February 16, 2001

Many veterans of the Gulf War have expressed concern that their unexplained illnesses may result from their experiences in that war. In response to veterans’ concerns, the Department of Defense established a task force in June 1995 to investigate those incidents and circumstances relating to possible causes. The Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses assumed responsibility for these investigations on November 12, 1996. Effective July 26, 2000, this office became the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments, with continued responsibility for Gulf War issues.

Case Narratives are reports of what we know today about specific events that took place during the Gulf War of 1990 and 1991. This report addresses the possibility that Gulf War veterans may have been exposed to mustard agent released as a result of Coalition air strikes at the Ukhaydir Ammunition Storage Depot located in Iraq. Our investigation to learn what happened at Ukhaydir during the Gulf War was an effort to determine if mustard agent could have been released and, if so, how much. The narrative was initially published on July 27, 2000. Since that time, the Office of the Special Assistant has not received any new information on the material presented, nor have any additional leads developed to change the narrative’s assessments. Additionally, the Presidential Special Oversight Board reviewed the narrative and recommended that the Office of the Special Assistant republish it as final. This version responds to the Board’s recommendation, so this is a final report. However, if you believe you have information that may change this case narrative, please contact my office by calling:

Dale A. Vesser
Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses,
Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments
US Department of Defense
2000297-0000002 Ver. 2.0

I. METHODOLOGY

II. SUMMARY

III. NARRATIVE
    A. Background
     B. Iraq’s Chemical Weapons Disclosures and UNSCOM Inspections Related to Ukhaydir
          1. UNSCOM’s Role
          2. Iraq’s 1991 Disclosure
          3. UNSCOM’s 1991 Fallujah Proving Ground Inspection
          4. Iraq’s 1996 Disclosure
          5. UNSCOM’s 1997 Ukhaydir Inspection
          6. UNSCOM Accounting as of Spring 1997
     C. 1997 Damage Assessment of Air Strikes
          1. January 20, 1991
          2. February 13/14, 1991
     D. Modeling Efforts
          1. CIA’s Analysis of January 20, 1991, Storage Bunker Fire
          2. CIA’s Analysis of February 13/14, 1991, Strike of Munitions Stored on the Road
          3. DoD’s Analysis of February 13/14, 1991, Strike of Munitions Stored on the Road
               a. DoD’s Modeling Methodology
               b. DoD’s Modeling Results
     E. UNSCOM’s 1998 Ukhaydir Inspection
     F. CIA’s Reassessments
          1. February 1999 Letter
          2. October 1999 Letter
     G. Lessons Learned

IV. ASSESSMENT

TAB A - Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary

TAB B - Bibliography

TAB C - Methodology for Chemical Incident Investigation

TAB D - DoD’s Modeling

TAB E - How to Read the Hazard Area Maps

TAB F - How Unit Locations Were Determined

TAB G - Comparison of Preliminary and Follow-on Modeling for February Air Strike

TAB H - Changes in this Report

END NOTES

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