numerous
instances organizations demanded EOD support then placed it in a
stand-by mode; requested validation of decisions already made;
placed EOD in limited advisory roles or ignored them. Best
example occurred in April when VII Corps requested five
additional units be attached to them despite the fact they were
not using all of the seven units already dedicated to them.
operations in Saudi Arabia tended to be very much like
USAREUR. The Corps felt free to ignore ARCENT and the Divisions
in turn ignored instructions from Corps. Within each Division
directives could be tightly enforced but even then differences
between Brigades and Battalions could cause coordination
problems. An action coordinated at the ARCENT or Corps level
would disappear several times before reaching the working level.
There were significant differences between VIIth and XVIII
Corps and the way EOD was employed with each. VIIth Corps was
much richer and heavier with more equipment a-id most of the
combat power. XVIII Corps started light, stayed light, and
maneuvered in the western portion of the battle against lighter
opposition spread over a greater area.
Major Poole ( 512th EODCT - Vllth Corps) placed his units
in a traditional manner, based them in rear areas and sent them
forward as required. Major Zeucjner (543rd EODCT - XVIII Corps)
sent units much further forward with maneuver elements. I cannot
determine any cause and effect relationship but all the
casualties incurred by Ist EOD Group came from the 543rd EODCT.
The 512th and the 542nd did not have any. In addition to Major
Zeugner's death there were three individuals who received minor
frag wounds and one serious traffic accident involving three
individuals.
2
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Document 14 f:/Week-46/BX005555/1ST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP/after action report ods 14jun91:121796111636108
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-46
Box ID = BX005555
Unit = 22D SUPCOM
Parent Organization = ARCENT
Folder Title = 1ST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP
Folder Seq # = 1
Subject = AFTER ACTION REPORT ODS 14JUN91
Document Seq # = 2
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996