[1] An acronym listing/glossary is at Tab A.
[2] Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, May 1, 1996, Presidential Advisory Committee.
[3] Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, May 7, 1997, to the Presidential Advisory Committee.
[4] Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, December 1996, Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee of the House of Representatives.
[5] Testimony of Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, November 18, 1993, Hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
[6] Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Name Deleted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm. Finding 36, 1st MEF, USMC, 22 Feb 1994.
[7] This same event was referenced in the Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DOD (U), Chapter 11, Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release, Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report, p. 26. In this report, this event was referenced in Appendix A as three different events: Event 36, 37 and 39. These three events are actually the same singular Fox alert discussed in this narrative.
[8] Persian Gulf Special Summary, September 1990, CIA. p. 8.
[9] Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq's Capability and Posturing, Defense Intelligence Agency, undated (but prewar), p. 3.
[10] Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq's Capability and Posturing, Defense Intelligence Agency, undated (but prewar), p. 3.
[11] The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, United Nations, New York, 1996, Document 189, p.656-657.
[12] Intelligence Report, Iraqis Prepositioned Chemical Munitions, ARCENT, March, 1991.
[13] Message from COMUSMARCENT - G-3, 0313592 Feb 91.
[14] Interview with MALS 16 Officer in Charge, Lead Sheet 5279.
[15] 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 49.
[16] 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 49.
[17] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead sheet 5325.
[18] 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 80.
[19] 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 97-98.
[20] 7th Marines Log. Log entry times for the Iraqi prisoner disclosures: 1643 and 1733 hours.
[21] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
[22] Described in the Glossary.
[23] Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Staff, Lead Sheet 5299.
[24] Interview with members of the 245th Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Detachment, U.S. Army, Lead Sheets 5156 and 5181.
[25] Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Staff, Lead Sheet 5299.
[26] Description of M256A1 in Glossary.
[27] Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Staff and Executive Officer, Lead Sheets 5299 and 5357.
[28] 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 89.
[29] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead sheet 5325.
[30] Interview with Task Force Grizzly Commander, Lead Sheet 5354.
[31] 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 94.
[32] 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 90.
[33] 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 90.
[35] Command Chronology of the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion.
[36] "Ripper" goes to MOPP -4, with permission of the US Marine Corps Historical Center, Artist Col. Avery Cheneweth, USMCR.
[37] 3rd Tank Logs.
[38] Interviews with the 3rd Tank Battalion Commander, logistician (S-4) and NBC officer, Lead Sheets 3873, 5358, 5273.
[39] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
[40] Attempts to discuss this matter with those in the resupply train of Task Force Ripper have not resulted in additional knowledge of this alert. Interviews with Task Force Ripper NBC Staff and 3rd Tank S-4, Lead sheets 5337, 5273.
[41] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer and 3rd Tank Battalion NBC Officer, Lead Sheets 5325, 5358.
[42] For a better understanding of the Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle, see the Fox Information Paper.
[43] Interviews with Fox 5604 Crew, Lead Sheets 5359, 5353, 5391 and Interview with GySgt Grass, February 1997, p.11.
[44] Interview with Fox 5604 driver, Lead Sheets 5353, 5359.
[45] Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p.12.
[46] Because the minimum detectable amount is calculated from the background and backgrounds vary-dependent on environmental and atmospheric conditions-the minimum detectable amounts will vary. The sensitivities listed in Table 2 are relevant only for the specific conditions they were calculated from.
[47] At this level unprotected personnel would experience moderate to severe symptoms from Sarin before the MM-1 would alert.
[48] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects; June 1994 Table 18.
[49] For more information on the Fox vehicle, please refer to the Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle Information Paper.
[50] Interviews with Fox 5604 Crew, Lead Sheets 5359, 5353, 5391, 5336 and Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p.19.
[51] Interviews with Fox 5604 Crew, Lead Sheets 5359, 5353, 5391, 5336 and Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p.19. Driver Statement to 1994 Marine Corps Investigation, p. 3 of Lead Sheet 5353.
