TASK FORCE III DESERT SHIELD/STORM

File: aaacf_164.txt
Page: 164
Total Pages: 273
flexibility of the current system, including PACs ability to exercise the decision 
making authority regarding patient movement requirements and how best to respond. In 
addition, casualty estimates have been determined to exceed the capability of APES, 
causing system failure and reverting the PAC back to manual mission management. The 
use of Charleston and McGuire as recovery stations for retro C-141 AE missions would 
require a limited detachment function at those areas. Veterans Administration bed 
availability is based on saturation of DoD beds per Congressional mandate, therefore, 
incoming airflow should not be based on VA bed availability. Centralization of CONUS 
AE at the PAC is imperative to ensure coordination of resources, swift and efficient 
patient movement, and for determination of need. Augmentation of existing manpower at 
the detachments is needed to manage the increase in AE missions. There is no 
requirement for an AECE at Norton AFB with the current detachment located at Travis 
AFB. 
 
		(3) Recommended Action: a. Maintain the existing CONUS AE system to 
redistribute casualties to allow for PAC to exercise decision-making authority 
regarding best use of the system. Recommended Action Office: HQ MAC/SGX and 375 
MAW/AK. b. Expand the APES system to enable processing of expected numbers of 
casualties. Recommended Action Office: HQ MAC/SGAM. c. Maintain a centralized command 
and control from the PAC to include mission planning, patient manifesting and mission 
controlling. Recommended Action Office: 375 MAW/AK. 
 
10. Commanders Summary. Overall, I am very proud of the way the CONUS AE personnel, 
both active duty and Air Reserve Components, rose to this challenge. Numerous hours 
went into the planning and execution of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. As indicated 
earlier, there are many questions that need-to be addressed at our level as well as 
the HQ MAC level. There are some general comments that must be further emphasized: 
 
	a. The selection of C-130 aircrews and medical crews from different locations 
caused unnecessary hardship. HQ MAC must choose co-located units for ease of 
deployment and employment. 
 
	b. All ASFs and AECEs must participate under the same guidelines. This did not 
happen at Kelly AFB. HQ ATC developed a Casualty Reception Plan that completely 
disregarded the movement and regulatory systems. 
 
	c. Since MSC officers are a very small portion of the Corps, more active duty 
MSC officers should receive training in AK. This could be accomplished by detailing 
MSC officers assigned to the Scott AFB medical center to work for 6 months in the PAC. 
In addition, there are a number of facilities that have an overage of MSC officers, 
this could be a place to draw upon to get personnel specialized training in AK. 
 
	d. Communications is the cornerstone of any operation. We