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An Introduction

Countering
the V-1 & V-2


Counter-Force in Desert Storm

Special Forces in Desert Storm

Scud Hunting:
An Assessment


Post-1990 Developments

Implications for
the Future
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent American-led military response provided contemporary western military commanders with their first experience of confronting an opponent with a proven record of using ballistic missiles. Although Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces deployed large numbers of theatre ballistic missiles in eastern Europe during the Cold War, they were nearly always seen as part of the overall Communist air and nuclear threat so there was little effort put into specifically countering them, except for modifications to the US-manufactured Patriot air defence missile to restore and enhance its limited capabilities as an ATBM system.

'Counter-force' was a term that was usually associated with limited nuclear war concepts, with US nuclear weapons being assigned to destroy Soviet strategic and theatre nuclear forces. Multiple nuclear missile strikes were planned to assure the destruction of both hardened and mobile Soviet ballistic missile forces. Few US military planners, however, seriously believed that a counter-force strike would destroy all the Soviet's nuclear weapons before they could retaliate.

In his bid for military domination of the Middle East, Iraq's Saddam Hussein devoted considerable effort into fielding ballistic missile forces. They provided a short cut to building up an air force with the capability of penetrating deep into the territory of his enemies, principally Iran and Israel. During the 1980 to 1988 war with Iran, the Iraqis fired a total of some 350 ballistic missiles of all types.

Iraq's Scud Force

To maintain and expand his missile stockpile Saddam Hussein ordered the building of an indigenous missile design, development and manufacturing infrastructure. By the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was able to deploy a force of Iraqi-modified extended-range versions of the Soviet designed R-17 missile (known as the SS-IC Scud B in NATO terminology) called the AI Hussein and the AI Abbas. Some 650 R-17 missiles and 36 MAZ launch vehicles were sold to Iraq by the Soviet Union.

By cannibalising R-17 Scud missiles and the indigenous production of some components, the Iraqis were able to build two extended range versions of the 300 km range R-17 - the AI Hussein or AI Hosseih - with a range of 600 to 650 km and the AI Abbas, or AI Hijarah, with a range of 750 km to 900 km. For simplicity's sake, all Iraqi-modified Scud missiles are hereafter refered to by the generic term "Scud".



An Introduction

Countering
the V-1 & V-2


Counter-Force in Desert Storm

Special Forces in Desert Storm

Scud Hunting:
An Assessment


Post-1990 Developments

Implications for
the Future
According to the US Department of Defense 1992 Report Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqis had built five fixed sites with 28 launchers in western Iraq threatening Israel by August 1990. More importantly, they had developed a force of mobile TELs using civilian heavy goods vehicles, called AI Waleeds and AI Nidals. Other vehicles, including fuel tankers and missile supply vehicles disguised as civilian buses, supported the missile firing units. The mobile launch units had gained much experience during the war with Iraq and they were able to set up and fire their missiles in less than 30 minutes, significantly less than the 90 minutes it took the Soviets to fire their own R-17 units. Chemical warheads had also been developed for the AI Husseins. Iraqi missile units regularly moved their firing locations, operating from urban areas, forested areas or hardened shelters at air bases.

Prior to the Gulf War, US intelligence was unable to come up with an accurate figure for the number of Scuds and TELs in the Iraqi inventory or the locations of mobile missile launchers. Coalition intelligence was only able to provide satellite images and intelligence on the fixed Scud bases in western Iraq. This situation was not to change very much during the Gulf War. Even the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors who toured Iraq to disarm them after the war were unable to come up with reliable figures for Iraqi missile holdings in spite of seizing large numbers of Iraqi military documents.



Copyright � CDISS Lancaster University, 1996

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