[52] Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p.21. GySgt Grass says he reported the alert to the 3rd Tank NBC Officer, but both the 3rd Tank and Ripper NBC Officers remember him reporting to Ripper while 3rd Tanks NBC Officer was monitoring. Lead Sheets 5325, 5358.
[53] Interview with Fox 5604 Crew, Lead Sheets 5359, 5353, 5391, 5336.
[54] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
[55] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
[56] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
[57] 3rd Tank Bn Logs.
[58] Some agents types such as nerve and blister will be detected within 15 minutes, but to ensure no CWA (including blood agent types) are present, the test should be run to its conclusion. The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects, June, 1994, p. 35.
[59] Interview with Task Force Ripper and 3rd Tank NBC Officers, Lead Sheets 5325, 5358.
[60] 3rd Tank Bn Logs.
[61] Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p. 22-25.
[62] There are pre-war reports that Iraq possessed "Dusty Mustard"-a powder form of Mustard -but this CWA was not found by UNSCOM after the war. The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, United Nations, New York, 1996, Document 189, p.656-657.
[63] FM 3-100, NBC Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 17 Sept. 1985.
[64] See also the Fox Vehicle Information Paper for further discussion and examples of Fox tapes.
[65] Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p. 29. See also the ASP/Orchard Case Narrative.
[66] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
[67] Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Officer and Fox MM-1 operator, Lead Sheets 5274 and 5310.
[68] Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5274.
[69] Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5274.
[70] Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p. 28.
[71] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
[72] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
[74] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
[75] Interview with Grizzly Commander, Lead Sheet 5354.
[76] Description of the M-8 Detection Paper found in the Glossary.
[77] EOD Situation Report for the period 23 February 1991 through 31 March 1991, MALS-16, 10 April 1991, enclosure 1 and enclosure 3.
[78] Interview with MALS-16 Officer in Charge, Lead Sheet 5279.
[79] Interviews with EOD Technicians from the 1st and 2nd Platoons, Lead Sheets 5277, 5278, 5296, 5331, 5390.
[80] Ordnance destroyed in SWA, NAVEODTECHEN, 1997. Note, Table A shows all USMC ordnance found to be unfit for transport back to the U.S. and destroyed in place as well as some foreign ordnance on the bottom of this list.
[81] Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait, IIR 7 7171 0082 97, Defense Intelligence Agency, June 1997.
[82] Statement by Mr. Igor Mitrokhin, UN Special Commission, to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29, 1997.
[83] The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, United Nations, New York, 1996, Document 189, p.656-657.
[84] Ibid. p.656-657.
[85] ASP/Orchard Investigation.
[86] Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), Volume II, Effects and Effectiveness, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, p.109.
[87] Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm' - Update. Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225.
[88] This was confirmed in a statement by Mr. Charles Duefler, UN Special Commission, to the Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC) on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29, 1997. Major Cross of the PAC asked, "Do you see any evidence where any weapons were moved from the three lower depots, actually down into Kuwait, maybe brought back at some time?" Mr. Duefler answered, "We have seen no evidence of that and Iraqis have said that no movements took place other than what is described here." Mr. Duefler was referring to movements of munitions to and from the depots near Baghdad and the three lower depots, of which the southernmost (and closest to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) was Khamisiyah.
[89] DIA Answers to Questions from OSAGWI , Undated, 1997.
[90] Analysis of MM-1 Data, Bruker DALTRONICS, 15 July 1997.
[91] Summary of MM-1 Spectra, U.S. Army Chemical Biological Defense Command, 15 Feb 1994.
[92] Interview with CBDCOM Expert, Lead Sheet 748.
[93] Interviews with Fox #5604 Crew, Lead Sheets 5359, 5391, 5353; GySgt Grass Interview, February 1997, p. 18.
[94] Interview with CBDCOM Expert, Lead Sheet 748.
[95] Interviews with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead sheet 5325.
[96] Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Name Deleted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm. Finding 36, 1st MEF, USMC, 22 Feb 1994.
[97] "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 States and ratified by 93 States (as of June 1997). It was signed by the U.S. on Jan 13, 1993 and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the Convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. [http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/chemical.htm]
[100] Command Chronology of the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion.
[101] 11th Marines Chronology.
[102] 11th Marines War Journal.
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