COMMAND REPORT OPERATION DESERT STORM

File: 091896_aug96_decls15_0009.txt
Page: 0009
Total Pages: 19

Subject: COMMAND REPORT OPERATION DESERT STORM                           

Box  ID: BX000481

Document Number:          1

Folder Title: COMMAND REPORTS  803D MEDICAL GROUP COMMAND REPORT                                              

Folder Seq #:         20

Unit: ARCENT      

Parent Organzation: CENTCOM     










            Brigade) was unable to react quickly to provide guards to Med
            Base America or to provide guards to go with patients on TAC
            flights.
            (5) Transport of EPW's to  and from the camp as well as
            transfer of EPW's to other medical facilities.

        These problems eased as the MP Brigade and supporting MP
        Battalions came on line. Some  degree of stability was established
        by the end of the second week.

        Translators. No translators were available until two weeks after
        the first EPW patient was treated by the Group.

        Transfer to Saudi Control. Almost two weeks were required before
        the Saudi officials at thi KKMC MODA Hospital were instructed by
        their chain to assume the EPW treatment/evacuation mission. No
        assistance was provided by the 800th MP's to assist in the transfer
        of responsibility from American to Saudi control at this time.
        Hospital Plan@ ing, The number of hospital beds in this location
        proved surtiozent tor total admissions to date of approximately
        2200 patients. Except for short stay beds required at the EPW Camp,
        the 540 minimal care beds in our Evae Hospitals were not required.
        However, more critical care and intermediate care beds and staffing
        were needed.
             The adaptation of the staff from an Evao Hospital into a fixed
        host nation facility was not a good match. A TDA hospital staff
        would probably have been more effective.
        Civilians. The MEDCOM OPORD had prepared us to cope with civilians
        on y secondarily (see Figure c). Iraqi civilians posed some medical
        problems since the hospitals did not have pediatricians, pediatric
        nurses or medical supplies. Early on, no one knew how to discharge
        a recovered civilian or where to send those who required additional
        long-term care.
        KRO. Sub-area I JMRO had difficulty communicating with the corps
   @O s repeatedly because they initially did not get communications
        equipment and later because of equipment malfunctions. Some forward
        dep@oyed units perhaps frustrated by poor communications with their
        medical brigade MRO'S, simply evacuated patients unregulated.
             inexperienced PAD personnel often did not understand medical
        terminology and confused messages as a result.
             Physicians and nurses did not understand the medical
        regulating system. They failed to properly use Form 602 and
        failed to request the level/location of care most appropriate for
        the patient.



          INFORMATION AVAILABLE DURING THE PLANNING PHASE AND THEN GAINED

        1. Good planning was hampered by contradictory estimates of
        anticipated casualties that would arrive at IIKMC, ranging from

Document 19 f:/Week-32/BX000481/COMMAND REPORTS 803D MEDICAL GROUP COMMAND REPORT/command report operation desert storm:09139616130233
Control Fields 17
File Room = aug96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-32
Box ID = BX000481
Unit = ARCENT
Parent Organization = CENTCOM
Folder Title = COMMAND REPORTS 803D MEDICAL GROUP COMMAND REPORT
Folder Seq # = 20
Subject = COMMAND REPORT OPERATION DESERT STORM
Document Seq # = 33
Document Date =
Scan Date = 14-AUG-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 13-SEP-1996